Wilson v. Inhabitants of City of Trenton

• Decision Date: 16 May 1898
• Citation: 61 N.J.L. 599,40 A. 575
• Parties: WILSON v. INHABITANTS OF CITY OF TRENTON et al.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

40 A. 575

61 N.J.L. 599

WILSON

v. INHABITANTS OF CITY OF TRENTON et al.

Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.

May 16, 1898.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Error to supreme court.

Certiorari by Samuel K. Wilson against the inhabitants of the city of Trenton and others to set aside a contract. From a judgment of the supreme court (38 Atl. 635) denying the relief sought, plaintiff brings error. Affirmed.

John H. Backes, for plaintiff in error.

John Rellstab and George W. Macpherson, for defendants in error.

DIXON, J. The plaintiff in error, owning land on Hamilton avenue, in the city of Trenton, sued out a writ of certiorari to set aside a contract which the city had made for paving that avenue with Trinidad Lake asphaltum. The supreme court having adjudged the contract legal, he has brought the matter to this court by writ of error.

The first reason urged by counsel for the plaintiff for holding the contract unlawful is that, besides requiring the contractor to lay a good pavement, it binds him to guaranty the durability of the pavement for five years, and during that period to maintain the pavement in good condition, and also binds him to repave, at a price stated, all openings made in the street during the same time. The effect of these provisions, it is argued, has been to enhance the price nominally charged for laying a good pavement, by making it cover the cost of maintenance and the cost of repaving beyond the stated price, which is said to be inadequate, and thus will be to increase the assessment to be levied upon the property owners, who are legally assessable for laying the pavement, but not for maintaining or relaying it. This contention, we think, ignores the principle on which assessments for municipal improvements are levied in this state. Property owners are not chargeable with the price of such improvements, but only with an equivalent for the special benefits they derive therefrom. Such an equivalent cannot exceed the reasonable value of the improvement, and hence the municipality itself, not the assessable property owners, must bear the excess of price beyond fair cost. If, therefore, the commissioners, who levy an assessment for this improvement, charge upon the property owners anything beyond the fair cost of laying a good pavement, their assessment will to that extent be illegal. The same evidence which would now show that the nominal price for paving includes compensation for the guaranty and for repaving will be then...