Wilson v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs
| Decision Date | 31 December 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 19-3542,19-3542 |
| Citation | 984 F.3d 265 |
| Parties | Richard J. WILSON, Petitioner v. DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION PROGRAMS, United States Department of Labor; Creamer-Sanzari Joint Venture ; Arch Insurance Company |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
Nicholas P. Giuliano [ARGUED], Matthew M. Gorden, Stanton J. Terranova, Giuliano McDonnell & Perrone, LLP, 170 Old Country Road, Suite 608, Mineola, New York 11501, Counsel for Richard J. Wilson
Kate S. O'Scannlain, Barry H. Joyner, Gary K. Stearman, William M. Bush [ARGUED], U.S. Department of Labor, Office of the Solicitor, 200 Constitution Ave, NW, Room N-2119, Washington, D.C. 20210, Counsel for Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs
Gabriel E.F. Thompson [ARGUED], Rabalais Unlad, 1404 Greengate Drive, Suite 110, Covington, LA 70433, Counsel for Creamer-Sanzari Joint Venture
Before: KRAUSE, RESTREPO, and BIBAS, Circuit Judges
Petitioner Richard Wilson sustained hearing loss while working on a marine construction project and subsequently sought compensation benefits under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act ("LHWCA"), 33 U.S.C. §§ 901 – 50. An Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") and the Benefits Review Board ("Board") dismissed Wilson's claim, finding that he was not covered under the LHWCA because he was not injured on navigable waters of the United States. Because we conclude that the ALJ and Board misconstrued the definition of navigable waters and that the waters where Wilson was injured were in fact navigable, we will reverse and remand for a determination of benefits.
Congress enacted the LHWCA to provide compensation for maritime workers who are injured on the job. Pa. Tidewater Dock Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs , 202 F.3d 656, 658 (3d Cir. 2000). To be eligible for coverage, the LHWCA requires (1) that a worker be "engaged in maritime employment," 33 U.S.C. § 902(3) ; and (2) that his injury occur on "navigable waters of the Unites States" or an "adjoining [land] area," id. § 903(a). These two requirements are respectively known as the "status" and "situs" requirements. Ne. Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo , 432 U.S. 249, 265, 97 S.Ct. 2348, 53 L.Ed.2d 320 (1977). If "a worker is injured on the actual navigable waters in the course of his employment on those waters," then he also "satisfies the status requirement," for he was "required to perform [his] employment duties" "in a historically maritime locale." Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs v. Perini N. River Assocs. , 459 U.S. 297, 324, 103 S.Ct. 634, 74 L.Ed.2d 465 (1983). Because this case does not concern any injury on land, the success of Wilson's claim hinges on whether he satisfied the situs requirement, i.e. , whether the waters on which he was injured were in fact navigable.
The facts are not disputed. From approximately 2010 to 2014, Respondent Creamer-Sanzari Joint Venture ("Creamer") employed Wilson as a marine construction worker on the New Jersey Route 3 bridge replacement project. The Route 3 Bridge spans the Lower Passaic River from Clifton to Rutherford, New Jersey at River Mile 11.8. At that location, the navigation channel was authorized to be 150 feet wide and ten feet deep. Wilson's primary job on that project was to drive steel piles for a cofferdam, which is a watertight structure that allows for construction below the waterline. From a float stage on the river, Wilson positioned and secured piles while a crane operator hammered the piles into the riverbed. This process routinely exposed Wilson to extremely loud working conditions and, in 2014, he was diagnosed with a permanent hearing impairment resulting from such conditions.
A few days after his diagnosis, Wilson filed a claim for benefits under the LHWCA. Creamer disputed Wilson's claim and the case was referred to an ALJ. Although the ALJ found that Creamer was a responsible employer and that Wilson's injuries were caused by his work on the Route 3 bridge, she dismissed Wilson's claim after finding that he was not covered under the LHWCA. Specifically, the ALJ concluded that Wilson failed to show that the Lower Passaic River was navigable at River Mile 11.8. Wilson appealed the ALJ's decision and the Board affirmed. Wilson now seeks judicial review of the Board's order.
Wilson raises two issues on appeal. First, he asserts that § 920(a) of the LHWCA creates a situs presumption and argues that the ALJ erred by failing to apply it in her situs analysis. Second, Wilson argues, even if situs is not presumed, he provided sufficient evidence to show that the Lower Passaic River was navigable at River Mile 11.8, and that the ALJ and Board incorrectly reached the opposite conclusion by applying too narrow a definition of navigable waters. Although we find Wilson's presumption argument unavailing, we agree with Wilson that the ALJ and Board erred in finding that the Lower Passaic River was not navigable at River Mile 11.8.
We have appellate jurisdiction over this case under 33 U.S.C. § 921(c). We review the Board's decision only "to determine whether the Board acted in conformance with applicable law and within its proper scope of review." Consolidation Coal Co. v. Benefits Review Bd. , 629 F.3d 322, 326 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal quotations omitted). We exercise plenary review of the Board's legal conclusions, Del. River Stevedores v. DiFidelto , 440 F.3d 615, 619 (3d Cir. 2006), and "must independently review the record and decide whether the ALJ's [factual] findings are rational, consistent with applicable law and supported by substantial evidence" if those findings are challenged by a petitioner, Helen Mining Co. v. Elliott , 859 F.3d 226, 233 (3d Cir. 2017) (citations omitted).
We can preliminarily dispose of Wilson's presumption argument. Section 920(a) states: "it shall be presumed, in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary[,] ... [t]hat [a] claim [for compensation under this chapter] comes within the provisions of this chapter." 33 U.S.C. § 920(a). Wilson argues (1) that § 920(a) creates a situs presumption for claimants, and (2) that it shifts the burden of proving (or disproving) situs to respondents.
Both arguments are unavailing. First, situs is a threshold issue that must be resolved before § 920(a) can be applied. Congress enacted the LHWCA under its "admiralty and maritime jurisdiction," which gives it the authority to "alter or revise the maritime law which shall prevail throughout the country." Crowell v. Benson , 285 U.S. 22, 39, 52 S.Ct. 285, 76 L.Ed. 598 (1932) (citing U.S. Const. art. III, § 2). When Congress uses that authority, it is constrained by "the constitutional limits ... [of] admiralty and maritime jurisdiction," id. at 55, 52 S.Ct. 285 ; see also Ex parte Garnett, 141 U.S. 1, 14, 11 S.Ct. 840, 35 L.Ed. 631 (1891), Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs , 540 F.2d 629, 635 (3d Cir. 1976), which for maritime torts includes only injuries that occur on navigable waters of the United States and certain adjoining land areas, see Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law , 404 U.S. 202, 205, 92 S.Ct. 418, 30 L.Ed.2d 383 (1971) ; Herb's Welding, Inc. v. Gray , 470 U.S. 414, 423, 105 S.Ct. 1421, 84 L.Ed.2d 406 (1985) (). Thus, the LHWCA's situs requirement is essentially a jurisdictional determination, which means its "existence is a condition precedent to the operation of the statutory scheme." Crowell , 285 U.S. at 54, 52 S.Ct. 285.
Second, the burden of proving situs lies with the claimant. Under the LHWCA, administrative adjudications "shall be conducted in accordance with the [Administrative Procedure Act (‘APA’)]," 33 U.S.C. § 919(d), and the APA states that, "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute, the proponent of a[n] ... order has the burden of proof." 5 U.S.C. § 556(d). In Greenwich Collieries , the Supreme Court concluded that courts should "not lightly presume exemptions to the APA." Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs v. Greenwich Collieries , 512 U.S. 267, 271, 114 S.Ct. 2251, 129 L.Ed.2d 221 (1994). In that case, the Director argued that § 923(a) exempted the LHWCA from the APA's burden of proof rule. Id. That provision of the statute states that the Board is not bound by certain rules of evidence and procedure. Id. The Supreme Court disagreed with the Director, however, because it was reluctant to assume that Congress intended to group the burden of proof in the same category as evidentiary and procedural rules, noting that the burden of proof is a rule of substantive law. Id. Moreover, the Court explained, the LHWCA explicitly states that the APA is applicable "notwithstanding any other provisions of this chapter." Id. (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 919(d) ).
We have subsequently held that a claimant who "seeks to have an order issued that she is entitled to benefits under the [LHWCA] ... bears the burden of proving entitlement to benefits by a preponderance of the evidence."
Maher Terminals, Inc. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs , 992 F.2d 1277, 1282 (3d Cir. 1993). For the reasons explained above, we do not think § 920(a) applies to situs determinations. Even if it did, however, § 920(a) does nothing more than create a rebuttable presumption that eases the claimant's burden of proof. See Greenwich Collieries , 512 U.S. at 280, 114 S.Ct. 2251. It does not shift the burden of proof to the respondent. See id. at 279–80, 114 S.Ct. 2251 ().
We thus turn to the dispositive issue in this case: whether Wilson established that the Lower Passaic River was navigable at River Mile 11.8. Wilson argues that the ALJ and Board misconstrued the definition of...
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