Wilson v. Edelman

Decision Date28 September 1976
Docket Number75-2006,Nos. 75-2005,s. 75-2005
Citation542 F.2d 1260
PartiesCharles WILSON et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Joel EDELMAN, Director, Illinois Department of Public Aid, et al., Defendants-Appellees. Thomas STERLING et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Joel EDELMAN, Director, Illinois Department of Public Aid, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Thomas J. Grippando, James D. Weill, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiffs-appellants.

Samuel K. Skinner, U. S. Atty., Chicago, Ill., David M. Cohen, Civ. Div., Appellate Section, Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., Patricia Rosen, Asst. Atty. Gen., Chicago, Ill., for defendants-appellees.

Before FAIRCHILD, Chief Judge, SWYGERT, Circuit Judge, and STECKLER, District Chief Judge. *

SWYGERT, Circuit Judge.

Before this court are two consolidated appeals in which provisions of the Federal Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381 et seq., and the Illinois Public Aid Code, Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 23, §§ 3-1 et seq. (1973), are challenged as unconstitutional in that they operate to exclude otherwise eligible aged, blind, and disabled persons from public assistance benefits solely because they are either between the ages of twenty-one and sixty-five and reside in public mental hospitals or because they are confined in penal institutions as pre-trial detainees. Claiming that these statutes violate their rights to due process and equal protection of the laws under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, plaintiffs appeal from an order of a three-judge court dismissing their complaints against the Secretary of the United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare for lack of jurisdiction and sustaining the constitutionality of the state statute in question. Because there are significant jurisdictional issues raised in these appeals, it is helpful to trace the procedural history of these cases.

No. 75-2005, Wilson, et al. v. Edelman, et al.

On December 5, 1973 plaintiffs filed a three count complaint in the district court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief individually and on behalf of all persons who are otherwise eligible for aid to the disabled pursuant to Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381 et seq. and Chapter 23, §§ 3-1 et seq. of the Illinois Revised Statutes (1973) under the program of Aid to the Aged, Blind and Disabled (AABD), but are denied such assistance because they are hospitalized in a public mental institution. 1

Count I of the complaint challenged the constitutionality of Ill.Rev.Stat., ch. 23, § 3-1.4 (1973) and regulation IV-10-8 of the Illinois Department of Public Aid Manual which provide that needy and disabled patients residing in public mental institutions are ineligible for aid to the aged, blind, and disabled so long as they remain in such institutions. 2 Jurisdiction was based on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343(3) and (4) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Named as defendant in this count was the director of the Illinois Department of Public Welfare (hereinafter referred to as the state defendant).

Counts II and III of the complaint were directed against the Secretary of the United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare (hereinafter referred to as the Secretary or federal defendant). Count II of the complaint challenged the constitutionality of provisions of the Social Security Act which were in effect prior to January 1974 and which operated to preclude patients in public mental institutions from receiving disability assistance payments under the joint federal-state programs for Aid to the Aged, Blind or Disabled, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1355 and 1385(a). 3 Count III of the complaint challenged the constitutionality of 42 U.S.C. § 1382(e)(1)(A), as effective January 1, 1974. 4 Plaintiffs claimed that the effect of this statute was to bar otherwise eligible persons between the ages of twenty-one and sixty-five 5 from receiving benefits under the federally funded Supplemental Security Income Program, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381, et seq., solely because of their status as patients in public mental institutions. Jurisdiction of Counts II and III was based on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 (federal question), 1337 (commerce), 1361 (mandamus), and 5 U.S.C. § 702 (the Administrative Procedure Act).

Named as plaintiffs in the complaint were Charles Edward Wilson and Michael Irene Welch. According to the complaint, plaintiff Wilson was admitted to Elgin Mental Health Center, a facility of the Illinois Department of Mental Health, in October 1973. No welfare benefits were discontinued as a result of Wilson's confinement in the mental health center since he had not been a recipient of such benefits prior to his entry. Plaintiffs claimed, however, that Wilson was eligible for aid to the disabled under both the federal and state statutes and was unable to obtain said assistance solely because of his hospitalization in a public mental hospital.

Unlike Wilson, plaintiff Welch had been a recipient of disability assistance prior to her confinement in a public mental hospital as alleged in the complaint. Welch's assistance was terminated in October 1973 when she was admitted for the third time to Chicago Read Mental Health Center, an inpatient facility of the Illinois Department of Mental Health. Though it is not clear from the complaint whether plaintiff Welch received a notice or statement of reason for the termination of her assistance, plaintiffs claimed that Welch's assistance was terminated solely because of her admission to the public mental hospital.

On March 18, 1974 an amended complaint was filed adding several additional named plaintiffs to this action and noting plaintiff Welch's discharge from Chicago Read Mental Health Center in January 1974. The additional named plaintiffs included Maudie Simmons, James Armstrong, Gomer Johnson, Samuel Birdsell, Donald Clark, and John Kiernan Turney. According to the amended complaint, the additional named plaintiffs, like plaintiff Welch, had been recipients of disability assistance prior to their admission to public mental hospitals and discontinued receiving such assistance solely because of their status as patients in public mental institutions. With the exception of plaintiffs Simmons and Turney, all plaintiffs were admitted to public mental hospitals and discontinued receiving assistance payments on or before January 1, 1974. 6 The amended complaint also alleged that in some instances assistance payments were terminated without a prior notice and hearing. The complaint did not specify, however, which plaintiffs were denied such process.

As a result of their exclusion from eligibility for disability assistance, plaintiffs claimed the denial of due process and equal protection of the laws. The complaint alleged that disability assistance payments were intended to provide needy recipients with money to purchase personal essentials, clothing, and transportation as well as food and shelter. The mere fact of confinement in a public mental hospital, plaintiffs claimed, did not alleviate an indigent patient's need to purchase items such as newspapers, stamps, stationery, cosmetics, carfare, clothing, etc. 7 Thus, plaintiffs alleged that the challenged statutes constituted an irrebuttable presumption and arbitrary classification which operated to deprive them of their constitutional rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. In their prayer for relief, plaintiffs requested that the district court: (a) enter a declaratory judgment finding the challenged statutes and regulations unconstitutional, (b) issue a mandatory injunction requiring the state defendant to provide plaintiffs with aid to the disabled "to the extent that the facility in which they are hospitalized fails to provide all the basic needs" met by the state's program of Aid to the Aged, Blind and Disabled, and requiring the federal defendant to provide aid to the disabled or Supplemental Security Income to those persons who are otherwise qualified for such assistance, but are between the ages of twenty-one and sixty-five and are hospitalized in public mental institutions, and (c) grant plaintiffs restitution for the monies wrongfully denied them. Plaintiffs also requested that a three-judge court be convened to decide this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281 and 2282. 8

On July 13, 1974 plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to proceed as a class and for summary judgment. Both defendants opposed the motion by filing motions to dismiss, or in the alternative, cross motions for a summary judgment. The state defendant contended that plaintiffs lacked standing to maintain a class action; that plaintiffs' claims were moot; that there existed no actual controversy upon which declaratory relief could be granted; and that the Eleventh Amendment constituted a bar to any retroactive relief which plaintiffs sought from the state. 9

The Secretary opposed plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment by raising issues concerning jurisdiction, impropriety of class relief, and the absence of any constitutional infirmity in the challenged statutes.

In response to defendants' motions, particularly the Secretary's claim that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the complaint, plaintiffs filed a reply brief alleging an additional jurisdictional basis for their claims against the Secretary. Specifically, plaintiffs stated, "If it is necessary to reach the issue of jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3) incorporating it into the SSI Program, plaintiffs hereby move to amend their amended complaint on its face to allege such jurisdiction in Count III, paragraph 2."

After extensive briefing by all parties, the district court granted plaintiffs' motion to convene a three-judge court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281 and 2282 and ordered that plaintiffs' case be reassigned to the calendar of the Honorable Thomas R. McMillen, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Illinois,...

To continue reading

Request your trial
13 cases
  • Holden v. Heckler
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio
    • May 29, 1984
    ...of the Blind v. Califano, 568 F.2d 333, 344 (3d Cir.1977); Ellison v. Califano, 546 F.2d 1162, 1164 (5th Cir.1977); Wilson v. Edelman, 542 F.2d 1260, 1270-71 (7th Cir.1976); Lopez v. Heckler, 725 F.2d 1489 (9th Cir.1984) ("Lopez II") ("These decisions seem eminently sensible."). At a minimu......
  • Schweiker v. Wilson
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • March 4, 1981
    ...the federal and Illinois assistance schemes that prevailed prior to the effective date of the SSI program. See Wilson v. Edelman, 542 F.2d 1260, 1263-1266 (CA7 1976). The then-existing state assistance program, for which federal funds were received, excluded from eligibility any person who ......
  • Johnson v. Heckler
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit)
    • July 30, 1985
    ...waivable by the parties." Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 328 n. 9, 96 S.Ct. at 899 n. 9. This court has followed Salfi, see Wilson v. Edelman, 542 F.2d 1260, 1274 (7th Cir.1976), as have other circuits, see, e.g., City of New York v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 729, 737-38 (2d Cir.1984); Lopez v. Heckler, 725......
  • Young v. Walker
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida
    • July 21, 1977
    ...district court, either at the trial level or even on appeal, a three-judge district court is no longer needed. Wilson v. Edelman, 542 F.2d 1260, 1280 and n. 38 (7th Cir. 1976); Hubel v. West Va. Racing Comm'n, 513 F.2d at 242 and n. 5; Nieves v. Oswald, 477 F.2d at 1115; Seergy v. Kings Cou......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT