Wilson v. Commonwealth
| Decision Date | 16 March 1922 |
| Citation | 111 S.E. 96 |
| Parties | WILSON. v. COMMONWEALTH. |
| Court | Virginia Supreme Court |
[Ed. Note.—For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Bawdyhouse; House of HI Fame.]
Appeal from Corporation Court of Norfolk.
Bessie Wilson was convicted of keeping a house of ill fame, and she appeals. Affirmed.
James S. Barron, of Norfolk, for plaintiff in error.
John R. Saunders, Atty. Gen., J. D. Hank, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., and Leon M. Bazile, Second Asst. Atty. Gen., for the Commonwealth.
KELLY, P. The defendant, Bessie Wilson, was convicted in the police court of the city of Norfolk on a warrant charging her with keeping "a house of ill fame resorted to for the purpose of prostitution and lewdness." On appeal to the corporation court she was tried by a jury and again found guilty, and the sentence pronounced upon her by that court is before us for review.
The only ground upon which we are asked to interfere with the sentence is that the evidence did not warrant the verdict.
The statute upon which this prosecution rests is as follows:
"If any person keep a house of ill fame, resorted to for the purpose of prostitution or lewdness, he shall be confined in jail not exceeding one year and fined not exceeding two hundred dollars; and, in a prosecution for this offense, the general character of such housemay be proved." Code 1887, § 3790; Code 1919, § 4548.
The contention of the defendant is that to sustain a conviction tinder the foregoing statute the commonwealth must prove two things: First, that the house in question was in fact a bawdyhouse or brothel; and, second, that it had a general reputation as such.
With respect to the first proposition embraced in this contention, we shall not go into the details of the evidence. The defendant introduced no testimony. The commonwealth's evidence as to the actual character of the house consists of the testimony of four men who appear to have visited the place at the instance of the police to investigate conditions and procure evidence. They did not while there personally witness or personally indulge in any unlawful acts, but they evidently allowed the defendant and another woman who was in the house at the time to suppose that they had come for immoral purposes. There were some unimportant and circumstantial conflicts in the testimony of these four men, but otherwise their credibility was not shaken or even questioned, except by the effect of such caution as should be used in giving credence to evidence obtained under representations which are not true. Their respective narratives are reasonable and consistent, and are in a measure corroborated by the entries in a book or register kept by the defendant and introduced at the trial. Moreover, the question of the weight and credibility of their evidence was one for the jury to determine.
Attaching to the evidence of the commonwealth the weight which, under familiar rules, it must be accorded in this court, there is no room to doubt that the defendant was keeping a house resorted to for purposes of lewdness and prostitution. The arrangement of the house and its furnishings, the large number of alleged guests whose names appeared on her register, the method of keeping the register, together with her explanation of that method, the overtures which she and the other woman in the house made to the four men who testified, her declarations and admissions to them as to her ability to procure more women if desired, and her assurances that there would be no danger of detection, made it perfectly plain that she was then, and had been for some time prior thereto, plying her nefarious trade on a large scale.
The second proposition, namely, that it was incumbent upon the commonwealth to prove that the general reputation of the place was that of a bawdyhouse, appears to be the one mainly relied upon by the defendant, but in our opinion is without merit.
It is, of course, in a sense true that a house of ill fame is a house with a bad name, but the offense aimed at by the statute is the keeping of such a house, and not the establishment of its bad reputation.
Some apparent support for the defendant's contention that there must be proof of both the character and the reputation of the house may be found in the fact that the statute, after using the expression "house of ill fame, " also adds the words "resorted to for purposes of prostitution or lewdness." It seems plausible to argue that it was not necessary to vise both of these expressions if the fame of the house was not a material part of the offense. This argument, however, is satisfactorily repelled both by the language of the statute as a whole, and by the prevailing current of authority. The concluding sentence of the statute expressly provides that, "in a prosecution for this offense, the general character of such house may be proved." The words "general character" are evidently used here in the sense of "general reputation, " because it is universally held that before there can be a conviction for keeping a house of ill fame there must be proof that it was in fact a house of bad character; that is to say, a house actually resorted to for immoral purposes. The language of the statute, quoted last above, was manifestly intended to make it clear that the general reputation of the house could be used as evidence tending to show that it was in fact a bad house. This being true, it necessarily follows that the gist of the offense aimed at was the keeping of such a house, and not its reputation. The right to prove its reputation as tending to establish the offense was inserted for the express purpose of allowing the commonwealth to use evidence which otherwise might be excluded as immaterial and irrelevant, on the ground that the fame of the place is no part of the offense. This is illustrated by the case of State v. Plant, infra, wherein it was held that proof of general reputation was irrelevant and improper.
There is no Virginia case in point, and the decisions elsewhere are not entirely in accord upon the question under consideration. This may be, and doubtless is, in some meas-ure due to varying provisions of the several statutes on the subject. We are satisfied, however, that when proper effect is given to the language of the Virginia statute, the decided weight of both authority and reason supports the view we have adopted.
It seems clear that if our statute had used...
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Gaskill v. Com.
...unlawful sexual intercourse, on the night of her arrest. See Foster v. Commonwealth, 179 Va. 96, 18 S.E.2d 314; Wilson v. Commonwealth, 132 Va. 824, 826, 827, 111 S.E. 96, 97. Defendant says that the offense of keeping a bawdy house was not one of the minor offenses at common law which was ......
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Gaskill v. Commonwealth
...where these can be ascertained from the language used. Finally, counsel for the accused contends that in the cases of Wilson v. Commonwealth, 1922, 132 Va. 824, 111 S.E. 96; Foster v. Commonwealth, 1942, 179 Va. 96, 18 S.E.2d 314, and Trent v. Commonwealth, 1943, 181 Va. 338, 25 S.E.2d 350,......
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Gaskill v. Commonwealth, Record No. 3114.
...where these can be ascertained from the language used. Finally, counsel for the accused contends that in the cases of Wilson Commonwealth (1922), 132 Va. 824, 111 S.E. 96; Foster Commonwealth (1942), 179 Va. 96, 18 S.E.(2d) 314, and Trent Commonwealth (1943), 181 Va. 338, 25 S.E.(2d) 350, t......
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Mitchell v. Com.
...sec. 18-87) provides: 'In a prosecution for this offense the general character of the house may be proved.' We held in Wilson v. Commonwealth, 132 Va. 824, 111 S.E. 96, that the words 'general character' used in this section were synonymous with the words 'general reputation.' General reput......