Wilson v. Ampride (In re Motor Fuel Temperature Sales Practices Litig.)

Decision Date02 April 2012
Docket NumberCase No. 07–1840–KHV.,MDL No. 1840.
Citation867 F.Supp.2d 1124
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Kansas
PartiesIn re MOTOR FUEL TEMPERATURE SALES PRACTICES LITIGATION This Document Relates To: Wilson, et al. v. Ampride, Inc., et al., Case No. 06–2582–KHV and American Fiber & Cabling, LLC, et al. v. BP Products North America Inc., et al., Case No. 07–2053–KHV.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

George A. Zelcs, Korein Tillery, LLC, Chicago, IL, Joseph A. Kronawitter, Horn, Aylward & Bandy LLC, Thomas V. Bender, Amii Castle, Garrett M. Hodes, J. Brett Milbourn, Kip D. Richards, Walters Bender Strohbehn & Vaughan, PC, Richard M. Acosta, Robert A. Horn, Horn, Aylward & Bandy LLC, Ureka E. Idstrom, Kansas City, MO, Nina Hunter Fields, David M. Hendricks, Richardson, Patrick, Westbrook & Brickman, LLC, Mount Pleasant, SC, Kari A. Schulte, Timothy W. Van Ronzelen, Matthew A. Clement, Cook, Vetter, Doerhoff & Landwehr PC, Jefferson City, MO, Robert W. Russell, Spencer W. Eisenmenger, Kempton and Russell, Sedalia, MO, Eric A. Davis, John C. Niemeyer, Linda G. Alexander, Niemeyer, Alexander & Phillips, P.C., Joe Carson, Oklahoma City, OK, Christie R. Deaton, John A. Libra, Joseph A. Perez, Stephen M. Tillery, Korein Tillery, LLC, Robert King, St. Louis, MO, Daniel J. Shih, Lindsey N. Godfrey, Susman Godfrey, LLP, Seattle, WA, David F. Engstrom, David C. Frederick, Kellogg, Huber, Hansen, Todd, Evans & Figel, PLLC, Andrew N. Goldfarb, Jennifer Ross, Carlos T. Angulo, Graeme W. Bush, Elizabeth G. Taylor, Zuckerman Spaeder LLP, Washington, DC, Gregory A. Lofstead, James C. Bradley, Matthew D. Hamrick, Michael J. Brickman, Richardson, Patrick, Westbrook & Brickman, LLC, Charleston, SC, Guy D. Calladine, Robert M. Peterson, Carlson, Calladine & Peterson, LLP, San Francisco, CA, J. David Butler, Richardson, Patrick, Westbrook & Brickman, LLC, Barnwell, SC, Kevin F. Brady, Connolly Bovd Lodge & Hutz, Wilmington, DE, Marc M. Seltzer, Susman Godfrey, LLP, Bryan C. Payne, Elizabeth L. Crooke, Thu V. Nguyen, Walter J. Lack, Engstrom, Lipscomb & Lack, Christopher T. Aumais, Graham B. Lippsmith, Howard B. Miller, Thomas V. Girardi, Girardi Keese, Larry A. Sackey, Larry A. Sackey Law Offices, William Litvak, Dapeer Rosenblit and Litvak, Los Angeles, CA, Stephen D. Susman, Tibor L. Nagy, Susman Godfrey, LLP, Joseph Guglielmo, Whatley Drake & Kallas LLC, Shawn P. Naunton, Zuckerman Spaeder LLP, New York, NY, Matthew P. O'Malley, Tompkins, McGuire, Wachenfeld & Barry, LLP, Newark, NJ, Joseph P. Miller, John E. Tomlinson, Ted G. Meadows, Beasley Allen Crow Methvin Portis & Miles PC, Montgomery, AL, Charles J. Muchmore, John D. Curtis, II, Laura J. Meyer, Burch & Cracchiolo PA, Phoenix, AZ, Craig P. Niedenthal, Douglas A. Dellaccio, Jr., Ernest Cory, G. Rick Digiorgio, Cory Watson Crowder & Degaris, Howard M. Miles, Jeven Sloan, Joe R. Whatley, Jr., Whatley Drake & Kallas LLC, Birmingham, AL, David Deary, Deary Montgomery Defeo & Canada LLP, Martin Woodward, Stanley, Mandel & Iola, LLP, Roger L. Mandel, Lackey Hershman, LLP, Dallas, TX, Othni J. Lathram, Tuscaloosa, AL, William C. Wright, William C. Wright PA, West Palm Beach, FL, Theodore J. Leopold, Leopold Kuvin, PA, Palm Beach Gardens, FL, David F. Kirby, William B. Bystrynski, Kirby & Holt, William W. Plyler, McMillan & Smith, Raleigh, NC, Shane C. Youtz, Albuquerque, NM, J. Randall Jones, P. Kyle Smith, Harrison, Kemp Jones & Coulthard, John H. Cotton, Cotton & Associates, Las Vegas, NV, Andrew S. Kierstead, Andrew S. Kierstead Law Offices, John S. Stone, John S. Stone, LLC, Lawrence A. Locke, Kierstead & Locke, Portland, OR, Michael D. Donovan, Donovan Searles, LLC, Martin S. Kardon, Stewart Bernstein, Kanter, Bernstein and Kardon, PC, Philadelphia, PA, Lee L. Coleman, Hughes & Coleman, Nashville, TN, L. Dewayne Layfield, Attorney at Law, Beaumont, TX, Donald F. Hildre, Dougherty and Hildre, Jeffrey M. Padilla, Michael D. Padilla, O'Mara & Padilla, Thomas D. Haklar, Law Offices of Thomas D. Haklar, San Diego, CA, Avery L. Griffin, Deborah S. Henton, Edward F. Kohnke, IV, Stacy R. Palowsky, William J. Hamlin, Hamlin, Griffin & Kohnke, LLC, Abita Springs, LA, J. Bruce McMath, Samuel E. Ledbetter, McMath Woods PA, Little Rock, AR, Boyce Allen Clardy, Jr., Dick James Law Firm, Greenville, SC, Alex M. Moskowitz, A.J. Weiss & Associates, St. Thomas, VI.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

KATHRYN H. VRATIL, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment On Plaintiffs' KCPA And Unjust Enrichment Claims (Doc. # 2705) filed November 1, 2011. Defendants argue that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Kansas law specifically authorizes the sale of motor fuel without disclosing or adjusting for temperature and because Kansas law prohibits using automatic temperature compensation (“ATC”) at retail. They also argue that the undisputed facts establish that defendants have not willfully concealed, suppressed or omitted any material information regarding the retail sale of motor fuel, and have not engaged in any unconscionable acts or practices under the Kansas Consumer Protection Act (“KCPA”), K.S.A. § 50–626(b)(3) and 50–627.1 For the following reasons, the Court overrules defendants' motion.

Summary Judgment Standards

Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. SeeFed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Vitkus v. Beatrice Co., 11 F.3d 1535, 1538–39 (10th Cir.1993). A factual dispute is “material” only if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. A “genuine” factual dispute requires more than a mere scintilla of evidence. Id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

The moving party bears the initial burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Hicks v. City of Watonga, 942 F.2d 737, 743 (10th Cir.1991). Once the moving party meets its burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to demonstrate that genuine issues remain for trial as to those dispositive matters for which it carries the burden of proof. Applied Genetics Int'l, Inc. v. First Affiliated Sec., Inc., 912 F.2d 1238, 1241 (10th Cir.1990); see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Bacchus Indus., Inc. v. Arvin Indus., Inc., 939 F.2d 887, 891 (10th Cir.1991). The nonmoving party may not rest on its pleadings but must set forth specific facts. Applied Genetics, 912 F.2d at 1241.

The Court views the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Deepwater Invs., Ltd. v. Jackson Hole Ski Corp., 938 F.2d 1105, 1110 (10th Cir.1991). It may grant summary judgment if the nonmoving party's evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly probative. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 250–51, 106 S.Ct. 2505. In response to a motion for summary judgment, a party cannot rely on ignorance of facts, on speculation, or on suspicion, and may not escape summary judgment in the mere hope that something will turn up at trial. Conaway v. Smith, 853 F.2d 789, 794 (10th Cir.1988). The heart of the inquiry is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to the jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 251–52, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

Factual Background

Both parties' purported statements of fact are rife with legal arguments and conclusions, specifically with respect to the statutory and regulatory framework that governs the sale of motor fuel at retail in Kansas. These are not “facts” for purposes of summary judgment. Sprint Commc'ns Co. v. Vonage Holdings Corp., 500 F.Supp.2d 1290, 1303–04 (D.Kan.2007) (attorney argument and commentary, legal conclusions not facts admissible in evidence under Rule 56(e), Fed.R.Civ.P.). In its legal analysis below, the Court addresses the relevant statutes and regulations. The Court disregards any fact that is immaterial or not properly supported by the record. SeeFed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), (e); D. Kan. Rule 56.1; Law v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 902 F.Supp. 1394, 1398 (D.Kan.1995).

The following facts are either uncontroverted, deemed admitted or where controverted, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, the non-movants.

During the relevant time period, each defendant offered to sell motor fuel to plaintiffs and putative class members by the gallon, at a posted price per gallon. As a unit, a gallon is defined by Kansas law and the common English dictionary to be 231 cubic inches. Handbook 44, App. B at B–1; Webster's Third New International Dictionary 931 (1993) (unabridged). A “gross gallon” is a specific volume of motor fuel at any temperature (231 cubic inches with no reference temperature). A “net gallon” is a specific volume of motor fuel at an exact temperature (231 cubic inches at 60 degrees Fahrenheit). A net gallon and gross gallon are each liquid measures of volume.

A gallon of motor fuel at a higher temperature has less mass, and thus less energy, than a gallon of the same motor fuel at a cooler temperature. The volume of gasoline expands and contracts 1 per cent for every temperature change of 15 degrees Fahrenheit. The volume of diesel fuel expands and contracts approximately 0.6 per cent for every temperature change of 15 degrees Fahrenheit. The parties dispute whether temperature affects the value and quality of motor fuel.

The national standard reference temperature for petroleum products—60 degrees Fahrenheit—was adopted to remedy inequities in wholesale motor fuel transactions by enabling the buyer and seller to calculate the...

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