Wilmington Medical Center, Inc. v. Bradford
Citation | 382 A.2d 1338 |
Parties | The WILMINGTON MEDICAL CENTER, INCORPORATED, Plaintiff, v. Joseph BRADFORD and Delaware Health Facilities Authority, Defendants. |
Decision Date | 16 January 1978 |
Court | United States State Supreme Court of Delaware |
Upon certification from Court of Chancery.
Rodney M. Layton and Wendell Fenton of Richards, Layton & Finger, Wilmington, for plaintiff, The Wilmington Medical Center.
Henry N. Herndon, Jr. and Edward M. McNally of Morris, James, Hitchens & Williams, Wilmington, for defendant, Joseph Bradford.
Richard L. McMahon of Potter, Anderson & Corroon, Wilmington, for defendant, Delaware Health Facilities Authority.
Before HERRMANN, C. J., and DUFFY and McNEILLY, JJ.
This certification from the Court of Chancery 1 originated in a declaratory judgment action brought to test the constitutionality of the Delaware Health Facilities Act, 16 Del.C. Ch. 97, (hereinafter "the Statute").
The certificate states the following undisputed facts:
The following additional facts appear in the application referred to in subparagraph (f) above:
Of the major hospitals in Wilmington, the Medical Center operates 1104 beds; the other 2 hospitals operate 100 and 267 beds respectively. Under "Plan Omega", the Medical Center proposes to construct a 758-bed hospital in Stanton and to modernize the present Delaware Division of the Center in Wilmington. Upon completion thereof, the Memorial and General Divisions in Wilmington would be vacated under the Plan. The cost of the project would exceed approximately $87 million; of this, about $16 million would be raised through private donations and the remainder would be financed by tax-exempt revenue bonds issued by the Delaware Health Facilities Authority under the Statute. 2 The Authority's bonds would be paid with the proceeds from repayment of a loan from the Authority to the Medical Center. This debt would be secured by a mortgage on the new Stanton Hospital and on the Delaware Division Hospital. As additional security, the Medical Center would pledge its "gross receipts" (defined basically as all receipts, less gifts limited to a specific purpose). The Medical Center would repay the debt to the Authority, principal and interest, in the same manner as the payments on the Authority's bonds are due. The Medical Center would indemnify the Authority for all its expenses.
The ability of the Medical Center to repay the debt incurred would depend on the revenues it derives for its services. In 1975, the State of Delaware supplied about 4% Of the Medical Center's $61,000,000 in operating income, i. e., over $2,400,000.
The following are the questions of law certified:
It is to be noted as a threshold observation that the defendant Bradford, 3 seeking to overthrow the Statute, has the burden of rebutting the presumption of validity and constitutionality with which every statute is cloaked. That burden has been summarized by this Court as follows, once the constitutional question has been determined to be "fairly debatable":
Justice v. Gatchell, Del.Supr., 325 A.2d 97, 102 (1974).
It is in the light of the foregoing criteria that each constitutional challenge presented here must be tested.
It is contended by Bradford that the title to the Statute (see 59 Del.L. Ch. 292) violated Del.Const. Art. II, § 16. 4 The title is:
"An Act to Amend Title 16, Delaware Code, by Adding a New Part IX Providing For a Delaware Health Facilities Authority."
First, it is argued that the Statute embraces subjects not expressed in its title in that Title 16 previously dealt almost entirely with controlling potential threats to public health and treating or aiding those in need of special health care; thus, the argument goes, the reader was mislead and deceived as to the nature of the Authority being created. In support of this...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Common Cause v. State
...as primary debtor. Some courts have explicitly limited such prohibitions to the state in the role of surety, Wilmington Medical Center v. Bradford, 382 A.2d 1338 (Del.1978) (alternative holding); Richards v. City of Muscatine, 237 N.W.2d 48 (Iowa 1975); Development Credit Corp. v. McKean, 2......
-
Helman v. State, 55, 2000.
...requires a measure of self-restraint upon courts sitting in review over claims of unconstitutionality. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc. v. Bradford, Del.Supr., 382 A.2d 1338, 1342 (1978). That restraint requires deference to legislative judgment in matters "fairly debatable." Id. Courts are ......
-
Fults v. City of Coralville, 02-1857.
...detrimental effect of a possible default upon the State's general reputation and credit rating." Wilmington Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Bradford, 382 A.2d 1338, 1349 (Del.1978). That is, the constitutional debt limitation provision of our constitution applies to legally enforceable obligations, not ......
-
Arcon Const. Co., Inc. v. South Dakota Cement Plant, s. 14139
...liability on cement enterprise contracts; any other constitutional provision to the contrary notwithstanding. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc. v. Bradford, 382 A.2d 1338 (Del.1978); Wisconsin Solid Waste Recycling Authority v. Earl, 70 Wis.2d 464, 235 N.W.2d 648 (1975); State ex rel. Warren ......