Wilson v. Joughin

• Decision Date: 26 April 1932
• Citation: 141 So. 182,105 Fla. 353
• Parties: WILSON v. JOUGHIN, Sheriff.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

141 So. 182

105 Fla. 353

WILSON v. JOUGHIN, Sheriff.

Florida Supreme Court

April 26, 1932

En Bance.

Original habeas corpus proceedings by Charles H. Wilson against R. T Joughin, Sheriff of Hillsborough County.

Petitioner remanded.

See also, 141 So. 178.

BUFORD C.J., dissenting.

COUNSEL Dickenson & Lake, of Tampa, for petitioner.

Charles F. Blake, of Tampa, for respondent.

OPINION

WHITFIELD J.

The facts are stated in the opinion by the CHIEF JUSTICE filed herein. In Ex parte Earman, 85 Fla. 297, 95 So. 755, 761, 31 A. L. R. 1226, the contempt charged was language used in a letter written to a circuit judge by a judge of the municipal court. The letter was not clearly contemptuous in its import, and it expressly stated it was written for information, and as 'a communication from a judge of an inferior court to the judge of an appellate court' as 'a statement of facts.' It was held that under the rules of the common law the writer of the letter could not be adjudged in contempt, where he expressly denied under oath that he wrote the letter with intent to reflect on the circuit judge, the language complained of not being plainly contemptuous. See, also, Ex parte Biggers, 85 Fla. 323, 95 So. 763; 6 R. C. L. 525; 13 C.J. 75.

Where the act charged clearly constitutes contempt, a denial under oath of a contemptuous intent in committing the act does not require a discharge. In such cases the question is not whether contempt was intended, but whether the conduct constituted contempt. See United States v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563, 27 S.Ct. 165, 51 L.Ed. 319, 8 Ann. Cas. 265; Emery v. State, 78 Neb. 547, 111 N.W. 374, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1124; O'Flynn v. State, 89 Miss. 850, 43 So. 82, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1119, 119 Am. St. Rep. 727, 11 Ann. Cas. 530; Ex parte Bankhead, 200 Ala. 102, 75 So. 478; Prine v. State, 143 Miss. 231, 108 So. 716; Pierce v. U. S., 37 App. D. C. 582; Carson v. Ennis, 146 Ga. 726, 92 S.E. 221, L. R. A. 1917E, 650; In re Fountain, 182 N.C. 49, 108 S.E. 342, 18 A. L. R. 208.

'As a general rule, habeas corpus does not lie to correct mere irregularities of procedure where there is jurisdiction; and in order to sustain the writ there must be illegality, or want of jurisdiction. Ex parte Pitts, 35 Fla. 149, 17 So. 76; Ex parte Prince, 27 Fla. 196, 9 So. 659 ; Ex parte Bowen, 25 Fla. 214, 6 So. 65. When a person has been taken into custody under an order of a court exercising proper jurisdiction, a habeas corpus to discharge the person so taken involves a collateral attack on the order under which he is held, and well-established rules forbid an investigation into matters of mere irregularity in procedure. But illegality in matter of law, or want of jurisdiction, may be inquired into, and the decision of the lower court as to such matter is not conclusive. The following language taken from People ex rel. Hackley v. Kelly, 24 N.Y. 74,--a contempt proceeding,--is expressive of our view on the subject, viz.: 'But this rule is, of course, subject to the qualification that the conduct charged as constituting the contempt must be such that some degree of delinquency or misbehavior can be predicated of it; for if the act be plainly indifferent or meritorious, or if it be only the assertion of the undoubted right of the party, it will not become a criminal contempt by being adjudged to be so. The question whether the alleged offender really committed the act charged will be conclusively determined by the order or judgment of the court, and so with equivocal acts, which may be culpable or innocent according to the circumstances; but, where the act is necessarily innocent or justifiable, it would be preposterous to hold it a cause of imprisonment. Hence, if the refusal of Mr. Hackley, the relator, to answer the question propounded to him, was only an assertion of a right secured to every person by the constitution, it was illegal to commit him for a contempt.' It cannot certainly be true that the decision of an inferior court adjudging a matter to be a contempt precludes all investigation as to the legality or proper authority of the court to make such order; and, on the other hand, it must not be forgotten that in such matters, when the court is acting within the sphere of its legitimate powers, the appellate tribunal will not undertake to review the correctness of conclusions as to matters of fact, or questions of mere procedure. In Re Dill, 32 Kan. 668, 5 P. 39 .' Ex Parte Ed. Senior, Jr., Habeas Corpus, 37 Fla. 1, 14, 19 So. 652, 653, 32 L. R. A. 133.

'When the order or judgment of a court of general jurisdiction committing the petitioner to jail for contempt is collaterally attacked by habeas corpus, every intendment will be indulged in support of validity of such order or judgment, unless the contrary affirmatively appears. It is generally held in such cases that the recitals in the commitment record are conclusive of the facts recited, and a statement filed by the judge as to matters occurring before him is usually regarded as importing absolute verity.' State ex rel. Grebstein v. Lehman, 100 Fla. 481, 482, 129 So. 818, 819.

The overt conduct charged is not equivocal and it constitutes contempt; therefore the commitment for contempt is conclusive. See Ex parte Savin, 131 U.S. 267, 9 S.Ct. 699, 33 L.Ed. 150; Sinclair v. U. S., 279 U.S. 749, 49 S.Ct. 471, 73 L.Ed. 938, 63 A. L. R. 1258; McCaully v. United States, 25 App. D. C. 404; Baumgartner v. Joughin (Fla.) 141 So. 185, and Wilson v. Joughin, No. 3 (Fla.) 141 So. 178, filed this day.

Petitioner remanded.

ELLIS, TERRELL, BROWN, and DAVIS, JJ., concur.

DISSENTING

BUFORD C.J. (dissenting).

This is an original proceeding in habeas corpus before this court. The petitioner, Charles Wilson, was adjudged in contempt of court by Hon. L. L. Parks, one of the judges of the circuit court of the Thirteenth judicial circuit of Florida, in and for Hillsborough county. Rule nisi issued by Judge Parks on the 12th day of March, 1932, based upon testimony of certain witnesses taken before the court, which witnesses were named in the rule. The rule charged as follows:

'That from said testimony of the foregoing witnesses it appears that you, the said Charles H. Wilson, did on the morning of Sunday, February 28th, A. D. 1932, approach the said T. B. Crosson, after the said T. B. Crosson had been duly served with summons to appear as a juror, knowing that he was a juror drawn to serve in this court on the above entitled cause, and knowing that the said above entitled cause of the State of Florida v. Victor Palmer et al., was to be called for trial on the followng day, and attempted to corrupt the said juror, to-wit: T. B. Crosson, by influencing him to bring in a particular verdict in said cause and with the intent to bias the opinion and influence the decision of such juror relating to the cause pending in the court, and thereby corrupt, hinder and obstruct the administration of justice in the Court aforesaid, in contempt of this Court and the Judges serving therein.'

Transcript of the testimony upon which the rule was based was attached to and made a part of the rule. The transaction between the witness and Wilson, according to the testimony of the witness, which is the only testimony in this record, was:

'Q. Do you know what make car it was? A. No sir.

'Q. And these people drove up? A. Yes sir.

'Q. A large or small car? A. It was a big car, a large car.

'Q. A sedan? A. I couldn't say, it was a large car.

'Q. Do you know what color? A. No, sir.

'Q. Did they get out of the car and come to see you? A. I was standing up outside of the house and it must have been the young man came and spoke to me and said 'There is a man up there wants to see you,' so I walked up to the car and he says, 'Is this Mr. Crosson? and I says, 'Yes, this is Mr. Crosson.' And he commenced. This man got out of the car and said 'I want to speak a word to you.' And he walked off to one side and said, 'I want you fellows--' or men, I forget just how he said that, anyhow he says 'I want you men' or boys, I dont know just how, but says, 'I want you all if you can not to electrocute this boy,' but he didn't say what boy. He says 'If you can, I would rather you would give him life time than to execute him.' When he started about this matter I just spoke to him and said, 'I am a juror,' and didn't want him to be telling me nothing, if he wanted me to wishe-washe I didn't want him to do that. I said, 'I am a juror' and he said 'I understand. I am not doing this thing to incriminate myself, I am just asking you if you can not to electrocute him if you can.' And said 'It would be best to give him life and not electrocute him.'

'Q. And then what happened: What did you say? A. I told him that I was a man that tried to give justice to give the man all of the doubts that there was about it.'

The respondent filed his answer under oath containing the following allegations:

'This respondent denies emphatically any intention on his part to corrupt in any manner whatsoever, the said T. B. Crosson, as set out in Rule Nisi.

'2. This respondent further answering said Rule Nisi, denies each and every material allegation contained therein, and specifically denies that he had any intention of influencing in ay manner, or attempting to influence in any manner, the decision of the said T. B. Crosson to bring in any particular verdict in the case of State of Florida vs. Victor Palmer et al., and thereby corrupt, hinder and obstruct the administration of justice in the court aforesaid, in contempt of the court and the jurors serving therein.

'3. This respondent denies that he knew that the said T. B Crosson was a juror drawn to serve in the case of State of Florida vs. Victor Palmer, et al., as set...