Wilson County Sch. v Clifton

• Citation: 41 S.W.3d 645
• Decision Date: 16 March 2000
• Docket Number: 99-00359
• Parties: THE WILSON COUNTY SCHOOL SYSTEM, Plaintiff/Appellee/Cross-Appellant, VS. CREAD CLIFTON and wife, TAMELA CLIFTON, as next of kin for their minor son, WILLIAM (KYLE) CLIFTON, Defendants/Appellants/Cross-Appellees. C.A.IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE Filed
• Court: Court of Appeals of Tennessee

THE WILSON COUNTY SCHOOL SYSTEM, Plaintiff/Appellee/Cross-Appellant VS CREAD CLIFTON and wife, TAMELA CLIFTON, as next of kin for their minor son, WILLIAM (KYLE) CLIFTON, Defendants/Appellants/Cross-Appellees

C.A. No. M1999-00359-COA-R3-CV

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE

Filed March 16, 2000

Davidson County Chancery Court No. 91-2675-II

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED

From the Chancery Court of Davidson County at Nashville.

Honorable Carol L. McCoy, Chancellor

J. Page Garrett, Tennessee Protection & Advocacy, Nashville, Tennessee

Attorney for Defendants/Appellants/Cross-Appellees.

Michael R. Jennings, Lebanon, Tennessee

Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

FARMER, J.,

CRAWFORD, P.J., W.S., HIGHERS, J.: (Concurs)

OPINION FILED:

Cread and Tamela Clifton, on behalf of their minor son, William Kyle Clifton, appeal the trial court's judgment denying their request for prejudgment interest on a reimbursement award and an attorney's fee award entered in their favor pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. The Wilson County School System also has appealed, contending that the trial court erred (1) in granting the Cliftons' claim for reimbursement, and (2) in awarding the Cliftons' attorney's fees based upon the court's ruling that the Cliftons were the prevailing party in this litigation. After carefully reviewing the record, we affirm the trial court's judgment in its entirety.

I. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)

The Cliftons brought this action against the Wilson County School System pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).¹ Before setting forth the factual and procedural history of this case, we find it useful to outline some of the basic purposes and requirements of the IDEA. In enacting the IDEA, Congress intended, inter alia, "to ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for employment and independent living." 20 U.S.C.A. 1400(d)(1)(A) (West 2000). To this end, the IDEA requires public school districts to develop a curriculum "tailored to the unique needs of the [disabled] child by means of an 'individualized educational program'" (IEP). Cleveland Heights-Univ. Heights City Sch. Dist. v. Boss, 144 F.3d 391, 397-98 (6th Cir. 1998) (quoting Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 181-82 (1982)).

An IEP is "the written statement which sets out an educational program to meet the particularized needs of a child with disabilities." Tennessee Dep't of Mental Health & Mental Retardation v. Paul B., 88 F.3d 1466, 1471 (6th Cir. 1996). The IEP's "development and implementation . . . are the cornerstones of the [IDEA]." Id. Among other things, each IEP must set forth "the child's current abilities, a description of the services to be provided, and progress goals." Wise v. Ohio Dep't of Educ., 80 F.3d 177, 183 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing 20 U.S.C.A. 1401(a)(20)).²20 U.S.C.A. 1414(d)(1)(A) (West 2000).

The IDEA requires public school districts to ensure that children with disabilities are educated "to the maximum extent appropriate" with nondisabled children. Doe v. Board of Educ., 9 F.3d 455, 460 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1108 (1994); 20 U.S.C.A. 1412(a)(5)(A) (West 2000). In this way, Congress has stated a "very strong" preference for "mainstreaming" disabled children by placing them in regular classes where feasible. Doe v. Board of Educ., 9 F.3d at 460. Nevertheless, this "mainstreaming" requirement is not absolute, and courts have recognized that mainstreaming is not required in every case. Id. Instead, the proper inquiry remains whether the proposed placement is appropriate under the IDEA. Id.

Under the IDEA, parents who complain about the adequacy of their child's IEP may request an impartial due process hearing to be conducted by the local educational agency. See 20 U.S.C.A. 1415(f) (West 2000). If the parents are dissatisfied with the results of the due process hearing, the parents may appeal to the state educational agency, which is required to conduct an impartial review of the local educational agency's decision. See 20 U.S.C.A. 1415(g) (West 2000). After exhausting the state's administrative procedures, the parents may bring a civil action in state court or federal district court. See 20 U.S.C.A. 1415(i)(2) (West 2000).

If the parents ultimately pursue such a civil action, the trial court is required to use a modified de novo standard for reviewing the decision of the state educational agency. Peck v. Lansing Sch. Dist., 148 F.3d 619, 625 (6th Cir. 1998); Doe v. Metropolitan Nashville Pub. Sch., 133 F.3d 384, 387 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 47 (1998). This standard requires the trial court to conduct an independent reexamination of the evidence. Renner v. Board of Educ., 185 F.3d 635, 641 (6th Cir. 1999). In conducting its review, however, the trial court must give "due weight" to the state administrative proceedings and, specifically, to the findings and determinations of the hearing officer or the administrative law judge who heard the case. Peck, 148 F.3d at 625-36; Doe v. Metropolitan Nashville Pub. Sch., 133 F.3d at 388; Gillette v. Fairland Bd. of Educ., 932 F.2d 551, 553 (6th Cir. 1991). This deference to the final decisions of state authorities is required because "courts are generalists with no expertise in the educational needs of [disabled] children, and will benefit from the factfinding of a state agency with expertise in the field." Renner, 185 F.3d at 641 (quoting Doe v. Smith, 879 F.2d 1340, 1343 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1025 (1990)). Due to their technical expertise, "administrative agencies are traditionally better suited to make these types of determinations." Babb v. Knox County Sch. Sys., 965 F.2d 104, 107 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 941 (1992).

In construing the IDEA's requirement of a free appropriate public education, the federal courts repeatedly have emphasized that public schools are not required to maximize a disabled student's educational potential. Renner v. Board of Educ., 185 F.3d 635, 644 (6th Cir. 1999); Doe v. Board of Educ., 9 F.3d 455, 459 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1108 (1994); Cordrey v. Euckert, 917 F.2d 1460, 1473-74 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 938 (1991); Brimmer v. Traverse City Area Pub. Sch., 872 F. Supp. 447, 454 (W.D. Mich. 1994). Public schools need only (1) comply with the IDEA's procedural requirements, and (2) develop an IEP that is "reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits." Renner, 185 F.3d at 644; Babb, 965 F.2d at 107; Cordrey, 917 F.2d at 1464. In this regard, the IDEA requires only that public schools "provide children with disabilities an appropriate education, not the very best possible special education services." Wise v. Ohio Dep't of Educ., 80 F.3d 177, 185 (6th Cir. 1996); accord Cordrey, 917 F.2d at 1474. The IDEA "provides no more than a 'basic floor of opportunity.'" Doe v. Board of Educ., 9 F.3d at 459 (quoting Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 201 (1982)); see also Walczak v. Florida Union Free Sch. Dist., 142 F.3d 119, 132 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that IEP need not maximize child's potential, offer superior opportunities, or provide optimal level of services).

Nevertheless, in order to be "appropriate," the educational benefits provided by the school district must be more than de minimis. Doe v. Board of Educ., 9 F.3d at 459. The "basic floor of opportunity" provided by the IDEA should consist of "access to specialized instruction and related services which are individually designed" to "confer some educational benefit" upon the disabled child. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 201. Thus, the IEP proposed by the school district should provide an opportunity for "meaningful" and not merely "trivial" advancement. Walczak, 142 F.3d at 130; see also Bonnie Ann F. v. Calallen Indep. Sch. Dist., 835 F. Supp. 340, 346 (S.D. Tex. 1993) (indicating that, although IDEA does not require school district to attempt to maximize each child's potential, educational benefit provided to child must be "meaningful"), aff'd, 40 F.3d 386 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1084 (1995).

If the parents unilaterally place their child in a private program pending the outcome of the administrative and judicial review process, the parents may seek retroactive reimbursement for educational expenses and related services under the IDEA. Babb v. Knox County Sch. Sys., 965 F.2d 104, 107 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 941 (1992) (citing School Comm. v. Massachusetts Dep't of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369 (1985)). In such a case, however, the parents have the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the proposed IEP was "inadequate," "inappropriate," or "improper" and, further, that the private school placement was "proper" or "appropriate." Renner v. Board of Educ., 185 F.3d 635, 642 (6th Cir. 1999); Doe v. Metropolitan Nashville Pub. Sch., 133 F.3d 384, 387 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 47 (1998); Wise v. Ohio Dep't of Educ., 80 F.3d 177, 184 (6th Cir. 1996); Doe v. Board of Educ., 9 F.3d 455, 458 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1108 (1994); Babb v. Knox County Sch. Sys., 965 F.2d 104, 108 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 941 (1992); Doe v. Defendant I, 898 F.2d 1186, 1191 (6th Cir. 1990). In accordance with the foregoing authorities, the parents do not meet this burden merely by proving that the private facility provided their child with superior services. Doe v. Board of Educ., 9 F.3d at 459. Rather, the parents first must prove that the public school was "unable to provide [their] child with an appropriate education." Gillette v. Fairland Bd. of Educ., 932 F.2d 551, 554 (6th Cir. 1991).

II. Factual and Procedural History of the Cliftons' IDEA Claim

The present...