Wilson v. City of Fountain Valley

• Decision Date: 23 March 2004
• Docket Number: No. SA CV 01-0147 DOC(RZ).,SA CV 01-0147 DOC(RZ).
• Citation: 372 F.Supp.2d 1178
• Parties: Mark WILSON, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF FOUNTAIN VALLEY, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Central District of California

372 F.Supp.2d 1178

Mark WILSON, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF FOUNTAIN VALLEY, et al., Defendants.

No. SA CV 01-0147 DOC(RZ).

United States District Court, C.D. California.

March 23, 2004.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Mark Wilson, Santa Ana, CA, Pro se.

John Barber, Santa Ana, CA, for City of Fountain Valley.

ORDER:

(1) ACCEPTING THIRD REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE; and

(2) WITHDRAWING REFERENCE TO MAGISTRATE JUDGE

CARTER, District Judge.

The Court has reviewed the file in this matter, has read and reviewed the Third Report and Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge; and has reviewed de novo all objections, including not only objections to the Third Report but also objections to the Second And Final Report and the First Interim Report. The Court accepts the Third Report and its findings and recommendations.

The reference to the Magistrate Judge is WITHDRAWN. The undersigned District Judge shall preside over further proceedings.

THIRD REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ZAREFSKY, United States Magistrate Judge.

The undersigned hereby withdraws the Second And Final Report and Recommendation filed on August 13, 2003 and, in part to respond to certain objections raised by Plaintiff, submits in its place this Third Report and Recommendation to the Honorable David O. Carter, United States District Judge. The undersigned recommends that Defendant Gillen's Motion for Summary Judgment be granted; that all remaining claims against Defendant Gillen be dismissed; that the Fountain Valley defendants' motion to dismiss, converted by the undersigned to a motion for summary judgment and/or for judgment on the pleadings, be granted; and that all claims against the Fountain Valley defendants except claims 10 and 14 be dismissed.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND PRIOR TO THE TWO CURRENT MOTIONS

In January 2001, Plaintiff Mark Wilson commenced this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging fourteen ways in which Defendants violated his constitutional rights in 1999 and 2000. His first three claims stem from a March 1999 incident in which he alleges that Detective Mike Llorens, one of the six City of Fountain Valley police officers named in this action (collectively referred to, with the defendant City, as the "Fountain Valley defendants"), detained and questioned him without justification. His fourth, fifth and sixth claims relate to his arrest on December 1, 1999, by four of the Fountain Valley defendants (Simko, Farley, Ahlo and Long) and a state parole agent, Defendant Richard Gillen, in a manner that he contends violated his rights. In his seventh, eighth and ninth claims, Plaintiff asserts that Gillen and the same four Fountain Valley police officers searched his dwelling on February 3, 2000, without reasonable purpose — although one of the conditions of his parole at that time was that he submit to searches at any time and with or without cause — and principally in retaliation for Plaintiff's prior litigation efforts against those four Fountain Valley defendants. Plaintiff's eleventh and twelfth claims accuse Defendants of violating his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by attaching a "Tele-trac" device to his car on December 1, 1999, to monitor his movements. His thirteenth claim asserts that, on the same day, Gillen handcuffed him too tightly for too long.

Never targeted for dismissal or summary adjudication are claims 10 and 14, neither of which implicates defendant Gillen. In claim 10, Plaintiff accuses either two or four of the Fountain Valley defendants-it is unclear whether this count targets only Ahlo and Long or if it also targets Farley and McInnis — of violating Plaintiff's right of access to the courts by improperly confiscating materials during their March 2000 search of his residence. In claim 14, Plaintiff asserts that the City of Fountain Valley failed to train the defendant officers adequately, resulting in their wrongful actions in counts 1 through 12.

On January 8, 2002, upon the recommendation of the undersigned, the Court granted in part defendant Gillen's prior dismissal motion. Specifically, the Court dismissed (a) claims 4 and 13, which stemmed from the December 1, 1999, events, as time-barred; and (b) claims 11 and 12, based on use of the Tele-trac device, and claim 8, asserting that the February 3, 2000, search occurred at an unreasonably early hour of the day, as legally insufficient. Hence, in the wake of the Court's January 8, 2002 Order, the following claims remain:

• all claims against the Fountain Valley defendants (claims 1-14, except claim 13, the handcuffing claim, which targeted only Gillen); and

• claims 7 and 9 against defendant Gillen. (Claims 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 10 and 14 do not target Gillen.)

II. THE TWO CURRENT MOTIONS BY DEFENDANTS

On November 8, 2002, the Fountain Valley defendants filed a FED. R. CIV. P 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss all claims against them except claims 10 and 14. The undersigned, noting that a motion under that rule was untimely, converted that motion to one seeking either judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) or, given the possible need to refer to matters outside the pleadings, summary adjudication under Rule 56.

On November 27, 2002, defendant Gillen filed a motion for summary judgment as to the two remaining claims against him, claims 7 and 9, along with the required Statement of Uncontroverted Facts and Conclusions of Law ("SUP") and other supporting documents. The Fountain Valley defendants filed a joinder in Gillen's motion on December 10, 2002, although they did not add any evidence of their own.

Plaintiff filed several documents in opposition to the motions, including multiple declarations, although be never filed a Statement Of Genuine Issues In Dispute "setting forth all material facts as to which it is contended there exists a genuine issue necessary to be litigated," as he was advised to do in the Court's and Gillen's notices made pursuant to Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 960 (9th Cir.1998), and as is required by CIVIL L.R. 56-2. The Local Rules provide that —

In determining any motion for summary judgment, the Court will assume that the material facts as claimed and adequately supported by the moving party are admitted to exist without controversy except to the extent that such material facts are (a) included in the "Statement of Genuine Issues" and (b) controverted by declaration or other written evidence filed in opposition to the motion.

CIVIL L.R. 56-3 (emphasis added). Notwithstanding this Rule and Plaintiff's failure to provide a Statement of Genuine Issues In Dispute, the Court has considered Plaintiff's declarations and other submissions in opposition to the motions.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Standards of Proof

Although Gillen seeks only summary judgment under FED. R. CIV. P. 56, the Court has converted the Fountain Valley defendants' motion to one seeking either summary judgment or judgment on the pleadings under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c). Accordingly, the Court reviews the standard of proof for both kinds of motions.

1. Judgment on the Pleadings

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) provides that "[a]fter the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings." Normally, judgment on the pleadings is proper when the moving party clearly establishes on the face of the pleadings that no material issue of fact remains to be resolved and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 (9th Cir.1989). However, if a motion for judgment on the pleadings is used to raise the defense of failure to state a claim, then the motion faces the same test as a motion brought under Rule 12(b)(6): judgment may be granted to the defendant only if it is clear that no relief could be granted to the plaintiff under any set of facts that could be proven consistent with the allegations. McGlinchy v. Shell Chemical Co., 845 F.2d 802, 810 (9th Cir.1988). Under either standard, the allegations of the non-moving party must be accepted as true, while the allegations of the moving party which have been denied are assumed to be false. Hal Roach, 896 F.2d at 1550.

2. Summary Judgment

In contrast, summary judgment motions test the evidence, not the pleadings. Such motions should be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of showing there is no genuine issue for trial, before the nonmoving party must introduce evidence. But the moving party is not initially required to introduce evidence negating an element on which the non-moving party will bear the burden of proof at trial (although the moving party may, and often does, do so). Rather, the moving party need only point out to the Court that, on at least one such element, no evidence supports non-moving party's case. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 815 (9th Cir.1994). Thereafter, the nonmoving party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading but rather must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

Any inferences drawn from the evidence presented will be viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See id. at 254, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed, moreover, because the "court recognizes that it has a duty to ensure that pro se litigants do not lose their right to a hearing on the merits due to ignorance of technical procedural...