Wilmington Transportation Company v. Railroad Commission of California
| Decision Date | 01 February 1915 |
| Docket Number | No. 369,369 |
| Citation | 59 L.Ed. 508,35 S.Ct. 276,236 U.S. 151 |
| Parties | WILMINGTON TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, Plff. in Err., v. RAILROAD COMMISSION OF CALIFORNIA |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Messrs. Edward E. Bacon and James A. Gibson for plaintiff in error.
Messrs. Max Thelen, Douglas Brookman, and Allan P. Matthew for defendant in error.
The Wilmington Transportation Company, a corporation organized under the laws of the state of California, is engaged as a common carrier of passengers and goods by sea, between San Pedro, on the mainland, and Avalon, on Santa Catalina island, both places being within the county of Los Angeles, in that state. Merchants at Avalon, insisting that the rates charged for this transportation were unreasonable, presented their complaint to the railroad commission of the state of California, and asked that reasonable rates be fixed under the public utilities act of 1911. Stat. (Cal.) 1911, Ex. Sees. p. 18. The Transportation Company challenged the authority of the commission upon the ground that the business was subject exclusively to the regulating power of Congress. The commission overruled the contention, and its authority to prescribe reasonable rates between these ports of the state was sustained on writ of review by the state court. 166 Cal. 741, 137 Pac. 1153. The case has been brought here on error.
The vessels of the plaintiff in error, in their direct passage between the ports named, must traverse the high seas for upwards of 20 miles. Adopting the statement of the commission, the supreme court of the state puts the case thus:
Relying upon Lord v. Goodall, N. & P. S. S. Co. 102 U. S. 541, 26 L. ed. 224, the plaintiff in error contends that transportation over the high seas is 'commerce with foreign nations' in the constitutional sense. See Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 145 U. S. 192, 203, 36 L. ed. 672, 675, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 87, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 806; The Abby Dodge, 223 U. S. 166, 176, 56 L. ed. 390, 393, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 310. But if it be assumed for the present purpose that the power of Congress extends to the subject of this controversy, the fact remains that the power has not been exercised. The provisions of the Federal statutes relating to vessels do not go so far, and the Interstate Commerce Commission has not been authorized to prescribe rates for water transportation unconnected with transportation by railroad. 36 Stat. at L. 539, 545, chap. 309. In this aspect, the question is whether the mere existence of the Federal power, that is, while it is dormant, precludes the exercise of state authority to prevent exorbitant charges with respect to this traffic which has its origin and destination within the limits of the state.
It is urged that the fixing of rates is a regulation of the commerce involved, and hence, of necessity, is repugnant to the Federal authority, although the latter be unexercised. This proposition, however, as has frequently been pointed out, is too broadly asserted if no regard be had to the differences in the subject which, by virtue of the commerce clause, are within the control of Congress. Thus, vessels engaged in foreign commerce have been compelled to submit to state requirements as to pilotage and quarantine since the foundation of the government,
Comp.St. 1913, § 8563 although it could not be denied that these requirements were regulations which Congress could at any time displace. Cooley v. Port Wardens, 12 How. 299, 317, 319, 13 L. ed. 996, 1004; Ex parte McNiel, 13 Wall. 236, 240, 20 L. ed. 624, 625; Wilson v.McNamee, 102 U. S. 572, 26 L. ed. 234; Anderson v. Pacific Coast S. S. Co. 225 U. S. 187, 195, 56 L. ed. 1047, 1051, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 626; Morgan, L. & T. R. S. S. Co. v. Board of Health, 118 U. S. 455, 465, 30 L. ed. 237, 242, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1114; Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur v. State Bd. of Health, 186 U. S. 380, 387, 46 L. ed. 1209, 1213, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 811. In these cases, it was apparent that the subject was of a local nature, admitting of diversity of treatment according to local necessities, and it could not be supposed that it was the intention to deny to the states the exercise of their protective power, in the absence of Federal action. It is not necessarily determinative that the vessels in the course of the transportation in question pass beyond the boundary of the state. See The Hamilton (Old Dominion S. S. Co. v. Gilmore) 207 U. S. 398, 405, 52 L. ed. 264, 270, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 133. In the case of ferries over boundary waters, it has always been recognized that ferriage from the shore of a state is peculiarly a matter of local concern, and, while undoubtedly Congress may regulate interstate transportation by ferry as well as other interstate commercial intercourse, still, because of the nature of the transportation and the local exigency, a state, in the absence of Federal regulation, may prevent unreasonable charges for carriage by ferry from a point of departure within its borders. Port Richmond & B. P. Ferry Co. v. Hudson County, 234 U. S. 317, 332, 58 L. ed. 1330, 1336, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 821; Sault Ste. Marie v. International Transit Co. 234 U. S. 333, 342, 58 L. ed. 1337, 1341, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 826. The rule which the plaintiff in error invokes is not an arbitrary rule, with arbitrary exceptions, but is one that has its basis in a rational construction of the commerce clause. As repeatedly stated, it denies authority to the state in all cases where the subject is of such a nature as to demand that, if regulated at all, its regulation should be through a general or national system, and...
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