Wilson v. Beeler
| Decision Date | 14 December 1951 |
| Citation | 193 Tenn. 213,245 S.W.2d 620,29 Beeler 213 |
| Parties | , 193 Tenn. 213 WILSON et al. v. BEELER et al. |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
Boyce Griffith, LaFollette, for appellants.
Harry B. Brown, Jellico, for appellees.
This is a suit by taxpayers of Campbell County alleging that Chapter 625 of the Private Acts of Tennessee for 1951 is unconstitutional. The bill seeks to prevent the issuance of county bonds which this Private Act purports to validate.
The Chancellor, without writing an opinion, sustained a demurrer and dismissed the bill, thereby holding that the Private Act under attack is constitutional. The case is here on appeal of the taxpayers.
Chapter 184 of the Public Acts of 1945 is known as the 'County Recovery and Post War Aid Act of 1945'. That act empowers the Quarterly Court of each county in Tennessee to authorize and direct the issuance of the bonds of the county, without limitation as to amount, for the purpose of carrying out one or more of the public works projects mentioned in this statute including, among others, the building and construction of roads and highways of such county. The bonds are to be paid from ad valorem taxes to be levied upon all taxable property in the county or, as the Quarterly Court may direct, of such property in that portion of the county affected by the project.
After the Quarterly Court of any county has adopted a resolution authorizing the issuance of such bonds it is required by Section 5 of Chapter 184 to publish such resolution in full in some newspaper of the county or put the same in five conspicuous places in the county, if there be no such newspaper.
Section 6 of the Act forbids the issuance of the bonds authorized by the Quarterly Court resolution under the following conditions: 'If * * * (2) a petition protesting the issuance of such bonds signed by at least twenty (20%) per cent of the qualified electors as aforesaid shall have been filed with the Clerk of the County within ten (10) days from the publication or posting, as the case may be, of the Initial Resolution, then no bonds shall be issued under this Act without the assent of a majority of the qualified electors therein voting upon a proposition for the Issuance of such bonds in the manner provided by the next following section.'
On January 18, 1951 the Quarterly Court of Campbell County adopted the resolution hereinafter mentioned. More than a majority, but less than three-fourths, of all the members of that Quarterly Court voted in favor of that resolution. That resolution authorized the issuance of bonds of the county in the principal amount of $300,000.00 'under and pursuant to--Chapter 184 of the 1945 Public Acts of Tennessee--for the purpose of obtaining funds to pay the cost of constructing road(s) in and for Campbell County, Tennessee'. This resolution provided for the levy of a tax 'upon all the taxable property in' Campbell County for the purpose of providing funds with which to pay the interest and principal of said bonds. It provided for the distribution among the various districts of the county of the proceeds of the sale of the bonds after withholding a certain amount for road machinery and tools.
This Quarterly Court Resolution is not on its face in conflict with any of the provisions of the aforesaid public statute under which it was authorized, except that it did not direct the publication of the notice of the passage of the resolution. Nor was there any compliance with the requirements of Section 5 of this public statute by publishing the resolution in full in one of the two newspapers in the county, or by posting it at any place in the county.
Notwithstanding the failure of the Quarterly Court to comply with this requirement as to notice to the public, a petition protesting the issuance of these bonds was signed by a few more than one-third of the qualified voters of Campbell County, and filed with the Clerk of the County Court within ten days after the passage of the resolution that authorized and directed the issuance of these bonds. Therefore, under the heretofore quoted Section 6 of Chapter 184, Public Acts of 1945, applicable alike to all counties, Campbell County was forbidden the power to issue the bonds in question, in the absence of assent thereto by a majority of the qualified voters in an election to be held for that purpose as required by this statute under which it was purported to issue these bonds.
With matters in the status stated, the Legislature on March 15, 1951 enacted Chapter 625 of the Private Acts of 1951. It is the constitutionality of that Act that is attacked by this taxpayers' suit. This private act purports to validate and legalize the bonds authorized by the aforesaid Quarterly Court resolution and to authorize their issuance and sale, and further provides that 'no election shall be necessary in connection with said bonds', and directs the levy of a tax each year upon all taxable property in the county for the payment of the principal and interest of these bonds.
From that immediately above stated, it is obvious that Chapter 625 of the Private Acts of 1951 purports to extend to Campbell County alone the right and privilege of issuing bonds authorized by the general law, Chapter 184, Public Acts of 1945, without the assent of the voters in an election held for that purpose, notwithstanding a petition protesting the issuance of said bonds filed by more than twenty (20%) per cent of the voters in the manner required by this general law.
Thus it is that this Private Act purports to grant to Campbell County a right and privilege withheld from all the other counties of the State, and to impose upon the taxpayers of Campbell County a burden which under the general law, the premises considered, cannot be imposed upon the taxpayers of any other county of the State. This is partial, class legislation forbidden by Article XI, Section 8 of our Constitution unless there be some reason for the discrimination. That reason need not affirmatively appear on the face of the statute, but it must exist. No reason is suggested, and, in the opinion of this Court, none can be suggested, for this discrimination. It is, therefore, an arbitrary and...
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