Wilmot v. Mudge
| Decision Date | 01 October 1880 |
| Citation | 26 L.Ed. 536,103 U.S. 217 |
| Parties | WILMOT v. MUDGE |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
ERROR to the Superior Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Mr. James B. Richardson for the plaintiff in error.
Mr. Moorfield Storey, contra.
Mudge & Co. brought their action against Wilmot in the Superior Court of Massachusetts, in tort, for false representations whereby the plaintiffs were induced to sell him certain goods on credit. The damages claimed were their value. He denied the false representations, and also pleaded a composition order of the District Court of the United States, and his offer to pay the plaintiffs what was due them under the composition.
The case was tried without a jury by the court, who found for the plaintiffs, and gave judgment for the agreed price of the goods.
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts affirmed the judgment on all points. Wilmot sued out this writ.
The only question we can consider is whether the composition with the order of the court thereon is a discharge of Wilmot's liability on account of the cause of action on which he was sued in this case.
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts held that it was not such a discharge, because the action was founded on a fraud.
Sect. 5117 of the Revised Statutes enacts that 'no debt created by the fraud or embezzlement of the bankrupt, or by his defalcation as a public officer, or while acting in any fiduciary character, shall be discharged by proceedings in bankruptcy; but the debt may be proved, and the dividend thereon shall be a payment on account of such debt.' The phraseology of the original statute of bankruptcy of 1867 was that no such debt 'shall be discharged under this act;' and an argument is made that while such debt might not be discharged under the act of 1867, it might be under the composition provided for by the act of 1874, because the latter was a different act. We are of opinion that the language of the Revised Statutes expresses the true construction of the act of 1867, namely, that no such debt should be discharged by the proceedings which the bankrupt law of the United States authorized. The language adopted in the act of 1867 was appropriate, because that was the only bankrupt act then in existence, and established a complete system in itself. When the Revised Statutes came to be enacted, many amendments had been made to the original act, and as none of them were supposed to affect the principle that debts founded in fraud should not be discharged by bankrupt proceedings, it was proper to say so.
The seventeenth section of the act of 1874, c. 390, introduced the system of composition which, when the proposal of the bankrupt to pay a certain proportion of his debts had been accepted by a majority in number and three-fourths in value of the creditors, and confirmed by the signatures of the parties and approved by the court, 'shall be binding on all the creditors whose names and addresses, and the amounts of the debts due to whom, are shown in the statement of the debtor produced at the meeting at which the resolution shall have been passed, but shall not affect or prejudice the rights of any other creditors.' 18 Stat., pt. 3, p. 183. Everything was done which this act required to bring Mudge & Co. within its provisions. Although they had received notice of the meeting which passed the composition resolution, they did not take part in the proceedings, nor accept the sum to which by its terms they were entitled, though they were included in Wilmot's list of creditors.
Their counsel relies solely on the proposition, that as their claim against him arises out of his fraudulent representations to them in purchasing the goods, their debt is not discharged by this composition, nor by any other proceedings in bankruptcy.
To this it is answered that proceedings in composition are not in bankruptcy, but so far distinct therefrom, that they constitute a compromise and release of the debtor by virtue of the provision which declares them binding on both parties.
It is said to be an accord and satisfaction. But this requires the voluntary assent of the creditor, which in this case was not given.
Next, it is said that the seventeenth section of the act of 1874, which provides for this composition, is not in pari materia with the bankrupt law, and is a new and independent mode of distributing the bankrupt's assets, and releasing him from his debt, and is not a part of the proceedings under the bankrupt law.
We do not understand that there is any power in the debtor to invoke this remedy until proceedings in bankruptcy have been commenced by him or against him under...
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General Electric Credit Corp. v. James Talcott, Inc.
...82 L.Ed. 488 (1938). To find a repeal, it must be "impossible" for both provisions under consideration to stand. Wilmot v. Mudge, 103 U.S. 217, 221, 26 L.Ed. 536 (1880). Repeals by implication "are never admitted where the former can stand with the new act." Chew Heong v. United States, 112......
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Taylor v. Lumaghi Coal Co.
...Co. v. Hoffman, 101 U.S. 112, 115, 25 L. Ed. 782; State ex rel. Dean v. Daues, 321 Mo. 1126, 1151, 14 S.W. (2d) 990; Wilmot v. Mudge, 103 U.S. 217, 220, 26 L. Ed. 536; Yuengling v. Schile, 12 Fed. 97, 106; Smith v. Board of Trustees, 245 Pac. 173, 175; Zelig v. Blue Point Oyster Co., 104 Pa......
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Eustis v. Bolles
...are made to the provisions of chapter 157, Pub.St. All these provisions are, as was said of the composition act of congress, in Wilmot v. Mudge, 103 U.S. 217, in materia. In that case the supreme court said of said composition act of congress that "it was a part of the proceedings in bankru......
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Taylor v. Lumaghi Coal Co.
... ... v. Hoffman, 101 U.S. 112, ... 115, 25 L.Ed. 782; State ex rel. Dean v. Daues, 321 ... Mo. 1126, 1151, 14 S.W.2d 990; Wilmot v. Mudge, 103 ... U.S. 217, 220, 26 L.Ed. 536; Yuengling v. Schile, 12 ... F. 97, 106; Smith v. Board of Trustees, 245 P. 173, ... 175; ... ...