Wilson v. City of Providence

• Docket Number: PC-2022-01362
• Decision Date: 24 August 2023
• Parties: MARILYN L. WILSON, Plaintiff, v. THE CITY OF PROVIDENCE, by and through its Treasurer, JAMES J. LOMBARDI, and DIANE C. WILSON, Defendants.
• Court: Superior Court of Rhode Island

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MARILYN L. WILSON, Plaintiff, v. THE CITY OF PROVIDENCE, by and through its Treasurer, JAMES J. LOMBARDI, and DIANE C. WILSON, Defendants.

No. PC-2022-01362

Superior Court of Rhode Island, Providence

August 24, 2023

For Plaintiff: Robert P. Brooks, Esq.; Stephen D. Lapatin, Esq.

For Defendant: Suzannah Skolnick-Smith, Esq.; Ryan C. Hurley Esq.; Thomas C. Plunkett, Esq.

DECISION

THUNBERG, J.

Before the Court for a decision are Plaintiff Marilyn Wilson's Motion for Summary Judgment and Co-Defendant Diane Wilson's Motion for Summary Judgment. Jurisdiction is pursuant to G.L. 1956 §§ 8-2-13, 8-2-14(a), 9-30-1 and Rule 56 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure.

I Facts & Travel

Plaintiff Marilyn Wilson, and Milton Wilson were married on March 28, 1988. See Pl.'s Ex. A (Marriage Certificate to Marilyn) 1. Mr. Wilson was a police officer for Defendant, the City of Providence (the City). See Co-Def. Diane's Ex. I (Diane Aff.) ¶ 9. Mr. Wilson and Marilyn^[1]had no children during their marriage, and on January 27, 1994, Marilyn filed for divorce. (Pl.'s Ex. B (Compl. for Divorce) ¶¶ 3-4.)

Prior to the entry of final judgment in the divorce action, Mr. Wilson retired from the police department. See Pl.'s Ex. C (Mr. Wilson's Application for Service Retirement) 1. Mr. Wilson applied for service retirement on December 27, 1994. See id. He subsequently submitted a "Member's Election of Retirement Benefits" to the Employee Retirement System on March 15, 1995 through which he selected the "maximum retirement allowance with continuing benefits to [his] wife (Marilyn Wilson) immediately upon [his] death." Pl.'s Ex. E (Mr. Wilson's Election of Retirement Benefits) 1.

On April 29, 1995, Marilyn and Mr. Wilson executed a Property Settlement Agreement to divide their property and to determine support obligations. See Pl.'s Ex. F (Property Settlement Agreement) 1-2. The Property Settlement Agreement provided in pertinent part that:

"It is acknowledged by the parties that the husband has a pension with the City of Providence, which has a marital coverture value of approximately $300,000.00 . . . . The parties agree that [Mr. Wilson] shall have all right, title and interest to said pensions to the exclusion of [Marilyn], subject to the provisions set forth in paragraph FIFTH, entitled 'Alimony.'" Id. at 2.

The fifth paragraph stated that:

"[Mr. Wilson] shall nominate [Marilyn] as the designated beneficiary to receive his survivor pension benefits from the City of Providence . . . . To effectuate the nomination of [Marilyn] as [Mr. Wilson's] designated survivor beneficiary on his said pension with the City of Providence, [Mr. Wilson] shall nominate [Marilyn] by written designation duly executed and filed with the Retirement Board of the Employees' Retirement System . . . The parties shall execute any and all necessary documents to effectuate this provision of the within Agreement. In addition, [Mr. Wilson] shall not in any way alienate the survivor benefit to the detriment of [Marilyn], as set forth hereinabove and shall further take all the requisite steps to protect her status as the survivor beneficiary on his pension benefits with the City of Providence . . . It is acknowledge[d] by the parties that it is the intention that [Marilyn] be an irrevocable beneficiary on any of the pension, or annuity benefits that the husband has with the City of Providence . . . ." Id. at 5-6.

On June 1, 1995, the Family Court entered a Decision Pending Entry of Final Judgment which incorporated the terms of the Property Settlement Agreement by reference but did not merge the terms into the judgment. (Pl.'s Ex. H (Decision Pending Entry of Final J.) 1.) On September 21, 1998, the Family Court entered a Final Judgment of Divorce indicating that the terms of the Property Settlement Agreement were incorporated by reference but not merged into the final agreement. See Pl.'s Ex. J (Final J. of the Family Ct.) 2.

On May 4, 2007, Mr. Wilson married Co-Defendant Diane Wilson. (Pl.'s Ex. M (Marriage Certificate to Diane). Mr. Wilson and Diane lived together during their marriage and shared property and financial resources until Mr. Wilson's death on December 5, 2020. See Diane Aff. ¶¶ 2-7. After Mr. Wilson's death, the City began paying surviving spouse benefits to Diane. Id. ¶ 10.

On January 5, 2021, Marilyn, by and through her attorney, contacted Ken Chiavarini, the City's attorney, indicating that she was entitled to surviving spouse benefits pursuant to the divorce decree and asking what steps she should take to begin receiving payments. See Pl.'s Ex. Q (E-Mail Chain) 6. After some conversation, Mr. Chiavarini replied that any death benefit under Mr. Wilson's Maximum Option pension would have been used up approximately ten and a quarter years after his retirement, leaving none to be paid to Marilyn as the designated beneficiary. Id. at 2. Mr. Chiavarini also informed Marilyn that the surviving spouse benefit pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 45-21.3-1 was to be paid to the current surviving spouse. Id.

On April 29, 2021, Marilyn filed an ex parte, post-judgment motion for a Writ of Execution in the divorce action, requesting that the Family Court "issue a Writ of Execution regarding [Marilyn's] property right to survivor pension benefits from the City of Providence pursuant to her status as his surviving spouse, as indicated in the Family Court Final Judgment, Property Settlement Agreement, and Decision pending Entry of Final Judgment." (Pl.'s Ex. R (Mot. for Writ of Execution) 1.) The Family Court granted Marilyn's motion; however, after Marilyn filed another Post-Judgment Motion for Relief to which the City filed objections, the Family Court declined to rule on the issue of whether the City was required to pay the surviving spouse benefit to Marilyn and dismissed the Post-Judgment Motion for Relief. See Pl.'s Ex. S (Order Regarding Writ of Execution) 1; Pl.'s Ex. W (Post-Final J. Mot. for Relief) 1-5; Pl.'s Ex. X (City's Obj. to Pl.'s Post-Final Mot. for Relief) 1-4; see also Mem. of Law Supp. Pl.'s Mot. for Summ. J. (Pl.'s Summ. J. Mem.) 11; Mem. of Law Supp. Mot. for Summ. J. of Diane (Diane's Summ. J. Mem.) 5.

On March 8, 2022, Marilyn filed a three-count complaint against the City and Diane. (Compl. ¶¶ 50-65.) Count I is a declaratory judgment claim asserted against the City and Diane seeking a declaration that "[Marilyn] is entitled to the survivor pension benefits of Mr. Wilson from the City . . . ." (Compl. ¶¶ 50-55.) Count II is a breach of contract claim against the City seeking damages for the City's alleged breach of its contractual obligation to provide Marilyn with the surviving spouse benefit. Id. ¶¶ 56-61. Count III is a claim for injunctive relief asking for this Court to issue injunctive relief with respect to the surviving spouse benefit. Id. ¶¶ 62-65.

Diane and the City subsequently filed their answers to Marilyn's Complaint. See Docket. On November 7, 2022, Diane filed a cross-claim against the City asserting one count for declaratory relief seeking a declaration that she is the surviving spouse of Mr. Wilson and that she is entitled to Mr. Wilson's surviving spouse pension benefits from the City. (Co-Def. Diane's Cross-cl. Against Co-Def. the City (Diane's Cross-cl.) ¶¶ 15-17.) On November 16, 2022, the City filed its answer to Diane's Cross-claim. See Docket.

On March 6, 2023, Marilyn filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment, and Diane filed her Motion for Summary Judgment. Id. The City subsequently filed a response memorandum to both parties' motions, and Marilyn filed her objection to Diane's motion. Id. Diane subsequently filed her opposition to Marilyn's motion and her reply to Marilyn's objection. Id. Lastly, Marilyn filed her reply to Diane's objection, and the City filed its response to Marilyn's objection. Id.

On May 10, 2023, this Court heard the parties' arguments on their motions for summary judgment and reserved its judgment. See id. On June 27, 2023, Defendant Wilson filed a Supplemental Memorandum in Support of her Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of her Objection to Marilyn's Motion for Summary Judgment. Id. Marilyn filed her Supplemental Memorandum of Law in Support of her Motion for Summary Judgment and Objection to Defendant Diane's Motion for Summary Judgment on July 26, 2023. Id. Accordingly, Marilyn and Diane's motions for summary judgment are now before this Court for disposition.

II Standard of Review

"'[S]ummary judgment is a drastic remedy, and a motion for summary judgment should be dealt with cautiously.'" DeMaio v. Ciccone, 59 A.3d 125, 129 (R.I. 2013) (quoting Estate of Giuliano v. Giuliano, 949 A.2d 386, 390 (R.I. 2008)). Under Rule 56 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, a court should only grant a motion for summary judgment when the competent evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party "show[s] that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as matter of law." Super. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Andrade v. Westlo Management LLC, 276 A.3d 393, 399-400 (R.I. 2022). The court should examine the factual evidence contained in "the pleadings, depositions, documents, electronically stored information, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits . . .," Super. R. Civ. P. 56(c), but the parties may not rest on mere allegations or denials contained in the pleadings. See Loffredo v. Shapiro, 274 A.3d 782, 790 (R.I. 2022).

Once the movant has alleged the absence of material factual issues, the opposing party has an affirmative duty to provide evidence of the existence of material factual disputes. Id. Disputes of any fact will not defeat a ...