Wilson v. Beloit Corp., Civ. No. 87-1051.

• Decision Date: 29 November 1989
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 87-1051.
• Parties: Samuel C. WILSON and Flora I. Wilson, His Wife v. BELOIT CORPORATION, et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Arkansas

725 F. Supp. 1056

Samuel C. WILSON and Flora I. Wilson, His Wife v. BELOIT CORPORATION, et al.

Civ. No. 87-1051.

United States District Court, W.D. Arkansas, El Dorado Division.

November 29, 1989.

Art Anderson, North Little Rock, Ark., for Samuel and Flora Wilson.

James M. Moody, Little Rock, Ark., for Beloit Corp.

Dennis L. Shackleford, El Dorado, Ark., for Intern. Paper Co.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

OREN HARRIS, District Judge.

Plaintiffs bring this action seeking damages for a leg injury sustained by Mr. Wilson while working for defendant International Paper Company (IPC). Wilson was awarded workers' compensation benefits, and then brought this action against Beloit Corporation, the manufacturer of the machine which allegedly caused the injury. When Wilson sought to obtain certain component parts of the machine, it was discovered that the parts were missing. Wilson then brought IPC into this action on the theory that IPC either intentionally destroyed or negligently lost the parts, thereby irreparably damaging his lawsuit against Beloit.

IPC moved for summary judgment on the theory that Wilson's claim against it was an attempt to circumvent the exclusivity provisions of the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Law. At the conclusion of a hearing on December 17, 1987, the Court granted IPC's motion for summary judgment, and Wilson appealed.

On March 16, 1989, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals entered an opinion reversing the ruling of this Court, and remanding for further consideration. See 869 F.2d 1162 (8th Cir.1989). The Court of Appeals held that the Workers' Compensation Act did not apply to the injury allegedly sustained by IPC's negligent or intentional interference with Wilson's cause of action against Beloit, and that in a case of this nature, an employer is not protected by the exclusivity provision. The Court of Appeals further stated that this Court made no ruling on whether IPC had (1) a statutory duty to preserve the component parts for the injured employee; (2) assumed a duty to preserve them; or (3) a duty imposed under Arkansas tort law. The case was remanded for a determination as to whether there was such a duty.

By a letter dated September 19, 1989, the Court requested counsel to submit briefs on the issue of IPC's duty to preserve the parts. Counsel have submitted briefs in accordance with the Court's direction, and the Court is now ready to rule on this issue.

In the case of Koplin v. Rosel Well Perforators, Inc., 241 Kan. 206, 734 P.2d 1177, 70 A.L.R.4th 973 (1987), the Kansas Supreme Court, faced with a situation virtually identical to the one presented here, stated the general rule governing a duty to preserve evidence as follows:

Absent some special relationship or duty arising by reason of an agreement, contract, statute, or other special circumstance, the general rule is that there is no duty to preserve possible evidence for another party to aid that party in some future legal action against a third party.

241 Kan. at 208, 734 P.2d at 1179, 70 A.L. R.4th at 977. With this rule in mind, the Court will proceed to address the questions presented on remand.

1. DID IPC HAVE A STATUTORY DUTY TO PRESERVE THE COMPONENT PARTS FOR THE INJURED EMPLOYEE? IPC argues that there is no statutory duty to preserve the parts. Wilson cites two criminal statutes, Ark.Code Ann. §§ 5-53-110 and 5-53-111, which proscribe tampering with an official proceeding or investigation, and tampering with physical evidence, respectively. In Coley v. Arnot Ogden Memorial Hospital, 485 N.Y.S.2d 876, 107 A.D.2d 67 (1985), the plaintiff, in the course of her employment with defendant-hospital, was injured when a ladder she was standing on collapsed. Hospital personnel determined that the ladder was unsafe and discarded it, thereby preventing plaintiff from discovering the manufacturer and bringing a products liability action. Plaintiff sued the hospital alleging, inter alia, a violation of a penal statute prohibiting tampering with physical evidence. The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court stated that it was "unpersuaded by plaintiff's allegations of a violation of Penal Laws," on the basis that there was no evidence to show that hospital employees intended to prevent the use of the ladder in an official proceeding.

Here, Wilson does not know if the parts were intentionally destroyed or negligently lost. Because Wilson cannot state with certainty what happened to the parts, leaving open the possibility that mere negligence may be to blame, it would certainly not be appropriate to invoke a criminal statute which requires intent.

The Court is unable to find any statute which would impose upon IPC a duty to preserve the parts under the facts presented here. The Court therefore concludes that no statutory duty exists.

II. DOES ARKANSAS TORT LAW IMPOSE A...