Wilson v. Glos

• Decision Date: 04 February 1915
• Docket Number: No. 9729.,9729.
• Citation: 107 N.E. 630,266 Ill. 392
• Parties: WILSON et al. v. GLOS.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

266 Ill. 392

107 N.E. 630

WILSON et al.

v.GLOS.

No. 9729.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Dec. 16, 1914.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 4, 1915.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Cook County; Adelor J. Petit, Judge.

Application by Valdo F. Wilson and others to register title to certain land, to which Jacob Glos was made defendant and claimed title under certain tax deeds. From a decree in favor of the petitioners and setting aside the tax deeds, Glos appeals. Affirmed.John R. O'Connor, of Chicago, for appellant.

Charles F. McKinley, of Chicago, for appellees.

CRAIG, J.

Appellees filed their application in the circuit court of Cook county to register their title in fee simple to certain lots described in the application, under the act concerning land title, known as the Torrens Law. Hurd's Stat. 1913, [266 Ill. 393]p. 537. Appellant, Jacob Glos, was made a defendant, and its was alleged in the application that he was the owner of a tax deed to all the lots, which said tax deed was void. He appeared and filed an answer to the application, admitting that he was the owner of a tax title to the lots described, but denied it was invalid, and set up numerous reasons why the act under which the application was filed was in violation of both the state and federal Constitutions. The application was referred to one of the examiners of titles, who heard the evidence and made a report finding that the applicants were entitled to register their title as prayed, and recommending that the tax deed of appellant be declared void and that the same be set aside for the reasons that appellant had failed to make any proof of the existence of any valid judgment for delinquent taxes on which the tax sale to him was made and on which his deed was based, and that the proof failed to show that he had given sufficient and proper notice to the owners and those interested in the premises, as required by law, before taking out said tax deed on the expiration of the time for redemption from the tax sale. The examiner also found the amount paid out by appellant and expended by him in and about the procurement of said tax deed and payment of subsequent taxes, and recommended that appellant be reimbursed said amount as a condition to registering the title of appellees. Numerous objections were filed to the examiner's report, which were overruled and were ordered to stand as exceptions to said report. On the hearing the court rendered a decree in accordance with the report of the examiner, registering the title of said lots in appellees, and decreeing that the tax deed of appellant was void, and that he be reimbursed the amount expended and paid out by him in procuring said tax title and paying taxes on the property as found by the examiner. Appellant prayed an appeal to this court and had assigned numerous causes for error, of which the only ones relied upon and argued are that the abstracts of title which were offered in evidence by appellees before the examiner to prove their title to the premises involved were not made competent by the necessary preliminary proof under section 18 of the Torrens Act, and that the findings of the examiner of titles and the decree of the court regarding the invalidity of the tax deed are contrary to law and not supported by the evidence.

The specific reasons urged by appellant in support of his contention as to the abstracts of title are that two of the abstracts received in evidence (Applicants' Exhibit 1) are not competent, as there was no proof that the persons certifying to the same were in the business of making abstracts of title at the time of such certification, and that the time of such certification is not shown and the certificate is not dated. Applicants' Exhibit 1 is a copy of an abstract and shows the title of the property in question to May 12, 189§. The signature of the abstracters, Haddock, Vallette & Rickcords, to the certificate at the end of the abstract, together with the testimony, of the witness Harry L. Smith that he was acquainted with the firm of Haddock, Vallette & Rickcords and had worked for them, that they were in the business of making abstracts for hire and were in that business when the abstract was made, and made the abstract as a part of the transactions ordered in their office at the time it bore date, that he knew the firm signature, and that the signature was the genuine signature of said abstracters and was written by Erastus R. Green, who had an interest in the firm and who was accustomed to attach the firm signature in the ordinary course of business, was sufficient to make the abstracts competent evidence. The manner in which this abstract was signed is as follows:

Chicago, May twelfth (12), 1891.

Haddock, Vallette & Rickcords.

Fourteen (14) pages.

The foregoing (twenty-two [22] pages, this included) is a true copy of the original examinations of title.

Haddock, Vallette & Rickcords.

Appellant argues that, as the words ‘Haddock, Vallette & Rickcords' in the upper signature were printed on the abstract (the lower signature alone being written and identified), the date ‘May twelfth (12), 1891,’ did not apply to the lower signature, which was the signature identified as the written signature of the firm by the witness Smith. Counsel for appellant concedes that if the signature of Haddock, Vallette & Rickcords, which is printed, and which immediately follows the date, ‘May twelfth (12) 1891,’ was an original signature and so proved, it would be sufficient to make the document admissible. We think appellant's contention is without merit. The witness Smith testified that the abstract was made and issued at the date shown upon the abstract, May 12, 1891. In Chicago & Alton Railroad Co. v. Keegan, 152 Ill. 413, 39 N. E. 33, we held that it is a presumption of law, subject to rebuttal, that abstracts, like other documents, were made, written, and signed on the days they bear date.

Appellant also contends that the finding of the court that the tax deed was invalid for the reasons that no valid judgment for delinquent taxes was shown and no proof was made of proper notice of the tax sale to the owners and those interested in the premises is not supported by the evidence.

Appellant offered in evidence a tax deed dated September 6, 1910, and also offered a sworn copy of the tax judgment sale, redemption and forfeiture record of the county court of Cook county for taxes of the year 1906 and prior years, and also the affidavit of Jacob Glos and August A. Timke as to notice and inquiry for owners and persons interested in the premises. The copy of the judgment record offered in evidence shows that application for judgment was made by the county collector for a large amount of property embraced in a delinquent list of some 87 volumes submitted with the application for judgment. The court entered judgment against all the lands, lots, etc., as described in the delinquent list and application for judgment, being volumes 1 to 87, inclusive, except as to such lands,...