Wilson v. Board of Retirement of Los Angeles County Emp. Retirement Ass'n

• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Citation: 319 P.2d 426,156 Cal.App.2d 195
• Decision Date: 17 December 1957
• Parties: Harry Jerome WILSON, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. BOARD OF RETIREMENT OF THE LOS ANGELES COUNTY EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT ASSOCIATION, et al., Defendants and Respondents. Civ. 22417.

Page 426

319 P.2d 426

156 Cal.App.2d 195

Harry Jerome WILSON, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. BOARD OF RETIREMENT OF THE LOS ANGELES COUNTY EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT ASSOCIATION, et al., Defendants and Respondents.

Civ. 22417.

District Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 2, California.

Dec. 17, 1957.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 13, 1958.

Hearing Denied Feb. 11, 1958.

John J. Guerin and Lionel Richman, Los Angeles, for appellant.

Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel and Edward H. Gaylord, Deputy County Counsel, Los Angeles, for respondents.

RICHARDS, Justice pro tem.

This is an appeal from a judgment for respondents on the pleadings in an action for declaratory relief and for writs of mandamus. Appellant, as a permanent employee of the classified civil service of the county of Los Angeles since 1936, except for military leave, and as a member of the retirement system of said county under the County Employees' Retirement Law of 1937 (Gov. Code, §§ 31450-31822), on behalf of himself and others similarly situated, filed his first amended complaint containing ten causes of action. The first seven causes of action sought a declaratory judgment as to the rights of appellant and others under said retirement law and the eighth cause of action sought a declaration as to the rights of county employees to vacation benefits in accordance with such benefits allowed in private industry. The ninth and tenth causes of action for writs of mandamus are corollary to the seventh and eighth causes for declaratory relief; the ninth, to compel the board of retirement to give appellant credit toward retirement for prior employment by the city of Los Angeles and for military service, and the tenth, to compel the board of supervisors to fix a prevailing wage providing vacation benefits for county employees in accord with such benefits allowed in private industry. Respondents filed notice of motion, on the pleadings, for judgment that the court make the declarations set forth in their notice of motion as to the eight causes of action for declaratory relief and for judgment that appellant was not entitled to a writ of mandamus. Contemporaneously therewith respondents filed a general and special demurrer which was placed off calendar. The respondents' motion for judgment on the pleadings was granted and a judgment was thereupon entered specifically declaring the rights of the parties in favor of respondents and against the appellant as to the controversies in the causes of action for declaratory relief and adjudging that appellant was not entitled to a writ of mandamus.

Appellant's opening brief is devoid of any claim of error as to the merits of the declarations of the rights of the parties as decreed by the court on the counts for declaratory relief. His only contentions are that, the respondents' motion for judgment on the pleadings having been granted, the court was limited to the entry of a judgment of dismissal and erred in rendering a judgment on the merits, and further, that the court erred in not granting him leave to amend his complaint, such leave having been requested by him prior to the submission of respondents' motion for judgment on the pleadings.

It is a settled rule that in an action in which the complaint alleges sufficient facts to show the existence of an actual controversy within the provisions of section 1060 of the Code of Civil Procedure and requests that the respective rights and duties of the parties be adjudged, it is the duty of the court to declare such rights and duties whether or not the facts alleged establish that the plaintiff is entitled to a favorable declaration and that it is error to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend to such a complaint. Bennett v. Hibernia Bank, 47 Cal.2d 540, 549-550, 305 P.2d 20; Columbia Pictures Corp. v. DeToth, 26 Cal.2d 753, 760, 161 P.2d 217, 162 A.L.R. 747; Maguire v. Hibernia S. & L. Soc., 23 Cal.2d 719, 728-729, 146 P.2d 673, 151 A.L.R. 1062. If the complaint is legally sufficient and sets forth facts and circumstances showing that a declaratory adjudication is appropriate, it is error for the trial court to enter a judgment on the pleadings dismissing the action. Chas. L. Harney, Inc. v. Contractors' Board, 39 Cal.2d 561, 565, 247 P.2d 913; Sullivan v. San Francisco Art Assn., 101 Cal.App.2d 449, 455, 225 P.2d 993.

It is established, as appellant contends, that a motion for a judgment on the pleadings, if it attacks the sufficiency of a complaint to state a cause of action, is tantamount to a general demurrer. MacIsaac v. Pozzo, 26 Cal.2d 809, 812-813, 161 P.2d 449; Byson v. City of Los Angeles, 149 Cal.App.2d 469, 472, 308 P.2d 765; Davis v. City of Santa Ana, 108 Cal.App.2d 669, 685, 239 P.2d 656. It is likewise settled that a motion by defendant for a judgment on the pleadings which attacks the sufficiency of the complaint to state a cause of action should not be granted 'without first giving the party an opportunity to elect whether he will stand on his pleadings or amend them.' MacIsaac v. Pozzo, supra 26 Cal.2d at page 816, 161 P.2d at page 452. However, in this action respondents' motion for a judgment on the pleadings did not attack the sufficiency of the appellant's amended complaint to state causes of action for a declaratory judgment. As a motion for a judgment on the pleadings, it admitted as true all of the well-pleaded facts alleged in appellant's complaint (Davis v. City of Santa Ana, supra, 108 Cal.App.2d at page 685, 239 P.2d at page 665) and sought, as a matter of law, the particular declarations of the rights and duties of the parties as set forth in the notice of motion with respect to the admitted allegations of the amended complaint.

The difference in function of a motion for a judgment on the pleadings directed to the sufficiency of such pleading and a motion for judgment, in an action for declaratory relief, that a declaration of the rights and duties of the parties be made upon the allegations of the complaint is explained in Strauss v. University of State of New York, 282 App.Div. 593, 125 N.Y.S.2d 821, in which the court said at page 824 'When the practice obtaining on motions addressed to a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment is examined it will be observed that the procedural situation differs somewhat from that in the usual action. If the complaint shows a good ground upon which the court will grant judgment on the subject matter of the controversy the complaint is good and will not be dismissed even though the plaintiff is wrong on the merits of his contention. The complaint will stand as a pleading although the court might think that defendant would be entitled to the declaration in his favor. The procedural theory is that such a complaint states a good ground for declaratory judgment * * * The indicated procedure would be for defendant to move on the pleadings for judgment that the declaration be made, but that it be made in favor of the defendant. This would seem to reach the procedural problem where no triable issue is presented.'

The propriety of adjudicating the respective contentions of the parties upon the pleadings in an action for declaratory relief by means of a motion for judgment on the pleadings is recognized and established in this state. In Essick v. City of Los Angeles, 34 Cal.2d 614, 213 P.2d 492, an action for declaratory relief was filed in which the plaintiff sought to have declared null and void certain ordinance provisions and a resolution passed by the city council relating to the granting of "conditional use' permits.' The defendants filed motions to dismiss which were granted and a judgment entered accordingly. On appeal, the court held that the granting of the conditional use permit did not violate and was not prohibited by the city charter. The court modified the judgment stating at pages 624-625 of 34 Cal.2d, at page 497 of 213 P.2d that 'However, as was held in Maguire v. Hibernia S. & L. Soc. (1944), 23 Cal.2d 719, 728-731, 146 P.2d 673, 151 A.L.R. 1062 * * * rather than a judgment of dismissal the trial court should have entered its judgment decreeing expressly (as is implied by the judgment of dismissal) that the plaintiffs are not entitled to declarations in their favor, which they seek.' Accordingly the court directed that the judgment of the trial court be modified by striking therefrom the words 'the plaintiffs take nothing by this action and the same is hereby dismissed,' and inserting in lieu thereof 'the resolution [of the council] * * * granting the application of the defendant Forest Lawn Company * * * for a conditional use permit for cemetery purposes, * * * is not null and void, and does not violate and is not prohibited by the charter of the City of Los Angeles; and that the conditional use permit * * * is valid as against all contentions of plaintiffs at issue in this suit.' There is a striking analogy between the adjudications made by the trial court in the instant case, and the modifications directed to be made in the Essick case by the Supreme Court. It is to be noted also that no answer was filed in the Essick case but only the motions to dismiss and that while the defendants' motions were for dismissal rather than for a judgment on the pleadings, it is clear that the Supreme Court, in modifying the judgment, treated the matter as though a motion for judgment on the pleadings had been made.

Perkins v. Sommers, 117 Cal.App.2d 32, 254 P.2d 913, was an action for declaratory relief in which the second amended complaint sought to have declared void a contract for the purchase and sale of real property. The defendants demurred and at the hearing thereon the defendants made an oral motion for a judgment on the pleadings, notice of which was waived by the plaintiffs. The trial court sustained the demurrer and rendered a judgment on the pleadings declaring that the written contract of purchase was valid. On appeal it was held 'that the judgment was a proper declaration of...