Wilson v. Central Illinois Public Service Co.

• Decision Date: 25 January 1988
• Docket Number: No. 5-86-0779,5-86-0779
• Citation: Wilson v. Central Illinois Public Service Co., 519 N.E.2d 44, 165 Ill.App.3d 533 (Ill. App. 1988)
• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Parties: , 116 Ill.Dec. 454 Walter J. WILSON, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CENTRAL ILLINOIS PUBLIC SERVICE CO., a corp., Sargent & Lundy, Inc., and Newton Associates, Defendants-Appellants.

Page 44

519 N.E.2d 44

165 Ill.App.3d 533, 116 Ill.Dec. 454

Walter J. WILSON, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CENTRAL ILLINOIS PUBLIC SERVICE CO., a corp., Sargent &amp Lundy, Inc., and Newton Associates, Defendants-Appellants.

No. 5-86-0779.

Appellate Court of Illinois Fifth District.

Jan. 25, 1988.

Larry Hepler, Madelyn J. Lamb, Burroughs, Simpson, Hepler & Broom, Edwardsville, for defendants-appellants.

William W. Schooley, Law Offices of William W. Schooley, Granite City, for plaintiff-appellee.

Justice LEWIS delivered the opinion of the court:

This case is heard on appeal from the trial court's denial of the defendants' motions to transfer venue. The plaintiff, Walter J. Wilson, Jr., brought an action against the defendants, Central Illinois Public Service Company (CIPS), Sargent & Lundy, Inc. (Sargent & Lundy), and Newton Associates, in the circuit court of Madison County, Illinois, on March 27, 1984, seeking to recover damages for personal injuries sustained while working on the construction of an electric power generating facility located in Newton, Jasper County, Illinois.

It appears from the complaint that CIPS, in building the facility, contracted with Sargent & Lundy to design the facility and to provide construction supervision and contracted with Newton Associates to erect and construct the facility. Newton Associates contracted with plaintiff's employer to perform certain insulation services in the construction. The plaintiff was allegedly injured on the job, at the site, on October 18, 1982. The complaint contained six counts. Two counts were directed against each of the defendants charging violations of the Structural Work Act and negligence. All three defendants filed special and limited appearances and motions for change of venue alleging that they were not residents of Madison County within the meaning of the venue statute. Discovery was conducted, and arguments were heard on the motions, to which affidavits had been attached. The trial court took the motions under advisement, and, after considering the matter, entered the following order on November 3, 1986:

"Defendant's [sic] motion for change of venue on the grounds the defendant [sic] has not been doing business in Madison County is denied."

Although it is not spelled out, we can assume that the trial court denied the motions of all three defendants. Insofar as the defendant CIPS is concerned the plaintiff argues only that since there were no allegations that the remaining defendants were joined to fix venue, the residence of Sargent & Lundy and/or Newton Associates fixes venue for all defendants. The statutes in question provide in part as follows:

"s 2-101. Generally. Except as otherwise provided in this Act, every action must be commenced (1) in the county of residence of any defendant who is joined in good faith and with probable cause for the purpose of obtaining a judgment against him or her and not solely for the purpose of fixing venue in that county, or (2) in the county in which the transaction or some part thereof occurred out of which the cause of action arose." (Ill.Rev.Stat., 1985, ch. 110, par. 2-101.)

"s 2-102. Residence of corporations, voluntary unincorporated associations and partnerships defined. For purpose of venue, the following definitions apply:

(a) Any private corporation or railroad or bridge company, organized under the laws of this State, and any foreign corporation authorized to transact business in this State is a resident of any county in which it has its registered office or other office or is doing business. * * *

(b) A partnership sued in its firm name is a resident of any county in which any partner resides or in which the partnership has an office or is doing business. * * *" Ill.Rev.Stat., 1985, ch. 110, par. 2-102(a), (b).

We agree with the plaintiff that the county of residence of any defendant who is joined in good faith fixes venue in that county. (See Hines v. Dresser Industries, Inc. (1985), 137 Ill.App.3d 7, 91 Ill.Dec. 842, 484 N.E.2d 401.) The plaintiff maintains that both Sargent & Lundy, a partnership, and Newton Associates, a joint venture, were doing business in Madison County sufficiently to establish venue. The defendants take a contrary view.

The interrogatories disclose that the defendant Sargent & Lundy had entered into an annual service contract with Illinois Power Company to perform engineering services for Illinois Power throughout the State of Illinois. Under that agreement, the defendant Sargent & Lundy billed Illinois Power for work done in Madison County and was paid for services during the years 1977 through 1983. Total billings by Sargent & Lundy for work performed in Madison County since 1980 were as follows:

1980  $ 3,447.92
                1981   27,021.30
                1982    1,419.35
                1983    1,073.97
                1984         "0"
                

A similar contract was entered into between these same two parties in 1983, but there has been no activity on the account.

From the discovery material in the record, it appears that Newton Associates was a joint venture formed for the sole purpose of erecting a generating facility in Newton, Illinois, for CIPS. The members of the joint venture were as follows:

Power Systems, Inc.

Gust K. Newberg Construction

General Contractors, Inc.

Fishback and Moore Electrical Contracting, Inc.

McCartin, McAuliffe Mechanical Contractors, Inc. All of the members of the joint venture appear to be corporations. After the completion of the project, the joint venture was dissolved. The joint venture itself had no contacts with Madison County nor had any of the members with the exception of McCartin, McAuliffe Mechanical Contractors, Inc. (McCartin). Through discovery it was disclosed that McCartin performed work at the Kilngas plant in Wood River, Illinois, which is in Madison County, during the period of January 1982 through July 1983, and, further, that McCartin obtained supplies for this project from suppliers located in Madison County as follows:

East Alton Supply  $922,450.00
                S & K Rigging       118,970.00
                Ameri"Gas            58,804.00
                Barton Trucking     317,120.00
                

In asserting that venue was proper in Madison County in the instant case, the plaintiff relies on the concept of doing business within a county for the purpose of establishing venue. The cases of Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Mosele (1977), 67 Ill.2d 321, 10 Ill.Dec. 602, 368 N.E.2d 88, and Stambaugh v. International Harvester Co. (1984), 102 Ill.2d 250, 80 Ill.Dec. 28, 464 N.E.2d 1011, discuss this issue at length. The Mosele court held that the legislature intended that more extensive contacts with a county are necessary to establish proper venue than are required when the issue is whether the defendant is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State. The court held that a defendant must be conducting its usual and customary business within the county in which venue is sought. In the words of the Mosele court:

"A comparison of the literal terms of sections 6 and 17 demonstrates that the legislature intended that more extensive contacts with a county are necessary to establish proper venue than are required when the issue is whether the defendant is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State. It would be a distortion of the plain meaning of the words of the venue statute to hold that a corporation is 'doing business' within any county with which it has even minimal contacts. Additionally, such a construction of section 6 of the Civil Practice Act would have the effect of negating the principle of convenience upon which section 5 of the Act is based. To judicially define the 'doing business' provision of the venue statute as being synonomous [sic] with the test for establishing jurisdiction under section 17 would be to allow the institution of actions in locations with little connection with the defendant and with no connection with the activities which give rise to the suit.

We hold, therefore, that in order to establish that a defendant is doing business within a county for purposes of venue, quantitatively more business activity within the county must be demonstrated than where the question is whether the defendant has transacted any business within the State for purposes of service of process pursuant to section 17. The defendant must, in short, be conducting its usual and customary business within the county in which venue is sought. In the words of one Federal court faced with a similar problem of construction, 'the activity must be of such a nature so as to localize the business and make it an operation within the district.' (Remington Rand, Inc. v. Knapp-Monarch Co. (E.D.Pa.1956), 139 F.Supp. 613, 617.)" Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Mosele, 67 Ill.2d 321, 329-30, 10 Ill.Dec. 602-06, 368 N.E.2d 88-92.

The defendants argue that venue is established based upon the time the complaint was filed, while the plaintiff claims that venue attaches at the time the incident occurred. It has been stated as a general...