Wilson v. Bd. of Com'rs of Jersey City

• Decision Date: 01 March 1920
• Docket Number: No. 64.,64.
• Citation: 109 A. 364
• Parties: WILSON v. BOARD OF COM'RS OF JERSEY CITY et al.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

109 A. 364

WILSON

v. BOARD OF COM'RS OF JERSEY CITY et al.

No. 64.

Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.

March 1, 1920.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Appeal from Supreme Court

Certiorari by Samuel Wilson against the Board of Commissioners of Jersey City and others, to set aside, as violative of the federal War-Time Prohibition Act and the prohibition amendment to the federal Constitution, a liquor license issued to Hugh Meehan. From a judgment of the Supreme Court (107 Atl. 797) setting aside the license, the Board of Commissioners and Meehan appeal. Reversed.

John Bentley and John Milton, both of Jersey City, for appellants.

G. Rowland Munroe, of Newark, for respondent.

WALKER, Ch. The Supreme Court, on certiorari to review the action of the board of commissioners of the city of Jersey City in granting to Hugh Meehan a license to sell spirituous, vinous, malt, and brewed liquors, at No. 635 Ocean avenue, in said city, set the license aside. The board and Meehan appeal.

The facts are: Meehan was the holder of such a license, which expired June 30, 1919. He tiled an application for a new and similar license to run for one year from July 1, 1919. On June 30th the board of commissioners held a meeting and adopted a resolution granting to Meehan a license "to sell spirituous, vinous, malt and brewed liquors at No. 635 Ocean avenue, in said city, from date hereof to July 1, 1920," the license being dated June 30, 1919. On July 2, 1919, the writ of certiorari was applied for and granted to review the proceedings. On August 4th the matter was heard before one of the Justices of the Supreme court, who held that the license should be set aside, and judgment of reversal was accordingly entered.

It was contended on behalf of the defendants in the court below that the prosecutor of the writ had no standing because he was not specially injured by the action of the board of commissioners. This contention was decided in favor of the prosecutor. But, in the view we take of the case, it is unnecessary to consider that question.

There were three reasons assigned by the prosecutor for reversing the proceedings under review: First, because Meechan applied for a license to sell liquors for one year from July 1, 1919, to July 1, 1920, which was granted while the law of the United States providing for war-time prohibition forbade the sale for beverage purposes of any distilled spirits, or beer, wine or other intoxicating malt liquors after June 30, 1919, until the conclusion of the war, and thereafter until the termination of demobilization, the date of which was to be determined by the President of the United States, and, the war not having been concluded, and demobilization not having taken place, the grant of license to Meehan was contrary to the laws of the United States; second, because the license was issued in conflict with the Constitution of the United States, which forbade the sale of intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes after January 16, 1920; and third, because the license was granted without opportunity being afforded to the prosecutor to be heard on his remonstrance, although he demanded a hearing.

The court below decided that the first and second reasons were valid, but made no deliverance on the third one, nor was it necessary, because the decision was in favor of the prosecutor on the first two, which carried down the license.

We think the Supreme Court erred in deciding against the defendants for the first and second reasons assigned.

In Maroney v. La Barre, 77 N. J. Law, 556, 70 Atl. 156, the plaintiff in error, being imprisoned for debt, petitioned the common pleas court for discharging under the provisions of the act for the relief of persons imprisoned on civil process, but his discharge was refused upon the ground that the law invoked was suspended by the United States Bankruptcy Act. The Supreme Court affirmed the common pleas, and the case came to this court for review, where the judgment was reversed. It was here held that a general assignment for the equal benefit of creditors is an act of bankruptcy, but unless proceedings in bankruptcy are instituted it is...