Wilson v. Humphrey

• Decision Date: 19 December 2013
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:10-CV-489 (MTT)
• Parties: MARION WILSON, JR., Petitioner, v. CARL HUMPHREY, Warden, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Georgia

MARION WILSON, JR., Petitioner, v. CARL HUMPHREY, Warden, Respondent.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:10-CV-489 (MTT)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA MACON DIVISION

SO ORDERED: December 19, 2013

ORDER

MARION WILSON, JR. was sentenced to death for the murder of Donovan Corey Parks. He petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Although he alleges numerous errors on the part of the state courts that considered his various claims, his principal contention is that he would not have been sentenced to die if his trial attorneys had competently investigated his background and used the information gained from that background investigation to present an effective mitigation defense. Specifically, he argues that if the jury had heard from various teachers, social workers, and other background witnesses and if his attorneys had armed their mental health experts with this background information, the jury likely would not have found that he should be executed. This Court agrees that the conduct of Wilson's trial attorneys with regard to their investigation and presentation of mitigation evidence is difficult to defend. But even assuming his lawyers' performance was deficient, it is clear to this Court that Wilson cannot prove he was prejudiced. That is because the Court is satisfied that there is not a reasonable probability that, but for his lawyers' errors, the result of his trial would have been different.

For this and many other reasons discussed in detail below, Wilson's petition is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. Facts

The Georgia Supreme Court summarized the facts of this case in Wilson's direct appeal:

[O]n the night of March 28, 1996, the victim, Donovan Corey Parks, entered a local Wal-Mart to purchase cat food, leaving his 1992 Acura Vigor parked in the fire lane directly in front of the store. Witnesses observed Wilson and Robert Earl Butts standing behind Parks in one of the store's checkout lines and, shortly thereafter, speaking with Parks beside his automobile. A witness overheard Butts ask Parks for a ride, and several witnesses observed Wilson and Butts entering Parks's automobile, Butts in the front passenger seat and Wilson in the back seat. Minutes later, Parks's body was discovered lying face down on a residential street. Nearby residents testified to hearing a loud noise they had assumed to be a backfiring engine and to seeing the headlights of a vehicle driving from the scene. On the night of the murder, law enforcement officers took inventory of the vehicles in the Wal-Mart parking lot. Butts's automobile was among the vehicles remaining in the lot overnight. Based upon the statements of witnesses at the Wal-Mart, Wilson was arrested. A search of Wilson's residence yielded a sawed-off shotgun loaded with the type of ammunition used to kill Parks, three notebooks of handwritten gang "creeds," secret alphabets, symbols, and lexicons, and a photo of a young man displaying a gang hand sign.

Wilson gave several statements to law enforcement officers and rode in an automobile with officers indicating stops he and Butts had made in the victim's automobile after the murder. According to Wilson's statements, Butts had pulled out a sawed-off shotgun, had ordered Parks to drive to and then stop on Felton Drive, had ordered Parks to exit the automobile and lie on the ground, and had shot Parks once in the back of the head. Wilson and Butts then drove the victim's automobile to Gray where they stopped to purchase gasoline. Wilson, who was wearing gloves, was observed by witnesses and videotaped by a security camera inside the service station. Wilson and Butts then drove to Atlanta where they contacted Wilson's cousin in an unsuccessful effort to locate a "chop shop" for disposal of the victim's automobile. Wilson and Butts purchased two gasoline cans at a convenience store in Atlanta and drove to Macon where the victim's automobile was set on fire. Butts then called his uncle and arranged a rideback to the Milledgeville Wal-Mart where Butts and Wilson retrieved Butts's automobile.

Wilson v. State, 271 Ga. 811, 812-13, 525 S.E.2d 339, 343 (1999), overruled in part by O'Kelley v. State, 284 Ga. 758, 670 S.E.2d 388 (2008).

B. Procedural history

On November 5, 1997, a jury found Wilson guilty of malice murder, felony murder, armed robbery, hijacking a motor vehicle, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, and possession of a sawed-off shotgun. (Doc. 8-9 at 90).¹ He was sentenced to death for the crime of malice murder, and the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and sentence on November 1, 1999. (Doc. 8-9 at 88); Wilson, 271 Ga. at 812, 525 S.E.2d at 343.

Wilson filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Superior Court of Butts County, Georgia on January 19, 2001. (Doc. 11-4). After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the state habeas court denied relief in an order dated November 25, 2008. (Docs. 12-5 to12-8; 18-4).

On December 17, 2010, Wilson filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody in this Court. (Doc. 1). The Respondent filed his answer, and the Court denied Wilson's motions for discovery, a stay, and an evidentiary hearing. (Docs. 7, 28, 37, 39). Both parties have now briefed the issues. (Docs. 43, 44, 47).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. Exhaustion and procedural default

Procedural default bars federal habeas relief when a habeas petitioner has failed to exhaust state remedies that are no longer available or when the state court rejects the habeas petitioner's claim on independent state procedural grounds. Frazier v. Bouchard, 661 F.3d 519, 524 n.7 (11th Cir. 2011); Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d 1144, 1156-57 (11th Cir. 2010).

There are two exceptions to procedural default. If the habeas respondent establishes that a default has occurred, the petitioner bears the burden of establishing "cause for the failure to properly present the claim and actual prejudice, or that the failure to consider the claim would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice." Conner v. Hall, 645 F.3d 1277, 1287 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 81-88 (1977); Marek v. Singletary, 62 F.3d 1295, 1301-02 (11th Cir. 1995)). A petitioner establishes cause by demonstrating that some objective factor external to the defense impeded his efforts to raise the claim properly in the state courts. Spencer v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 609 F.3d 1170, 1180 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Henderson v. Campbell, 353 F.3d 880, 892 (11th Cir. 2003)). A petitioner establishes prejudice by showing that there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings would have been different. Id. To the extent the state court's cause and prejudice findings are based upon determinations of fact, those factual findings are presumed to be correct and can be rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Regarding what is necessary for a petitioner to establish a fundamental miscarriage of justice, the Eleventh Circuit has stated:

To excuse a default of a guilt-phase claim under [the fundamental miscarriage of justice] standard, a petitioner must prove "a constitutional violation [that] has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent." To gain review of a sentencing-phase claim based on [a fundamental miscarriage of justice], a petitioner must show that "but for constitutional error at his sentencing hearing, no reasonable juror could have found him eligible for the death penalty under [state] law."

Hill v. Jones, 81 F.3d 1015, 1023 (11th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).

B. Claims that were adjudicated on the merits in the state courts

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") provides the standard of review.² This Court may not grant habeas relief with respect to any claim that has been adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court's decision was (1) contrary to clearly established Federal law; (2) involved an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law; or (3) was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2); see also Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 785 (2011). The phrase "clearly established Federal law" refers to the holdings of the United States Supreme Court that were in existence at the time of the relevant state court decision. Thaler v. Haynes, 559 U.S. 43, 47 (2010); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000).

"The 'contrary to' and 'unreasonable application' clauses of § 2254(d)(1) are separate bases for reviewing a state court's decisions." Putman v. Head, 268 F.3d 1223, 1241 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 404-05).

Under § 2254(d)(1), "[a] state court's decision is 'contrary to'... clearly established law if it 'applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the United States Supreme Court's] cases' or if it 'confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the United States Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a [different] result....'"

Michael v. Crosby, 430 F.3d 1310, 1319 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 15-16 (2003)).

A state court's decision involves an "unreasonable application" of federal law when "'the state court identifies the correct governing legal rule but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular state prisoner's case, or when it unreasonably extends, or unreasonably declines to extend, a legal principle from Supreme Court case law to a new context.'" Reese v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 675 F.3d 1277, 1286 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Greene v. Upton, 644 F.3d 1145, 1154 (11th Cir. 2011)). An "unreasonable application" and an "incorrect application" are not the same:

We have explained that an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application

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