Wilson v. Boughton
| Decision Date | 19 July 2022 |
| Docket Number | 20-2938 |
| Citation | 41 F.4th 803 |
| Parties | Daniel M. WILSON, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Gary A. BOUGHTON, Respondent-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Christina Luise Wabiszewski, Attorney, Foley & Lardner LLP, Milwaukee, WI, for Petitioner-Appellant.
Daniel J. O'Brien, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, Wisconsin Department of Justice, Madison, WI, for Respondent-Appellee.
Before Sykes, Chief Judge, and Hamilton and Kirsch, Circuit Judges.
A Wisconsin jury convicted Daniel Wilson of sexually assaulting his girlfriend's young daughter, and the Wisconsin appellate courts affirmed. Wilson unsuccessfully sought habeas relief in federal district court and now appeals to us, arguing that the evidence could not support his conviction and that his counsel's representation was constitutionally deficient. But the Wisconsin courts reasonably found neither to be true, so we affirm.
In June 2013, Daniel "Trey" Wilson rekindled a romantic relationship with Jeanette Yegger, with whom he shares a child named Anthony. Yegger had four other children not fathered by Wilson; the oldest was FT, who, at that time, was seven years old and had special needs. At the outset of the rekindled relationship, Yegger was living with her five children and mother on Buffum Street in Milwaukee, and Wilson stayed there only occasionally. But those living arrangements changed in November 2013 when the couple moved with Yegger's five children into a house on 6th Street.
Within months of the move, the Bureau of Milwaukee Child Welfare received reports of physical abuse and unexplained injuries on Yegger's children. It therefore placed Yegger on a protective plan in May 2014, which required a protective adult to supervise Yegger's continued custody of her children. Originally, Yegger's sister acted as that adult at the 6th Street house from May 5 to May 13. But that did not work out, so Wilson's mother, Armer Lloyd—whom FT called "Anthony's granny"—agreed to take over, and the family moved to Lloyd's house on 28th Street on May 13, 2014.
One week later, on May 20, the Bureau removed all five children from Yegger's custody for placement with foster families. Each child received a medical checkup at the Children's Hospital of Wisconsin's Child Protection Center; FT's checkup was with pediatric nurse practitioner Debra Bretl. During the checkup, Bretl observed five genital lesions on FT. As Bretl made that observation, FT cried in response: "Someone did this to me," and, presumably referring to the instrument Bretl used during the exam, "Take it out."
FT had a follow-up appointment with pediatrician Judy Guinn three days later. Dr. Guinn observed genital and anal lesions, and an antibody test later allowed her to diagnose them as herpes.
Five days later, on May 28, FT spoke with Amanda Didier, a forensic interviewer at the Hospital's Child Protection Center, in a recorded video interview. FT recounted eight times that she had been sexually assaulted by Wilson, and police arrested Wilson later that day.
The State charged Wilson with Engaging in Repeated Acts of Sexual Assault of the Same Child in violation of Wis. Stat. § 948.025. One element of that offense requires at least three qualifying acts to occur "within a specified period of time." Id. § 948.025(1). The State specified this period as January 1, 2013 through May 5, 2014.
During the three-day jury trial on this charge, FT, Wilson, Yegger, Didier, and Guinn, among others, testified. The judge instructed the jury that it could find Wilson guilty of the lesser-included offense of First-Degree Sexual Assault of a Child, Wis. Stat. § 948.02(b), which requires only a single qualifying act, instead of the greater charged offense, which requires three. But the jury found Wilson guilty of the greater offense, § 948.025(1).
At sentencing, Wilson maintained his innocence to which the judge, who also presided at trial, responded, "[T]here was based upon my hearing of the case overwhelming testimony that you committed these outrageous assaults against that little girl." The judge then sentenced Wilson to 37 years' imprisonment with 13 years of extended supervision.
In a post-conviction motion, Wilson argued that the evidence could not support his conviction and that his counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient. The trial court denied his motion, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Wisconsin Supreme Court denied Wilson's subsequent petition for review.
Wilson then filed a habeas petition challenging his conviction, again arguing that the evidence was insufficient and his counsel's performance inadequate. The district court denied the petition but issued a certificate of appealability for each claim, and Wilson appealed.
We start with Wilson's sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge. See Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), we can grant habeas relief only under a few, limited circumstances. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Wilson argues that one such circumstance applies here. In his view, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals reached its decision to reject his sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge "based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." Id. § 2254(d)(2).
But Wilson has invoked the wrong AEDPA provision on appeal. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals did not purport to make any factual determinations in affirming his conviction. See Lopez v. Smith , 574 U.S. 1, 8, 135 S.Ct. 1, 190 L.Ed.2d 1 (2014) (per curiam) (). Instead, it merely cited the record to reach its legal conclusion that the jury had enough evidentiary support to find Wilson guilty of the charged offense under Jackson v. Virginia. We thus address his challenge under § 2254(d)(1) rather than (d)(2). Under this provision, we can grant habeas relief only if Wilson's state adjudication "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
To succeed, "a petitioner must persuade a federal court that no fairminded jurist could reach the state court's conclusion" under Supreme Court precedents. Brown v. Davenport , ––– U.S. ––––, 142 S. Ct. 1510, 1525, 212 L.Ed.2d 463 (2022) (). "The question under AEDPA is thus not whether a federal court believes the state court's determination was incorrect, but whether that determination was unreasonable—a substantially higher threshold for a prisoner to meet." Shoop v. Twyford , ––– U.S. ––––, 142 S. Ct. 2037, 2043, ––– L.Ed.2d –––– (2022) (citation omitted).
Under Jackson v. Virginia , the relevant Supreme Court precedent, evidence is constitutionally sufficient if, "after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781. This standard requires courts to presume that the trier of fact resolved any conflicting inferences in the prosecution's favor and to "defer to that resolution." Id. at 326, 99 S.Ct. 2781. Given these two layers of deference under AEDPA and Jackson , habeas petitioners pressing Jackson -based claims "face a high bar." Coleman v. Johnson , 566 U.S. 650, 655–56, 132 S.Ct. 2060, 182 L.Ed.2d 978 (2012) (per curiam).
The charge for which Wilson was convicted requires three acts of "sexual intercourse with a person who has not attained the age of 12 years." Wis. Stat. §§ 948.025(1)(b) ; 948.02(1)(b). The Wisconsin Court of Appeals held the evidence sufficient to convict Wilson because the jury heard FT describe at least three qualifying acts of sexual assault "at the homes where the family had lived during the specified time frame." Wilson argues that this explanation unreasonably construed the trial record which resulted in an unreasonable application of Jackson v. Virginia. According to Wilson, FT testified that all but one of the qualifying acts occurred when the family lived with Wilson's mother from May 13–20, 2014, a period after the State's specified timeframe ended on May 5.
We do not find the Wisconsin Court of Appeals' explanation unreasonable. It's true that, at trial, FT clearly testified about only one act that neatly fits Wisconsin's definition of "sexual intercourse"1 during the State's specified period. She testified that Wilson "touched [her] behind with his mouth" after pulling her pants down when she was asleep "at my house," not "Anthony's granny's house." All agree that "my house" refers to the 6th Street house, in which the family lived until May 13, 2014. Although it's possible that this assault occurred during the eight days after the State's specified period ended (May 5) but before the family's move from the 6th Street house (May 13), we do not understand Wilson to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence for this one act. At oral argument, Wilson's counsel agreed that this assault could have occurred during the charging period. Indeed, we don't see how he could have argued otherwise. The jury heard that Wilson lived with FT at the 6th Street house where the assault occurred for 185 days within the State's specified period.
That's one qualifying act, but two more are needed. See Wis. Stat. § 948.025(1)(b) (). During her videotaped forensic interview (submitted to the jury as substantive evidence), FT shared that Wilson performed at least two other sex acts fitting Wisconsin's definition of "sexual intercourse" without...
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...by his appellate counsel's failure to challenge the trial court's denial of his motions to suppress and quash. See Wilson v. Boughton, 41 F.4th 803, 811 (7th Cir. 2022) (holding a state court's application of Strickland not objectively unreasonable reasonable because the state court's deter......