Wills v. Ferrandino

Citation830 F. Supp. 116
Decision Date13 August 1993
Docket NumberNo. 2:92CV00937(AHN).,2:92CV00937(AHN).
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
PartiesErika WILLS, et al. v. Vincent FERRANDINO, et al.

Lawrence W. Berliner, State of Conn., Office of Prot. & Adv. for the Handicapped, Hartford, CT, for plaintiffs.

Athan S. Mikalakos, Middlebury, CT, for defendants.

RULING ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

NEVAS, District Judge.

Erika Wills and her parents, Charles and Louise Wills, (collectively referred to as the "Willses") bring this action against the Waterbury Board of Education, Charles Joy, Foster Crawford, and Joseph Sullivan, individuals sued in their official capacities as Superintendents of Waterbury Public Schools, (collectively referred to as ("Waterbury") and individual members of State of Connecticut Board of Education, including Commissioner Vincent Ferrandino, who are also sued in their official capacities (collectively referred to as the "State"), pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Section 504), 29 U.S.C. § 794, and state special education laws, Conn.Gen.Stat. § 10-76a et seq. The Willses seek review of a recent decision by a state administrative hearing officer denying their request that Waterbury be compelled to provide Erika, a disabled person as defined by the IDEA, with an appropriate special education program in accordance with state and federal law. Currently pending is Waterbury's motion for reconsideration of the court's ruling denying its motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. For the reasons stated below, the court GRANTS Waterbury's motion for reconsideration and VACATES the earlier ruling on the motion to dismiss. After reconsideration, the court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Waterbury's motion to dismiss.

Background

Erika Wills received special education and related services from the Waterbury Public Schools throughout the 1990-91 and 1991-92 school years. As a local educational agency receiving certain federal funds, the Waterbury Public Schools are required to provide these services in compliance with certain provisions of the IDEA. In particular, the IDEA dictates that local educational agencies create or revise, on a yearly basis, an individualized educational program (IEP) tailored to the unique needs of each disabled child. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(5). Erika's parents attended meetings in an effort to assist in and monitor the design of an IEP suitable for her needs. The Willses, however, were ultimately dissatisfied with the IEP recommended for Erika.

Thereafter, the Willses requested a due process hearing before a state administrative hearing officer to contest the appropriateness of the IEP developed for Erika and to compel Waterbury to provide a compensatory education in accordance with state and federal law. After hearing evidence on the issue, a state hearing officer filed an initial decision on September 16, 1992 (the "initial decision"). On September 23, 1992, the hearing officer issued a second decision, consisting of approximately thirty pages of corrections of errors found in the initial decision (the "corrected decision"). A copy of the corrected decision was mailed to the Willses on September 23, and they received the copy on September 29, 1992.

In her corrected decision, the hearing officer noted that compensatory education could be awarded by a state agency in Connecticut. The hearing officer found, however, that the IEP provided Erika by Waterbury for the 1990-91 and 1991-92 academic years conformed to the requirements of federal and state laws. She concluded that Erika was not entitled to compensatory education for the years in issue. The Willses, moreover, were notified that they had 45-days from the mailing of the hearing officer's findings in which to file an appeal of the final decision.

On November 10, 1992, the Willses filed this federal action challenging the state hearing officer's findings and conclusions as set forth in the corrected decision. On December 7, 1992, Waterbury filed a motion to dismiss the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), Fed. R.Civ.P. Waterbury argued that the Willses failed to file the action within the applicable statute of limitations period. On May 6, 1993, the court denied the motion with the following endorsement ruling:

plaintiffs' appeal was filed November 10, 1992, forty-two (42) days after plaintiffs received the corrected, final administrative decision on September 29, 1992. Plaintiffs' appeal, therefore, was filed within the forty-five day statute of limitations period urged by the defendants. Accordingly, the court concludes that plaintiffs' appeal was timely filed under any of the proposed statute of limitations periods in this case. The court, however, offers no view as to what statute of limitations period it would employ in this action if it were forced to rule on the issue.

(See Filing No. 3, Endorsement Ruling (D.Conn. 5/6/93).) On May 17, 1993, Waterbury filed for reconsideration of the court's ruling pursuant to Rule 9(e)(1), R.Civ.P. (D.Conn.). On May 27, 1993, the Willses filed an objection to that motion. Accordingly, Waterbury's motion for reconsideration is now ripe.

DISCUSSION

In their motion for reconsideration, Defendants renew their attack on the court's subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), Fed.R.Civ.P. Specifically, Defendants argue that the Willses failed to file the action in compliance with the applicable statute of limitations and, therefore, the entire action must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

As a preliminary matter, the court notes that the complaint sets forth claims under Section 504 as well as the IDEA. Clearly, the alleged IDEA and Section 504 violations constitute distinct causes of action whose statute of limitations periods derive from different statutory provisions. Cf. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 with 29 U.S.C. § 794; see also Kampmeier v. Nyquist, 553 F.2d 296, 299 (2d Cir.1977) (recognizing a private right of action for disabled persons under Section 504). Accordingly, the court evaluates the sufficiency of the IDEA and Section 504 claims separately.

A. IDEA Claims

The IDEA was enacted in 1970 by Congress to ensure that children born with physical and mental disabilities were not denied the same educational opportunities commonly available to other children. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400(b)(3), 1414(a)(1)(C). Congress, however, failed to prescribe a specific statute of limitations period for the bringing of IDEA actions.

In general, a court interprets Congressional silence on a statute of limitations period as a directive to "apply the most closely analogous statute of limitations under state law," Del Costello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 158, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 2287, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983), provided that "it is not inconsistent with federal law or policy to do so." Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-67, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 1942, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985). In determining the most analogous state statute of limitations, moreover, the court considers the essential nature of the federal claim and the extent to which the proceedings provided under the respective state and federal causes of action are functionally equivalent. See generally, Flavin v. Connecticut State Bd. of Educ., 553 F.Supp. 827, 831 (D.Conn.1982) (citing Smith v. Perkin-Elmer Corp., 373 F.Supp. 930, 936 (D.Conn.1973) (Newman, J.)).

Applying these rules, this district has yet to settle on a precise statute of limitations period for actions brought under § 1415(e)(2) of the IDEA. Cf. Flavin, 553 F.Supp. at 831 (holding that an action filed 111 days after receipt of the State's final administrative decision was not untimely, but failing to specify a precise statute of limitations period). The court's first task, therefore, is to discern the applicable statute of limitations period for IDEA actions filed in the District of Connecticut.

1. Applicable Statute of Limitations Period

The statute of limitations issue in IDEA actions has produced a divergence of views among federal courts. Some courts have applied relatively short statute of limitations periods to IDEA claims brought pursuant to § 1415(e)(2). See, e.g., Amann v. Town of Stow, 991 F.2d 929 (1st Cir.1993) (30 days); Spiegler v. District of Columbia, 866 F.2d 461 (D.C.Cir.1989) (30 days); Adler v. Education Dept., 760 F.2d 454 (2d Cir.1985) (4 months); Department of Educ. v. Carl D., 695 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir.1983) (30 days); Bow School Dist. v. Quentin W., 750 F.Supp. 546 (D.N.H.1990) (30 days). Conversely, other courts have held that longer, multiple-year limitation periods are more appropriate analogues. See, e.g., Scokin v. Texas, 723 F.2d 432 (5th Cir.1984) (2 years); Tokarcik v. Forest Hills School Dist., 665 F.2d 443 (3rd Cir.1981) (2 or 6 years), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1121, 102 S.Ct. 3508, 73 L.Ed.2d 1383 (1982).

Here, defendants contend that the most analogous statute of limitations is the 45-day time period set forth in the Connecticut Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (UAPA), Conn.Gen.Stat. § 4-183(c). The court agrees.

In support of their argument, defendants offer the court a line of cases that adopt the limitations periods of their respective state administrative appeals provisions. See Amann, 991 F.2d at 932; Adler, 760 F.2d at 456-457; Bow School Dist., 750 F.Supp. at 550. Amann, is of particular interest to the court in this case.

In Amann, the First Circuit addressed the identical issue of whether the relatively short limitations period of the state's administrative appeal statute, or a longer, multi-year period should govern actions brought pursuant to § 1415(e)(2) of the IDEA. See 991 F.2d at 931. Amann noted that a court reviewing a state administrative decision under § 1415(e)(2) will rely heavily on the administrative record. Id. at 932. Ama...

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