Wilson v. Com.

Decision Date11 August 1992
PartiesJoan WILSON & others 1 v. COMMONWEALTH.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Nicholas B. Soutter (Paul S. McGovern, with him), Wellesley, for plaintiffs.

Madelyn Morris, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the Com.

Gregor I. McGregor, Boston, for Massachusetts Ass'n of Conservation Commissions, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.

Richard S. Emmet, Boston, for Conservation Law Foundation, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.

Before WILKINS, ABRAMS, NOLAN, LYNCH and GREANEY, JJ.

WILKINS, Justice.

In January, 1987, a storm caused a breach in Nauset Beach off the coast of Chatham resulting, among other things, in the exposure of the coastline of portions of Chatham to higher tides and more destructive wave action than before the storm. Beginning in the fall of 1987, the plaintiffs and some of their Chatham neighbors, who owned property being eroded by the ocean, commenced law suits and administrative proceedings seeking permission to erect protective barriers to prevent the further erosion of their properties. On October 22, 1988, while the plaintiffs' administrative appeal from the denial of their petition to construct a stone revetment was pending before the Department of Environmental Quality Engineering (now the Department of Environmental Protection), their houses were destroyed by the sea. According to the plaintiffs' complaint, their properties are now worthless as a result of the destructive action of the ocean. For the purposes of this appeal, we must accept this allegation as true.

The plaintiffs commenced this action on July 31, 1989, claiming monetary damages on the ground that the Commonwealth had acted negligently and unlawfully and had made a regulatory taking of their properties. A judge in the Superior Court allowed the Commonwealth's motion to dismiss the complaint under Mass.R.Civ.P. 12(c), 365 Mass. 754 (1974). The Appeals Court affirmed as to all counts of the complaint except those alleging a taking. Wilson v. Commonwealth, 31 Mass.App.Ct. 757, 583 N.E.2d 894 (1992). As to the taking claim, the Appeals Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. We granted the Commonwealth's application for further appellate review to consider its claim that, as a matter of law, the circumstances disclosed by the pleadings could not constitute a regulatory taking. 2

Our interest in taking the case for further appellate review was to determine whether we could identify circumstances, within the scope of the complaint, in which the action or inaction of the Commonwealth could amount to a regulatory taking of the plaintiffs' properties. The Commonwealth's principal argument is that the administrative process had not been completed when the ocean destroyed the plaintiffs' homes and that, without a final agency decision, it is impossible to determine that application of the regulatory process amounted to a taking of the plaintiffs' properties. Our task has been complicated by a complaint that the Appeals Court accurately characterized as "confused" (id. at 758) and by briefs for the plaintiffs, both in the Appeals Court and in this court, that fail to identify precisely what action or inaction by the Commonwealth constituted the alleged taking. 3

In an action claiming that the Commonwealth caused compensable losses to the plaintiffs by application of the requirements of statutes and regulations, a complaint should surely be more informative. But, as the Appeals Court noted (id. at 758 n. 2, 583 N.E.2d 894), the Commonwealth did not raise the issue of the complaint's failure to make a plain statement of the taking claim or claims. We, therefore, undertake to define, in general terms, the limits of any possibly valid taking claim within the allegations of the complaint. We conclude that, as a matter of law, the complaint in one respect states a claim of a regulatory taking sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.

We identify three taking claims that the complaint arguably adumbrates. It may be claimed that, if there had been no improper delays in the agency proceedings, authorization of the revetment would have been granted in time to prevent the total destruction of the plaintiffs' properties. This theory requires proof, among other things, that the department ultimately would have granted permission for the revetment, that the revetment would have been built, that the delay was due to unreasonable agency action, and that a favorable department decision within a reasonable time would have resulted in saving the plaintiffs' properties from total destruction. Generally, courts have rejected claims that, because an agency did not act more quickly on an application, a State or a State agency took a landowner's property. See, e.g., Moore v. Costa Mesa, 886 F.2d 260, 263-264 (9th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 906, 110 S.Ct. 2588, 110 L.Ed.2d 269 (1990); Bello v. Walker, 840 F.2d 1124, 1131 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 868, 109 S.Ct. 176, 102 L.Ed.2d 145 (1988). These cases, however, have involved claims of temporary takings of property in circumstances in which the property was not totally deprived of its value, while we are concerned here with the alleged total destruction of property due to agency delay.

We believe that this claim is adequately alleged in the generality of the complaint. We agree with the Appeals Court that the plaintiffs' taking claims do not fail in all respects simply because the administrative process was not completed before the properties were made worthless. See Wilson v. Commonwealth, 31 Mass.App.Ct. 757, 766-767, 583 N.E.2d 894 (1992). Unreasonable agency delay itself would be the basis for the failure to complete the agency proceeding and allegedly would be the cause of the taking. It would be illogical to permit the agency's own alleged dilatory practices to justify the dismissal of the taking claim for the reason, asserted by the Commonwealth, that departmental proceedings were not completed.

A second taking claim that may be alleged within the broad generality of the complaint is that the department would have unlawfully denied the plaintiffs permission to construct a revetment. The Supreme Court of the United States has generally denied landowners the right to challenge land use regulations as takings until they have shown that available legal processes, not yet used, will not eliminate the alleged taking. See MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340, 351, 106 S.Ct. 2561, 2567, 91 L.Ed.2d 285 (1986); Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 190-191, 105 S.Ct. 3108, 3118-19, 87 L.Ed.2d 126 (1985). Here, after the houses were destroyed, the plaintiffs voluntarily terminated their administrative appeal from the decision to deny permission to build a revetment. We cannot, therefore, know what the final agency decision would have been.

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