Wilson v. Dep't of Interior

• Docket Number: 5:22-cv-5094
• Decision Date: 31 July 2023
• Parties: MELAINE R. WILSON, Plaintiff v. DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR, BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS-WASHINGTON, D.C., BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAJRS-PINE RIDGE AGENCY, OGLALA SIOUX TRIBE LAND OFFICE, OGLALA SIOUX TRIBE LAND COMMITTEE, Defendants
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Dakota

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MELAINE R. WILSON, Plaintiff v. DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR, BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS-WASHINGTON, D.C., BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAJRS-PINE RIDGE AGENCY, OGLALA SIOUX TRIBE LAND OFFICE, OGLALA SIOUX TRIBE LAND COMMITTEE, Defendants

No. 5:22-cv-5094

United States District Court, D. South Dakota

July 31, 2023

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Lawrence L. Piersol, United States District Judge

Pending before the court is Plaintiffs lawsuit against the Department of Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs-Washington, D.C Bureau of Indian Affairs-Pine Ridge Agency, Oglala Sioux Tribe Land Office, and Oglala Sioux Tribe Land Committee. (Doc. 1). Plaintiff has filed a motion for appointment of counsel, (Doc. 3), and a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. 2). She asserts in an additional lawsuit that its claims are related to those in this case. (5:23-cv-5027, Doc 1-1, PgID 477).:

I. Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(1) directs the court to authorize the commencement of a civil action without prepayment of fees upon proof of plaintiffs inability to pay. A person may be permitted to proceed in forma pauperis if he or she “submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets” the person possesses, and also states “that the person is unable to pay such fees or give security therefore.” Id. The Eighth Circuit has established parameters for addressing in forma pauperis motions and has instructed that a petitioner's financial status should be evaluated first, and screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 should follow. Martin-Trigona v. Stewart, 691 F.2d 856, 857 (8th Cir. 1982). The court has recognized that the applicant need not establish “absolute destitution.” Lee v. McDonald's Corp., 231 F.3d 456, 459 (8th Cir. 2000). See also Babino v. Janssen & Son, 2017 WL 6813137, at *1 (D.S.D. 2017). The District Court's task is to determine whether the plaintiffs allegation of poverty is true, and that determination is within the court's discretion. Lee, 231 F.3d at 459.

Plaintiff has submitted sufficient documentation to establish that she should be permitted to proceed in forma pauperis. The income stated was consistent with what she reported in the other lawsuits she has filed, including 5:22-cv-5091, 5:22-cv-5097, 5:22-cv-5094, and 5:22-cv-5095. Her income consists of recurring military retirement and disability payments. She has minimal assets and significant expenses. (Doc. 2). The Court finds Ms. Wilson is indigent within the meaning of § 1915(a)(1). The Court notes this aligns with its determination of in forma pauperis status for Plaintiff in 5:23-cv-5041, 5:22-cv-5091, 5:22-cv-5097, and 5:22-cv-5095. The Court's determination means her claims will be screened under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).

II. Screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)

A. Legal Standard

A proceeding in forma pauperis is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) which provides:

(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee .. . the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that- ...

(B) the action or appeal-

(i) is frivolous or malicious;

(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or

(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

This provision allows the court sua sponte to review a complaint filed with an in forma pauperis application to determine if the action warrants dismissal. In screening plaintiffs pro se complaint, the court must liberally construe it and assume as true all facts well pleaded in the complaint. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Even with this construction, “a pro se complaint must contain specific facts supporting its conclusions.” Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir. 1985). To state a claim for relief, a complaint must plead more than “legal conclusions” and “(t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action's elements, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). A reviewing court has the duty to examine a pro se complaint “to determine if the allegations provide for relief on any possible theory.” Williams v. Willits, 853 F.2d 586, 588 (8th Cir. 1988). A plaintiff must demonstrate a plausible claim for relief, that “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 675. If it does not contain these bare essentials, dismissal is appropriate. The court is not required to construct legal theories for the plaintiff to enable the case to proceed. Margion v City of Sioux Falls Police Dept., 2020 WL 906521, *2 (D.S.D. 2020) (citing Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004)).

B. Plaintiffs allegations

Plaintiff appears to be seeking to bring her lawsuit individually and on behalf of “all enrolled served by BIA.” (Doc. 1, PgID 1). Her complaint accuses “federal employees of the Bureau of Indian Affairs Realty Office” of “taking federal tribal trust lands by the use of illegal Indian Trust patents in the thousands and thousands of acres.” (Id.). She attaches a “Complaint for class action suit to reclaim lands,” which is in the form of a letter addressed to the United States Department of Interior, Office of Inspector General. (Doc. 1-1, PgID 6). Plaintiff attaches a document purporting to be a lien filed against various tribal and federal entities, the State of South Dakota, and several counties, (Doc. 1-3, PgID 35); a letter to President Biden, (Doc. 1-4, PgID 43); a previous complaint she filed with the Department of Interior, (id., PgID 3 8); copies of land patent and land ownership documents, (Doc. 1-1, PgID 9-33); and 434 pages of Bureau of Indian Affairs-BLM Records.

For relief, Plaintiff desires “a review of Indian Trust Patents with digital maps made available through the Bureau of Trust Funds Administration using our enrolled numbers for our respective tribes” and “lands returned to tribes that were illegally taken by illegal Indian trust patents.” (Doc. 1, PgID 3). Plaintiff seeks money damages of “$10,000 per enrolled member served by BIA.” (Id.).

The Court surmises that Plaintiff intends the complaint she filed with the Department of Interior to serve as her complaint in this lawsuit. The Court notes the remedy she requests includes a variety of actions, including certain disenrollments and banishments, removing certain people from land, land given to military veterans, land for herself, a toll-free number for Oglala Sioux tribal members, and removal of Oglala Sioux Tribe Council Members from sitting on certain boards of directors. (Doc. 1-1, PgID 8-9).

C. Analysis

As the Court has recognized, including in prior lawsuits filed by Plaintiff, many restrictions on federal court intervention in the internal affairs of tribes are firmly in place. See, e.g., Sac & Fox Tribe of the Mississippi in Iowa, Election Board v. Bureau of Indian Affairs, 439 F.3d 832, 835 (8th Cir. 2006) (noting that jurisdiction to resolve “internal tribal disputes” is in the tribe and not in federal district court); Wright v. Langdeau, 158 F.Supp.3d 825, 836 (D.S.D. 2016); Montgomery v. Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe, 2006 WL 482479, *5 (D.S.D. 2006). Tribal law and policy are matters to be determined by the tribe in the first instance. Sac & Fox Tribe, 439 F.3d at 835. Therefore, when an individual tribal member seeks federal court intervention in what appears to be a matter of internal tribal policy, the court proceeds with caution. As one court recently explained, federal question jurisdiction is not created simply because “a case involves an Indian party or contract or tribal or individual Indian property, or ... arises in Indian country.” Whalen v. Oglala Sioux Tribe Executive Officers, 2021 WL 4267654, *2 (D.S.D. 2021) (quoting COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 7.04[ 1] [a] (Nell Jessup Newton ed., 2012)). In this case, as discussed below, Plaintiffs lawsuit must be dismissed for at least three reasons: tribal sovereign immunity, standing, and failure to meet pleading requirements.

1. Tribal Sovereign Immunity

Tribal sovereign immunity has been recognized as a significant aspect of tribes' status as sovereigns. Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 572 U.S. 782, 788 (2014); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978) (holding that tribes possess “common-law immunity from suit traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers”). This immunity is viewed as “a necessary corollary to Indian sovereignty and self-governance.” Bay Mills, 572 U.S. at 788 (quoting Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Engineering, P.C., 476 U.S. 877, 890 (1986)). Suits may be brought against tribes if the tribe waives its immunity or Congress abrogates it. Okla. Tax Comm 'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505, 509 (1991); Stanko v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 916 F.3d 694, 696 (8th Cir. 2019) (citing Amerind Risk Mgmt. Corp, v. Malaterre, 633 F.3d 680, 685 (8 Cir. 2011)). Any waiver of tribal sovereign immunity must be “unequivocal.” Rupp v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 45 F.3d 1241, 1244 (8th Cir. 1995).

In the context of a lawsuit brought in federal court “sovereign immunity is a jurisdictional question.” Rupp, 45 F.3d at 1244 (citing Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Washington Game Dep't, 433 U.S. 165, 172 (1977)). The upshot is that, if the Tribe possesses sovereign immunity, the district court “has no jurisdiction.” Puyallup, 433 U.S. at 172; Rupp, 45 F.3d at 1244. Furthermore, a federal court must assess whether it has jurisdiction as a threshold matter in every case. Oglala Sioux Tribe v. Schwarting, 894 F.Supp.2d 1195, 1198 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting ...