Wilson v. Illinois Trust & Sav. Bank
| Decision Date | 03 April 1897 |
| Citation | 166 Ill. 9,46 N.E. 740 |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
| Parties | WILSON v. ILLINOIS TRUST & SAVINGS BANK. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from circuit court, Cook county; O. H. Horton, Judge.
Bill by the Illinois Trust & Savings Bank, as executor and trustee under the will of William G. Wilson, deceased, against Harriet A. Wilson and others. From the decree, defendant Harriet A. Wilson appeals. Affirmed.
Defrees, Brace & Ritter, for appellant.
Prussing & McCulloch, for appellee.
Appellant is the widow of William G. Wilson, deceased, and appellee is executor and trustee under his will. At the time of his death, he owned and occupied as his residence with his family, consisting of appellant and their minor daughter, Marguerite Wilson, certain premises,situated at the southwest corner of Lake and Oakwood avenues, in the city of Chicago. By the will, this property, with other estate, was devised to appellee, in trust for appellant, the minor child, Marguerite, Alice May Coykendall, his married daughter, and others, as beneficiaries under the will. After his death, appellant continued to occupy the homestead with the minor daughter. Many questions having arisen as to the true construction of the will and the trusts thereby created, appellee filed its bill in this case for such construction, and for relief accordingly. The court decided all the questions presented to the satisfaction of all parties, except as to the homestead right in the above-mentioned property. As to that property, the court found that it was worth $36,000; that appellant was entitled to a homestead therein to the extent and value of $1,000; that the premises were not susceptible of partition or division, so as to set off $1,000 in value or any part of the premises for a homestead; that her claim to be entitled to the possession, and to the rents, issues, and profits of the whole of the premises, was unjust, inequitable, and unlawful; and that $1,000 was the whole value of her homestead right in the premises. The court decreed that, upon payment to her of said $1,000, she should be required to deliver up possession to appellee. There are no creditors to be affected. No complaint is made of the method adopted by the court in adjusting the rights of the parties if appellant was not entitled to the occupancy and enjoyment of the whole premises, and if the court had any right to make any adjustment at all between them.
Appellant asserts that, whatever her rights may be by virtue of the statute exempting the homestead from the laws of descent or devise, she is entitled to occupy the premises jointly with her daughter Marguerite, as a home, by virtue of the sixth paragraph of the will. That paragraph recited that the testator had in contemplation the procuring of another home than the one in question, and provided that, in the event that he did procure such other home, and own and occupy the same at the time of his decease as a homestead, his daughter Marguerite might hold and occupy such future-acquired home as long as she should live, and that appellant should have the use with said daughter of such home as long as the daughter should occupy the same, provided appellant should not marry again, or until she should marry again. The testator never procured any other home, as he had contemplated; but it is contended that, on account of his failure to do so, a like provision should attach to these premises. The will cannot be made to bear such construction. The provision was only to apply to the substituted home in case it should be purchased, and it was to consist of property other and different from that in controversy in this case; so that this home was not only not intended, but was excluded, by the terms of the will.
Appellant says, however, that the most serious and important question presented in the case is whether the homestead is limited in value to $1,000 where the rights of creditors are not involved, and she insists that it is not so limited. The argument is that the limitation is for the benefit of creditors, and that the home selected by her husband must be conclusively deemed to be the homestead of appellant, irrespective of its value, unless the rights of his creditors are thereby interfered...
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Rossiter v. Soper
...complaint for partition be denied. This was in accordance with the rule established and approved by this court. Wilson v. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank, 166 Ill. 9, 46 N.E. 740. This is the decree from which the appeal was taken to the Appellate Court, and which was reversed by that court. ......
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Wiegand v. Wiegand
...result to the owner or owners of the balance of the estate. The leading case to promulgate this principle is Wilson v. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank, 166 Ill. 9, 46 N.E. 740. There, one who had a homestead, or right of occupancy, to the extent of $1000 in value in premises with a total valu......
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Chapman v. Richey
...for the payment of his debts or other purposes and from the laws of conveyance, descent and devise, * * *." In Wilson v. Illinois Trust, etc. Bank, 166 Ill. 9, 46 N.E. 740, the court "The exemption is equally from the laws of conveyance, descent and devise as from sale and debts, and there ......
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Miller v. Miller
...recognizes chancery proceedings as not being governed by that act and as not coming within its provisions; and Wilson v. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank, 166 Ill. 9, 46 N. E. 740, which holds that the Partition Act, with the exception of the last two sections, relates to a proceeding at law a......