Wilson v. Cramer

• Decision Date: 10 August 2010
• Docket Number: No. WD 71313.,WD 71313.
• Citation: 317 S.W.3d 206
• Parties: Nicholas Michael WILSON, Appellant,v.Jennifer L. CRAMER and James R. Stowe, Respondents.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

317 S.W.3d 206

Nicholas Michael WILSON, Appellant,
v.
Jennifer L. CRAMER and James R. Stowe, Respondents.

No. WD 71313.

Missouri Court of Appeals,
Western District.

Aug. 10, 2010.

317 S.W.3d 207

Michaela Shelton, Overland Park, KS, for Appellant.

Jennifer L. Cramer and James R. Stowe, Blue Springs, MO, Respondents, pro se.

Before Division II: JOSEPH M. ELLIS, Presiding Judge, and ALOK AHUJA and KAREN KING MITCHELL, Judges.

KAREN KING MITCHELL, Judge.

This is a paternity case. Appellant Nicholas Wilson filed a petition in the Circuit Court of Jackson County, praying for a finding of paternity, a custody determination, an order of child support, and a change of Wilson's alleged son's name (“Son”). Respondents Jennifer Cramer, Son's Mother (“Mother”), and James Stowe filed answers, denying that Wilson was Son's father and pleading that Wilson had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Respondents pled that Stowe was Son's father. Mother and Stowe also filed a motion to dismiss the petition. Mother and Stowe argued that Wilson lacked standing because Stowe had signed an affidavit acknowledging that he was Son's father (“Acknowledgment of Paternity”), see section 210.823,¹ and because the Director of the Division of Child Support Enforcement, Department of Social Services (“Division”) had entered an order finding that Stowe was Son's father and entering a child support decree. The circuit court, the Honorable William S. Richards presiding, granted the motion to dismiss, finding that section 210.823 barred Wilson's claims. We reverse.

Facts and Procedural Background²

On February 9, 2003, Mother gave birth to Son. Two days later, Mother and Stowe signed the Acknowledgment of Paternity, acknowledging that Stowe was Son's father.

Mother also filled out various forms seeking temporary assistance from the Division. On one of these forms, Mother stated that Wilson was Son's father. On another, Mother stated that Stowe was the

317 S.W.3d 208

father. On a third, Mother named Stowe as the father and Wilson as a man who might be the father. On June 16, 2003, Stowe filled out the Division's form for his financial information. Wilson never submitted his financial information to the Division.

On August 8, 2003, the Division sent a Notice and Finding of Financial Responsibility to Stowe concerning support enforcement services.

On October 8, 2003, the Director of the Division filed an Order with the Department of Civil Records, Court Administrator's Office in Jackson County, Missouri, finding Stowe to be the legal father of Son, with a support obligation of $228 per month (“Division's order”). Stowe has made child support payments regularly and otherwise has acted as Son's father for over six years. He has visitation every Wednesday and every other weekend, and he attends Son's sporting events and school functions.

On January 7, 2009, Wilson filed his petition in the Circuit Court of Jackson County, seeking, among other things, a declaration that he was Son's biological father.³ Wilson alleged that he had DNA test results that proved that he was Son's biological father.

Mother and Stowe filed a motion to dismiss the petition. Mother and Stowe argued that Wilson lacked standing because the Acknowledgment of Paternity and the Division's order barred his claims.

On June 22, 2009, the circuit court held a hearing on Mother and Stowe's motion to dismiss. The administrative file and the Division's records were admitted into evidence. The court considered Wilson's alleged DNA test results for purposes of standing only.

On July 1, 2009, the circuit court granted the motion to dismiss, finding that, under section 210.823, the Acknowledgement of Paternity was conclusive and barred Wilson's claims.

This appeal follows.

Standard of Review

The standard of review for an appeal of a motion to dismiss for lack of standing is de novo. White v. White, 293 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Mo.App. W.D.2009). Here, the trial court conducted a hearing on Mother and Stowe's motion to dismiss and considered matters outside the pleadings in making its judgment. Under these circumstances, the motion to dismiss was converted into a motion for summary judgment, and we will review it as such. Rule 55.27(a), (b); Deeken v. City of St. Louis, 27 S.W.3d 868, 870 (Mo.App. E.D.2000). Ordinarily, when the trial court converts a matter into a motion for summary judgment, the court must place the parties on notice, and the parties must comply with the procedural requirements of Rule 74.04. Mitchell v. McEvoy, 237 S.W.3d 257, 259 (Mo.App. E.D.2007). However, when the parties both submit matters outside the pleadings for the court's consideration, the parties waive notice of the court's conversion of the matter into a motion for summary judgment, and they likewise waive compliance with Rule 74.04's procedural requirements. Id. Here, the parties both submitted matters outside the pleadings for the court's consideration, and therefore

317 S.W.3d 209

they acquiesced in treating this matter as a motion for summary judgment See id.

A party is entitled to summary judgment when there is no dispute of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Mid-America Marine Supply Corp., 854 S.W.2d 371, 382 (Mo. banc 1993). If the defendants can show that the undisputed material facts reveal that the plaintiff lacks standing, then they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Hinton v. City of St. Joseph, 889 S.W.2d 854, 857 (Mo.App. W.D.1994). We make all reasonable inferences in favor on the non-moving party. Mitchell, 237 S.W.3d at 260.

Legal Analysis

In his only point on appeal, Wilson argues that the motion court erred in dismissing his petition in that he had standing to bring a paternity action and because neither section 210.823 nor the Division's order barred his claims. We agree.

I. Standing to bring a paternity action

“Standing requires that the party seeking relief has a legally cognizable interest in the subject matter and that the party has a threatened or actual injury.” Shannon v. Hines, 21 S.W.3d 839, 841 (Mo.App. E.D.1999). Section 210.826 governs who has standing to bring a paternity action. Jefferson v. Jefferson, 137 S.W.3d 510, 517 (Mo.App. E.D.2004).

In determining standing under section 210.826, we must first decide whether Son has a presumed father. See § 210.826.1 and .2. A child has a presumed father if he was born to a married couple (or the couple married within three hundred days of the child's birth) or if an expert, as defined by section 210.834.7, conducts a blood test and concludes that “the alleged parent is not excluded and that the probability of paternity is ninety-eight percent or higher, using a prior probability of 0.5.” § 210.822.1(4). A child also has a presumed father if the mother attempted to marry, but the marriage was invalidated, and various other circumstances apply. See § 210.822.1(2), (3). Here, Son has no presumed father because Mother has neither married nor attempted to marry, and no blood test has been performed that would meet the statutory guidelines for such tests.⁴

Given that Son...