Wilson v. King

Decision Date04 April 2022
Docket Number1:22CV226
PartiesNATHAN WILSON, Plaintiff, v. PAUL KING, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of North Carolina

ORDER AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Joe L Webster, United States Magistrate Judge

This matter is before the Court upon pro se Plaintiff Nathan Wilson's application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). (Docket Entry 1.) The Court will review the Complaint to determine whether dismissal is appropriate because it is frivolous, malicious or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Michau v. Charleston County, 434 F.3d 725, 728 (4th Cir. 2006). A frivolous complaint “lacks an arguable basis in either law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); see also Nagy v. Federal Med. Ctr. Hutner, 376 F.3d 252, 256-57 (4th Cir. 2004) (“The word ‘frivolous' is inherently elastic and not susceptible to categorical definition. . . . The term's capaciousness directs lower courts to conduct a flexible analysis, in light of the totality of the circumstances, of all factors bearing upon the frivolity of a claim.” (some internal quotation marks omitted)).

Alternatively a complaint that does not “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face' must be dismissed. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Hell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct.” Id. The court accepts all well-pled facts as true and construes these facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff in weighing the legal sufficiency of the complaint, ” but does not consider “legal conclusions, elements of a cause of action, . . . bare assertions devoid of factual enhancement [, ] . . . unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments.” Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 255 (4th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). In other words, the standard requires a plaintiff to articulate facts, that, when accepted as true, demonstrate the plaintiff has stated a claim that makes it plausible he is entitled to relief, brands v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, and Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Pro se complaints are to be construed liberally and “must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Lrickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal quotations and citation omitted omitted).

Additionally, “[federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Lokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Thus, original jurisdiction lies in two types of cases: (1) those involving federal questions and (2) those involving diversity of citizenship. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332(a). The plaintiff bears the burden of showing that jurisdiction exists. McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Cop., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936); Adams v. Pain, 697 F.2d 1213, 1219 (4th Cir. 1982). Questions concerning subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time by the parties or sua sponte by the Court. Prickwood Contractors, Inc. v. Datanet Angy Inc., 369 F.3d 385, 390 (4th Cir. 2004). Should the Court conclude that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it must dismiss the action. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3).

Here, a review of Plaintiff s Complaint raises threshold jurisdictional concerns. In the jurisdictional section of the Complaint, Plaintiff states “my mind open” as a basis for federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (see Compl. at 3), [1] which is insufficient to assert a claim arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States. In the diversity jurisdiction section, the Complaint lists Plaintiff as a citizen of North Carolina and Defendant Paul King as a corporation operating under the laws of the state of Georgia while stating “did a surgery when I didn't need one” as the amount in controversy. (See id. at 3-4.)[2]Even under the most liberal construction and assuming that the parties are diverse, the Court still lacks subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 because the Complaint does not set forth any specific amount in damages, nor otherwise sets out the amount-in-controversy requirement in excess of $75, 000. Indeed, [w]hile -a pro se complaint is supposed to be liberally construed, a court cannot construe what is not in the complaint.” Killing v. Guma, No. 116CV00514GBLIDD, 2016 WL 11668948, at *2 (E.D. Va. July 5, 2016) (unpublished). Thus, having not established a basis for jurisdiction, Plaintiffs Complaint should be dismissed.

Even if the Court were to conclude that subject-matter jurisdiction exists, Plaintiffs Complaint is still subject to dismissal for failure to state a plausible action as required under Iqbal. 556 U.S. at 678. Plaintiffs statement of the claim simply reads, “my medical records with cp at the white house.” (Compl. at 4.) This allegation is wholly insubstantial and frivolous as it lacks an arguable basis either in law or fact. Heitgke, 490 U.S. at 325.

Beyond that, Plaintiff attaches several documents, including several state court filings involving himself and other individuals. (See Compl. at 6-38.) They shed no further light on establishing a cognizable claim under federal law.

As previously stated, Plaintiff mentions an unnecessary surgery (see id. at 4), and the undersigned further acknowledges Plaintiffs designation of this action as a medical malpractice claim on his civil cover sheet. (See Docket Entry 3.)[3] Even if the Court were to construe this action as a medical malpractice state claim, Plaintiff fails to allege adequate facts to support his claim either under North Carolina or Georgia state law. See Stockton v. Cty., 173 F.Supp.3d 292, 307 (E.D. N.C. 2016) (setting forth North Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 9(j) pleading requirements and stating that “[f| allure to comply with Rule 9(j) is ground for dismissal of a state medical-malpractice claim filed in federal court.”); Wright v. United States, 280 F.Supp.2d 472, 477 (M.D. N.C. 2003) (“To prevail on a medical malpractice claim in North Carolina, a plaintiff must establish: (1) the applicable standard of care; (2) the defendant's breach of that standard; and (3) that the breach caused the plaintiffs...

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