Wilson v. Commission

• Decision Date: 03 January 1884
• Citation: 1 P. 587,31 Kan. 257
• Parties: THOMAS L. WILSON v. THE PRICE-RAID AUDITING COMMISSION FOR THE STATE OF KANSAS
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

1 P. 587

31 Kan. 257

THOMAS L. WILSON v. THE PRICE-RAID AUDITING COMMISSION FOR THE STATE OF KANSAS

Supreme Court of Kansas

January 3, 1884

Error from Price-Raid Auditing Commission.

JANUARY 6, 1883, the Price-Raid Auditing Commission, in the matter of the claim of Thomas L. Wilson for damages to the amount of $ 10,540, allowed the claimant $ 1,350, and rejected the remainder thereof. The claimant comes to this court.

Case dismissed.

Jetmore & Son, for plaintiff in error.

W. A Johnston, attorney general, and Edwin A. Austin, for defendant in error.

VALENTINE J. All the Justices concurring.

OPINION

VALENTINE, J.:

This proceeding in this court is founded upon a petition in error entitled as follows: "Thomas L. Wilson, plaintiff in error, v. The Price-Raid Auditing Commission for the State of Kansas, defendant in error." The object of the petition in error is to reverse a decision made by the defendant in error, on January 6, 1883, refusing to reexamine a certain Price-raid claim belonging to the plaintiff in error, and in refusing to allow a greater amount on said claim than had been previously allowed. The claim had been twice before examined--once in 1865, and once in 1867, and a portion of the same had been previously allowed. It seems from this petition in error that the defendant in error is considered not only as a tribunal from which a petition in error will lie, but also as a party to the proceeding; and yet a portion of the language of the brief of counsel for plaintiff in error indicates that they do not consider the defendant in error as a court. Such language reads as follows:

"We submit that the action of the commission is that of an agent for the state of Kansas, and the citizens who have suffered damage in consequence of the Price raid, to audit the claims of such citizens, and is purely ministerial, and their decision can in no sense be said to partake of a judicial character. . . . The commissions are merely examining boards. Their examinations are summary, and limited as to time, and their duty seems to be to report claims audited and allowed, not those rejected. Their deliberations partake not in any sense of a judicial determination, but rather the taking of information to be reported to the governor of the state. No provision for the appearance of counsel; but the scope of all the law upon the subject regards the commission purely and simply examining boards--not courts. . . . The commission acts in a ministerial capacity, as a financial agent of the state, and must obey the law as enacted. It has no judicial discretion."

But if the defendant in error, "the Price-raid auditing commission," is not a court, then how can an appeal be taken from its decision to the supreme court? (Auditor v. A. T. & S. F. Rld. Co., 6 Kan. 500.) Under the constitution of the state of Kansas, all the judicial power of the state is vested in courts. (Const., art. 3, § 1.) Therefore, any seemingly judicial power which is not vested in some court, is not judicial power within the meaning of the constitution. Now the supreme court can exercise only judicial power, and such power as is incident thereto. (Const., art. 3, §§ 1, 3, 4, 13.) It can exercise original jurisdiction only in proceedings in quo warranto, mandamus, and habeas corpus; and can exercise appellate jurisdiction only in the exercise of judicial power, which must necessarily under the constitution have come to it from some other court. If the supreme court should attempt to exercise power which is not judicial in its character, or should attempt to exercise jurisdiction in cases other than quo warranto, mandamus, or habeas corpus, before such jurisdiction had been exercised by some other court, it would transcend the constitution. It would not be sufficient in order to give the supreme court jurisdiction that such power had previously been exercised by some person, officer, board, or commission, not a court. In order to give the supreme court jurisdiction, except in quo warranto, mandamus and habeas corpus, the power must first have been exercised by some other court. The jurisdiction of the supreme court is much more limited by the constitution than that of the district court; for under the constitution, the legislature can confer upon the district court all the original and all the appellate jurisdiction which it may choose. (Const., art. 3, § 6.) It may confer upon the district court jurisdiction in any matters of a judicial character, without reference to where such matters may originate; for if the district court does not take jurisdiction of such matters under or by virtue of its appellate jurisdiction, it may take jurisdiction of the same under or by virtue of its original jurisdiction. Any matter judicial in its character can be taken from even a road overseer to the district court, provided the statutes authorize the same; for when the matter gets into the district court the district court can exercise jurisdiction over it as a court of original jurisdiction. But, as before stated, the supreme court has no such extended powers.

Under the constitution and the statutes, is the Price-raid auditing commission a court? This commission, by whatever name it may be called, is composed of the following state officers, to wit: the governor, the secretary of state, the auditor, the treasurer, and the attorney general; and the name of the board under the statutes, is the "Price-Raid Auditing Commission." (Laws of 1879, ch. 128, § 1; Comp. Laws of 1879, ch. 79a, § 1.) It is always mentioned in the statutes as a commission, and never as a court. Under the statutes, the claim of a party is presented to the commission under such regulations as the commission may prescribe; and the commission may also prescribe the kind of proof required, and the form for vouchers presented. (Sec. 3 of said ch. 128, and as amended in 1881, Laws of 1881, ch. 125, § 2; and as amended in 1883, Laws of 1883, ch. 121, § 1.) The commission after hearing the claim may allow the same, or allow a portion thereof, or reject it. The commission is required to make out a statement of the amounts allowed on all claims, which statement is filed with the auditor of state. (See § 6 of said ch. 128, as it originally stood, and as amended in 1881.) All the records, books, papers, etc., of the commission are filed in the office of the secretary of state, and a copy of such portion of the same as may be thought proper is placed in the hands of the governor to be transmitted by him to the legislature...