Wilson v. GE Precision HealthCare LLC

• Docket Number: C/A 4:22-cv-181-RBH-KDW
• Decision Date: 25 July 2022
• Parties: Luvenia Wilson, Plaintiff, v. GE Precision Healthcare, LLC, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina

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Luvenia Wilson, Plaintiff, v. GE Precision Healthcare, LLC, Defendant.

C/A No. 4:22-cv-181-RBH-KDW

United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Florence Division

July 25, 2022

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Kaymani D. West United States Magistrate Judge

This employment-related matter is before the court for issuance of a Report and Recommendation (“Report”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.). Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, ECF No. 7 includes federal-law-based causes of action brought pursuant to Title VII, the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”); and state-law-based causes of action for breach of contract and promissory estoppel. Compl., ECF N. 7. Pending is the Partial Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant GE Precision Healthcare, LLC (“GE” or “Defendant”), in which it seeks Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of the state-law-based causes of action. ECF No 11. Having considered Defendant's Motion and Memorandum; Plaintiff's opposition, ECF No. 17; Defendant's Reply, ECF No. 19; and applicable law, the undersigned recommends Defendant's Partial Motion to Dismiss be denied.

I. Background

Taken from the Amended Complaint and accepted as true for purposes of this Report, Plaintiff alleges the following facts that potentially are relevant to the pending motion:

On July 17, 2017, Defendant hired Plaintiff, a Black female, as a Production Associate; she worked in a subassembly area and was responsible for winding switches for MRI machines.

Am. Compl. ¶¶ 7, 9, ECF No. 7. “As a part of her job, Plaintiff was allowed two weeks of vacation, which included sick leave.” Id. ¶ 10. Plaintiff became sick with a sinus infection in October 2020 and, on October 12, 2020, she called her supervisor to take leave as a result of her sinus infection. Id. ¶¶ 11, 12. Plaintiff provided Defendant with a doctor's excuse and followed all proper procedure for notifying Defendant of her need to take leave. Id. ¶¶ 13, 14. Plaintiff was out of work through October 15, 2020; on October 19, 2020, the next day for which she had been scheduled to work, Plaintiff returned to work and performed her job duties without issue. Id. ¶¶ 15-17.

Defendant uses a “‘point' system in which employees who have attendance violations or other violations accrue points. When an employee reaches nine points, an employee is terminated.” Am. Compl. ¶ 19. During her shift on October 19, 2020 Plaintiff was called to meet with Katie Thomas, Defendant's Assistant Human Resources (“HR”) Manager. Thomas is a white female. Id. ¶ 18. Thomas advised Plaintiff that she had only one point remaining before termination. Thomas stated Plaintiff had accrued a point for each day that she was out-October 12, 13, 14, and 15 of 2020. Id. ¶¶ 20-21. Plaintiff “stated that this was improper as [she] had followed the Defendant's policy for using her leave time.” Id. ¶ 22. On October 26, 2020, Plaintiff met with Aubrey Calhoun, one of her supervisors. Calhoun is a white male. Am. Compl. ¶ 23. Calhoun stated that, having resolved the issues relating to Plaintiff's use of leave time on October 12, 13, 14, and 15, 2020, Plaintiff would have three points remaining before termination. Id. ¶ 24. Calhoun stated that in December 2020, Plaintiff would have four points remaining before termination, because a point accumulated in December 2019 would drop off of her record. Id. ¶ 25.

Calhoun had Plaintiff sign a written level two corrective action form (“Level 2 Form”), which purportedly shows Plaintiff's point totals through October 26, 2020. Am. Compl. ¶ 27.^[1]The level two corrective action form alleges that Plaintiff received two points on October 12, 2020, and another two points on October 13, 2020, for “Absent Full Day Called in After Shift Start.” Id. ¶¶ 28, 29. The level two corrective action form did not provide for any points accrued on October 14 and 15, 2020. Id. ¶ 30. Calhoun, Thomas, and Plaintiff all signed and dated the Level 2 Form on October 26, 2020. Id. ¶ 26, 31. Plaintiff's coworker, Tammy Austin, heard the conversation between Calhoun and Plaintiff regarding the points remaining as indicated on the Level 2 Form. She also saw the form being signed. Id. ¶ 34. Calhoun refused to provide Plaintiff a copy of the Level 2 Form. Id. ¶ 35.^[2]

On November 19, 2020, the Assistant HR Manager summoned Plaintiff to her office, advised Plaintiff she had zero points remaining before termination, and told Plaintiff she needed to see Denise Bethay, a Black female who is Defendant's Personnel Manager. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 36-37. On November 20, 2020 Plaintiff met with Bethay; Dan Matsey, a white male who is Defendant's Department Manager; and Brooks Bennet, a white male who is Defendant's Plan Team Leader. Id. ¶ 38. Plaintiff was provided with a termination notice during this meeting. The termination notice indicated Plaintiff had been put on notice as of October 26, 2021 [sic] of attendance issues. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 39-40. Plaintiff's termination notice stated that she lost additional points following October 26, 2020; however, Plaintiff avers she had not committed any attendance or other violations since October 26, 2020. Id. ¶¶ 41, 42. Plaintiff was advised that her request for FMLA leave during the period of October 12 through 15, 2020 had been denied based on her alleged failure to provide documentation. Id. ¶¶ 39-44. Plaintiff avers she “provided all necessary documentation from her medical provider and otherwise followed all FMLA procedure.” Id. ¶ 45. Plaintiff's termination notice indicated that she had been “retroactively awarded additional points for the days of October 14 and 15 due to the denial of FMLA leave.” Id. ¶ 46.

Plaintiff was provided a Level 4 Corrective Action Form (“Level 4 Form”), which detailed the points allegedly accrued in the preceding 12 months. Am. Compl. ¶ 47.^[3] The Level 4 Form reflects that one point was accrued for each day of October 14 and 15, 2020 due to “Absent Full Day Called In.” Id. ¶ 48. Had the points for October 14 and 15, 2020 not been accrued, Plaintiff would not have reached a total of nine points, which is the minimum amount at which an employee may be terminated under Defendant policy. Id. ¶¶ 50-51. The Level 4 Form also reflects that three points were accrued for October 12, 2020, due to “Absent Full Day No Call In.” Id. ¶ 52. Plaintiff alleges this breaches the prior agreement reached on October 26, 2021 [sic], when Defendant had agreed that Plaintiff received two points for “Absent Full Day Called In After Shift Start.” Id. ¶ 53. Had the amount of points accrued for October 12, 2020, not been increased from two to three Plaintiff would not have reached a total of nine points. Id. ¶ 54.

II. Legal standard

Defendant moves to dismiss both of Plaintiff's state-law-based causes of action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing Plaintiff has not and cannot set forth viable breach-of-contract or promissory-estoppel causes of action in this employment-based litigation. “A motion filed under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the legal sufficiency of a complaint.” Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 192 (4th Cir. 2009). The court measures the legal sufficiency by determining whether the complaint meets the Rule 8 standards for a pleading. Id. The Supreme Court considered the issue of well-pleaded allegations, explaining the interplay between Rule 8(a) and Rule 12(b)(6) in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly:

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” in order to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the “grounds” of his “entitle[ment] to relief” requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . .

550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citations omitted); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556)). When considering a motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). The court is also to “‘draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.'” E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 440 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 253 (4th Cir. 2009)). Although a court must accept all facts alleged in the complaint as true, this is inapplicable to legal conclusions, and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, factual allegations must support the complaint for it to survive a motion to dismiss. Id. at 679. Therefore, a pleading that provides only “labels and conclusions” or “naked assertion[s]” lacking “some further factual enhancement” will not satisfy the requisite pleading standard. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557.

Further, the court “need not accept as true unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments.” E. Shore Mkts., Inc. v. J.D. Assocs., Ltd P'ship, 213 F.3d 175, 180 (4th Cir. 2000). At bottom, the...