Wilson v. Bd. of Educ. of Sch. Dist. No. 126

• Decision Date: 12 September 1946
• Docket Number: No. 29409.,29409.
• Citation: 394 Ill. 197,68 N.E.2d 257
• Parties: WILSON v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF SCHOOL DIST. NO. 126 et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

394 Ill. 197

68 N.E.2d 257

WILSON

v.BOARD OF EDUCATION OF SCHOOL DIST. NO. 126 et al.

No. 29409.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

May 21, 1946.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 12, 1946.

Appeal from Appellate Court for Fourth District, on Appeal from Circuit Court, Madison County; D. H. Mudge, Judge.

Petition for writ of mandamus by A. M. Wilson against the Board of Education of School District No. 126 and others to require petitioner to be reinstated as superintendent of schools and to have paid to him his previous salary, upon the claim that he was entitled to thereto by reason of provisions of the Teachers' Tenure Law. From a judgment of Appellate Court, 327 Ill.App. 338, 64 N.E.2d 380, modifying an award to petitioner, made by the Circuit Court, but sustaining right to mandamus, the Board of Education and others appeal.

Judgments of the Appellate and Circuit Court reversed.

Harry Faulkner, of Granite City, and J. F. Eeck, of Edwardsville, for appellants.

Jesse R. Brown, of Edwardsville, and Homer B. Harris, of Lincoln, for appellee.

GUNN, Justice.

A. M. Wilson filed a petition for writ of mandamus against the board of education of school district No. 126 in Union township in the county of Madison, and Ralph Z. Miller, president of said board of education, and the members thereof, for the purpose of requiring petitioner to be reinstated as superintendent of schools, and to have paid to him his previous salary, upon the claim that he was entitled to such by reason of the provisions of the Teachers Tenure Law. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1945, chap. 122, sec. 24-2.) The circuit court granted the writ, and found the amount due to be the sum of $6000. Upon appeal to the Appellate Court for the Fourth District the judgment of the circuit court was modified by changing the amount of money awarded to petitioner-appellee, but otherwise sustaining his right to a writ of mandamus. We have allowed an appeal to this court.

The facts disclose petitioner-appellee had been in the employ of the board of educationfor many years. The petition alleges he was superintendent of schools of the school district for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1941, and ending June 30, 1942; and that he had been superintendent of schools of said school district for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1942, and ending June 30, 1943; and the general allegation that he had been such superintendent for eight fiscal years previous to July 1, 1941, consecutively and continuously. In his petition he makes the allegation by way of conclusion that he has complied with all things necessary to bring him within the Teachers Tenure Law on contractual continued service, and that appellants have done nothing to abrogate appellee's rights under such law, and that by reason of such facts the appellee is deemed to be re-employed for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1943, and ending June 30, 1944, on the same terms as for the previous fiscal year.

The complaint alleges demand for his salary and refusal upon the part of the board to pay. A motion was made to dismiss the petition, and was overruled. An answer was filed in which appellants deny appellee has qualified under the Teachers Tenure Law, and also deny he has been dismissed, but allege he has been transferred to another school at less salary. The motion to strike this affirmative answer was denied, and the general reply to this answer is that the transfer alleged was illegal and not in accordance with the provisions of the Teachers Tenure Law. An inspection of the pleadings shows the case was not decided so much upon facts as upon issues of law, although the pleadings took the form of petition, answer, and reply.

The questions involved in this appeal have been decided by this court in Anderson v. Board of Education, 390 Ill. 412, 61 N.E.2d 562, and People ex rel. Davidson v. Bradley, 382 Ill. 383, 47 N.E.2d 93. In the Anderson case we held two things were necessary to state a cause of action under the Teachers Tenure Law: (1) that to come under the provisions thereof the teacher shall have been employed as a full-time teacher for the probationary period of two years, one of which shall be subsequent to the date this act became effective; (2) that there must be a probationary period of two consecutive years, and that for any part of the probationary period occurring prior to the effective date of the Tenure Law the same must be established as probationary by a contract between the parties, and that this probationary period was a prerequisite, under the statute, to contractual continued service.

In the Anderson case we held the term ‘years' meant calendar years, and therefore the petitioner in that case was denied a writ of mandamus because the year was a school year of...