Wilson v. Cohen

• Decision Date: 09 June 1992
• Docket Number: No. 14240,14240
• Citation: 610 A.2d 1177,222 Conn. 591
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Tyrone WILSON v. David COHEN, Assistant State's Attorney.

Page 1177

610 A.2d 1177

222 Conn. 591

Tyrone WILSON v. David COHEN, Assistant State's Attorney.

No. 14240.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Jan. 14, 1992.

Decided June 9, 1992.

Berdon, J., dissented and filed opinion.

Monte P. Radler, Asst. Public Defender, for plaintiff in error.

Jack W. Fischer, Deputy Asst. State's Atty., with whom, on the brief, were Eugene J. Callahan, State's Atty., and David I. Cohen, Sr. Asst. State's Atty., for defendant in error.

PETERS, C.J., and SHEA, GLASS, COVELLO, BORDEN, BERDON and SANTANIELLO, JJ.

GLASS, Associate Justice.

The plaintiff in error, Tyrone Wilson (plaintiff), brought a writ of error to this court seeking a reversal of a judgment of the Superior Court, summarily finding him in contempt of court and imposing a sentence of six months imprisonment. The sole issue is whether the plaintiff is entitled to a jury trial pursuant to General Statutes § 54-82b. ¹ Because we conclude that the plaintiff is not entitled to a jury trial, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The record discloses the following. The plaintiff and Terrence Boyd were charged with the crimes of felony murder, burglary in the first degree and larceny in the third degree. See State v. Boyd, 214 Conn. 132, 570 A.2d 1125 (1990). The plaintiff agreed to a sentence of twenty years on a plea of guilty to burglary in the first degree. The plaintiff testified at Boyd's trial and Boyd was convicted as charged. This court set aside Boyd's conviction of felony murder on appeal, however, on the ground that the insufficiency of admissible evidence presented at his probable cause hearing deprived the trial court of personal jurisdiction over him. Id., 141, 570 A.2d 1125. On remand, the trial court held a new probable cause hearing on December 23, 1990, at which the plaintiff was called as a witness. The plaintiff refused to answer any questions posed by the defendant in error, assistant state's attorney David Cohen (defendant). The trial court ordered the plaintiff to answer the defendant's questions and advised him that he could be held in contempt if he refused. ² Despite the trial court's admonitions, the plaintiff persisted in refusing to testify. The plaintiff stated that he was refusing to answer any questions because he was concerned about his personal safety at the correctional institution where he was incarcerated. The trial court reviewed the various contempt statutes, ³ and informed the plaintiff that it believed that General Statutes § 51-33a was applicable. The trial court advised the plaintiff that, pursuant to § 51-33a, the state's attorney would have to decide whether to file contempt charges, which would then be adjudicated by another judge. The trial court then continued Boyd's probable cause hearing until January, 1991.

On January 23, 1991, the trial court, relying on Moore v. State, 186 Conn. 256, 440 A.2d 969 (1982), advised the plaintiff that his refusal to testify would constitute summary contempt for which it could impose a sentence of up to six months to run concurrently or consecutively with the sentence that he was then serving. After answering a few preliminary questions posed by the defendant, the plaintiff refused to answer any further questions. The trial court established that the plaintiff did not intend to testify further and that his refusal was based on concern for his personal safety, the same reason that he had given at the previous hearing. The trial court then advised the plaintiff that it would order him to answer the defendant's questions, and that if he refused, it would hold him in contempt of court. The court again advised the plaintiff that it was authorized to impose a sentence of up to six months imprisonment. The plaintiff continued to refuse to testify, and the trial court found him in contempt of court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-33. ⁴ The trial court advised the plaintiff that his refusal to answer any questions despite its order that he do so amounted to summary contempt under Moore v. State, supra, and that it intended to impose a sentence of six months to run consecutively to his current sentence. After inquiring whether the plaintiff still refused to testify, to which the plaintiff responded affirmatively, the trial court sentenced him to six months incarceration to run consecutively to the sentence he was then serving.

The sole issue presented by this writ of error is whether, pursuant to § 54-82b, the trial court was empowered to impose a sentence in excess of thirty days on a summary contempt charge without providing the plaintiff the right to a jury trial. It is well established that this court's review of a summary criminal contempt proceeding by writ of error is limited to three questions: "(1) whether the designated conduct is legally susceptible of constituting a contempt; Goodhart v. State, [84 Conn. 60, 63, 78 A. 853 (1911) ]; (2) whether the punishment imposed was authorized by law; State v. Jackson, 147 Conn. 167, 169, 158 A.2d 166 (1960); and (3) whether the judicial authority was qualified to conduct the hearing. Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 465-66, 91 S.Ct. 499 [504-05], 27 L.Ed.2d 532 (1971)." Moore v. State, supra, 186 Conn. at 257, 440 A.2d 969; see also Jackson v. Bailey, 221 Conn. 498, 500-501, 605 A.2d 1350 (1992); In re Dodson, 214 Conn. 344, 346-47, 572 A.2d 328, cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 247, 112 L.Ed.2d 205 (1990). ⁵ The plaintiff concedes that the writ of error in the present case is limited to the second question.

The plaintiff argues that, pursuant to § 54-82b, the trial court was required to afford him the opportunity for a jury trial. In essence, the plaintiff contends that § 54-82b supersedes § 51-33 to the extent that the latter statute authorizes the summary imposition of up to six months imprisonment for a contempt committed in the presence of the court. The defendant argues that the plaintiff's construction of § 54-82b renders § 51-33 meaningless and, therefore, violates basic rules of statutory construction. We agree with the defendant.

Section 54-82b(a) provides that "[t]he party accused in a criminal action in the superior court may demand a trial by jury of issues which are triable of right by a jury." The statute specifically exempts criminal actions for which the maximum penalty is a fine of $199. ⁶ Section 51-33 authorizes "any court" to "punish by fine and imprisonment any person who in its presence behaves contemptuously or in a disorderly manner." Under the latter statute, a court's authority is expressly limited however, to imposing a fine of up to $100 or a term of imprisonment of up to six months or both. A statute providing for the summary punishment of criminal contempt had existed in the state of Connecticut well before § 54-82b was enacted. See, e.g., General Statutes (1888 Rev.) § 843 (allowing any court, except a justice of the peace, to punish by a fine no greater than $100 and by imprisonment for no longer than six months, any person who behaves contemptuously or disorderly in the court's presence).

Section 54-82b, by its terms, limits the right to a jury trial to "the party accused in a criminal action." (Emphasis added.) The plaintiff argues, therefore, that this court should construe a summary criminal contempt proceeding as a "criminal action" within the meaning of § 54-82b. In so arguing, the plaintiff asks this court to conclude that the legislature, in enacting § 54-82b, impliedly repealed § 51-33 to the extent that it permits a court summarily to punish a contempt committed in its presence. ⁷ We decline to reach such a conclusion.

"The rule disfavoring implied repeals is a well established principle of statutory construction.... The legislature is presumed to have acted with the intent to create a consistent body of law.... If two statutes appear to be in conflict but can be construed as consistent with each other, then the court should give effect to both.... [E]nactments by the General Assembly are presumed to repeal earlier inconsistent ones to the extent that they are in conflict.... Because repeal by implication is generally disfavored, however, the principle applies only when the relevant statutes cannot stand together...." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Dugas v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 217 Conn. 631, 641, 587 A.2d 415 (1991).

The plaintiff relies on Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 88 S.Ct. 1477, 20 L.Ed.2d 522 (1968), in support of his argument that the distinctions between summary criminal contempt proceedings and criminal prosecutions are artificial and, therefore, a summary criminal contempt proceeding should be deemed a "criminal action" within the meaning of § 54-82b. In deciding whether a contemnor summarily sentenced to more than six months imprisonment had a constitutional right to a jury trial, the United States Supreme Court in Bloom analogized criminal contempt proceedings to criminal prosecutions. The court referred to criminal contempt as "a crime in the ordinary sense" and "in every fundamental respect," stating that "convictions for criminal contempt are indistinguishable from ordinary criminal convictions...." Id., at 201, 88 S.Ct. at 1482.

Similarly, this court long ago concluded that a criminal contempt proceeding should conform as nearly as possible to proceedings in criminal cases. Welch v. Barber, 52 Conn. 147, 157 (1884); see also McTigue v. New London Education Assn., 164 Conn. 348, 356, 321 A.2d 462 (1973). We have nonetheless previously rejected an argument akin to that made by the plaintiff in the present case. In State v. Jackson, supra, the defendant, an attorney who had been summarily punished for a contempt committed in the presence of the court, claimed to have a right of appeal pursuant to General Statutes (1958 Rev.) § 54-12, which provided that "[a]ny person convicted ... by any municipal court of any offense may ... appeal from the judgment ... to...