Wilson v. Hart, 01-CV-390.

• Court: Court of Appeals of Columbia District
• Citation: 829 A.2d 511
• Docket Number: No. 01-CV-390.,01-CV-390.
• Parties: Thomas R. WILSON, et al., Appellants, v. Thomas A. HART, Jr., et al., Appellees.
• Decision Date: 31 July 2003

829 A.2d 511

Thomas R. WILSON, et al., Appellants,
v.
Thomas A. HART, Jr., et al., Appellees

No. 01-CV-390.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued November 25, 2002.

Decided July 31, 2003.

829 A.2d 512

Ronald L. Webne, for appellants

James C. McKay, Jr., Senior Assistant Corporation Counsel, with whom Robert R. Rigsby, Corporation Counsel at the time the brief was filed, and Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corporation Counsel at the time the brief was filed, were on the brief, for appellee District of Columbia.

Gary D. Wright, Bethesda, MD, filed a Notice in lieu of brief for appellee Thomas A. Hart, Jr.

Before STEADMAN, SCHWELB and REID, Associate Judges.

STEADMAN, Associate Judge:

Appellants were occupying an apartment in a building owned by appellee Thomas Hart. They vacated the premises at the request of District police, allegedly at the instigation of Hart who asserted that appellants had no right to be in the apartment. In a wrongful eviction action brought by appellants against Hart and the District of Columbia, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. It did so on grounds of res judicata and collateral estoppel, based on a prior agency proceeding before the rental housing authorities. We hold that although collateral estoppel bars appellants' claim insofar as it is based on any direct landlord-tenant relationship between Hart and appellants, there remains a genuine issue of material fact whether a subtenancy existed that may allow appellants to recover under our holding in Young v. District of Columbia, 752 A.2d 138 (D.C. 2000).

829 A.2d 513

I. Background

The parties have sharply differing accounts with respect to the events surrounding appellants' occupancy of the apartment.¹ According to the appellants, they saw a "for rent" sign on February 17 and spoke to Lawrence Bey, who they thought was the building manager. Bey took them to see Hart, who identified himself as the owner. Discussions took place and it was agreed that appellants could rent the apartment for $400 a month. Appellants purchased a money order for $200 payable to Hart and gave it to him as rent for the remainder of February.² On March 17, Hart appeared and demanded that they leave the premises immediately. Appellants called the police, but after a conversation with Hart, the police ordered appellants to leave immediately under threat of arrest.

Hart, supported by Bey, asserted that the apartment in question was under lease to Bey, with a clause that permitted occupancy by only one person and prohibited Bey from subletting or placing anyone else in possession of the apartment without Hart's written consent. Bey entered into an oral agreement with appellants which allowed appellants to remain in the apartment for two weeks. At Bey's request, appellants obtained a $200 money order payable to Hart, which Bey turned over to Hart in payment of back rent. Hart subsequently became aware of appellants' occupancy and asked them to leave since they had no right to be there. When they refused, the police were called. Appellants then left voluntarily and without force.

On or about the day of their eviction, appellants filed a tenant petition against Hart with the Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs, Rental Accommodations and Conversion Division. The petition alleged a wide range of violations of various provisions of the rental housing laws. In response, Hart filed a motion to dismiss the petition, asserting that the predicate landlord-tenant relationship did not exist between the parties. After a hearing, the hearing examiner determined that "Respondent's motion to dismiss should be granted because there has not been a landlord tenant relationship established here," and that Bey "was acting beyond the scope of his authority when he made arrangements with the petitioners." The petition was dismissed with prejudice.

Petitioners appealed to the Rental Housing Commission. The Rental Housing Commission remanded the case to the hearing examiner for "clarification." The hearing examiner corrected a finding of fact to state that petitioners "did not reside at 302 Florida Avenue, N.W., as tenants of Respondent, Thomas Hart"³ and again dismissed the petition with prejudice on August 3, 1998. No motion for reconsideration or further appeal was taken.

On March 13, 2000, appellants filed a complaint in Superior Court against Hart and the District of Columbia, alleging wrongful eviction and breach of covenant of quiet enjoyment. Answers were filed and Hart and the District both filed motions for summary judgment, asserting res judicata and collateral estoppel based on the unappealed hearing examiner's final decision. The appellants opposed the motion.

829 A.2d 514

On February 12, 2001, the trial court dismissed appellants' complaint on the grounds of res judicata and collateral estoppel because appellants had received a hearing on the merits and "[t]here is no dispute, nor could there be, that the Hearing Examiner dismissed the petition because no landlord-tenant relationship existed between the parties." The District no longer defends the trial court decision on the ground of res judicata,⁴ so that only the collateral estoppel issue is before us for review

II. Collateral Estoppel

Even where res judicata is inapplicable, collateral estoppel or issue preclusion may bar relitigation...