Wilson v. Lawrence

Citation81 N.E.3d 1242,150 Ohio St.3d 368,2017 Ohio 1410
Decision Date19 April 2017
Docket Number2016–0180.,Nos. 2015–2081,s. 2015–2081
Parties WILSON, Appellee, v. LAWRENCE, Exr., Appellant.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Ohio

Ulmer and Berne, L.L.P., James A. Goldsmith, and Matthew T. Wholey, Cleveland, for appellant.

Triscaro & Associates, Ltd., and Joseph J. Triscaro, Solon, for appellee.

O'CONNOR, C.J.

{¶ 1} In this consolidated appeal, we address whether a claimant seeking to file a claim against an estate meets the requirement of R.C. 2117.06(A)(1)(a) to "present" a claim "[t]o the executor or administrator in a writing" when the claimant delivers the claim to someone who has not been appointed by a probate court to serve as the executor or administrator of the estate. We hold that the claimant does not meet the statutory requirement, and, accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Eighth District Court of Appeals.

RELEVANT BACKGROUND

{¶ 2} Joseph T. Gorman entered a contract with appellee, James A. Wilson, to purchase a 15 percent interest in Marine 1, L.L.C., for $300,000. Gorman died on January 20, 2013. At the time of Gorman's death, he owed Wilson $187,000 on the contract.

{¶ 3} On July 1, 2013, the Cuyahoga County Probate Court opened Gorman's estate. That same day, the probate court appointed appellant, William Lawrence, as the executor of Gorman's estate, pursuant to Gorman's will. The probate court's docket showed that the estate's counsel was Joseph A. Goldsmith.

{¶ 4} On July 11, 2013, Wilson's attorney sent one letter addressed to both Gorman's personal secretary, Patricia Clark, and Gorman's accountant and the trustee of his trust, Randall Myeroff. Although that letter was addressed to Clark and Myeroff, not to Lawrence or Goldsmith, the letter purported to present Wilson's claim for approximately $200,000 to the executor of Gorman's estate. Wilson intended the letter as the presentment of his claim to the estate, but he did not send the letter to Lawrence or to Goldsmith. According to the record, however, Clark forwarded the letter to Goldsmith on the day she received it and Myeroff forwarded the letter to Goldsmith and Lawrence soon after he received it.

{¶ 5} On September 24, 2013, Goldsmith informed Wilson's attorney that he was aware that the attorney had sent a letter to Clark and Myeroff on Wilson's behalf. But Goldsmith asserted that the "mailing of [Wilson's] claim to the trustee of the decedent's trust and to his executive assistant are insufficient to effectuate the filing of an appropriate claim" and informed Lawrence that the "claim will not be considered as it was not presented to the Executor of the Estate in accordance with the Ohio Revised Code."1

{¶ 6} On November 14, 2013, Wilson brought suit against Lawrence, as executor of Gorman's estate, in the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court, alleging that Gorman breached the contract. After discovery, the estate and Wilson moved for summary judgment. The trial court judge expressly found that the letter was sent to "two individuals who were not in fact personal representatives of the decedent's estate" and thus that the letter was not legally sufficient, under R.C. 2117.06, for presenting Wilson's claim. The trial court granted the estate's motion for summary judgment and denied Wilson's motion.

{¶ 7} On Wilson's appeal, the Eighth District framed the issue before it as whether Wilson timely presented his claim against the estate in accordance with R.C. 2117.06. 2015-Ohio-4677, 49 N.E.3d 826, ¶ 15. After suggesting that Ohio courts have softened the standard for presenting claims under R.C. 2117.06, id. at ¶ 19, the appellate court concluded that Ohio law permits a claim against an estate to be deemed presented when "other individuals connected with the estate receive the claim," id. at ¶ 22. According to the appellate court, "the fact that Wilson's claim was forwarded to the estate attorney and the executor by a third party, who w[as] connected with the decedent, is of no consequence." Id. The appellate court rejected Lawrence's "strict interpretation of R.C. 2117.06," i.e., "that the claim be directly presented to the administrator" of the estate. Id.

{¶ 8} Lawrence successfully moved the Eighth District to certify a conflict between its judgment in his cause and the Fourth District Court of Appeals' decision in Jackson v. Stevens, 4th Dist. Scioto No. CA 1231, 1980 WL 350961 (Jan. 24, 1980). We recognized that conflict and asserted jurisdiction over Lawrence's discretionary appeal from the Eighth District's judgment. 145 Ohio St.3d 1420, 2016-Ohio-1173, 47 N.E.3d 165; 145 Ohio St.3d 1421, 2016-Ohio-1173, 47 N.E.3d 166.

ANALYSIS

{¶ 9} We begin with the language of the controlling statute, R.C. 2117.06 :

(A) All creditors having claims against an estate, including claims arising out of contract, out of tort, on cognovit notes, or on judgments, whether due or not due, secured or unsecured, liquidated or unliquidated, shall present their claims in one of the following manners:
(1) After the appointment of an executor or administrator and prior to the filing of a final account or a certificate of termination, in one of the following manners:
(a) To the executor or administrator in a writing * * *.

(Emphasis added.)

{¶ 10} Our initial inquiry in considering the statute is to determine whether it is ambiguous.

{¶ 11} "It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that where the terms of a statute are clear and unambiguous, the statute should be applied without interpretation." Wingate v. Hordge, 60 Ohio St.2d 55, 58, 396 N.E.2d 770 (1979), citing Provident Bank v. Wood, 36 Ohio St.2d 101, 304 N.E.2d 378 (1973). "If [the statute] is ambiguous, we must then interpret the statute to determine the General Assembly's intent. If it is not ambiguous, then we need not interpret it; we must simply apply it." State v. Hairston, 101 Ohio St.3d 308, 2004-Ohio-969, 804 N.E.2d 471, ¶ 13, citing Sears v. Weimer, 143 Ohio St. 312, 55 N.E.2d 413 (1944), paragraph five of the syllabus ("An unambiguous statute is to be applied, not interpreted"). "When the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, we must rely on what the General Assembly has said," Jones v. Action Coupling & Equip., Inc., 98 Ohio St.3d 330, 2003-Ohio-1099, 784 N.E.2d 1172, ¶ 12, citing Symmes Twp. Bd. of Trustees v. Smyth, 87 Ohio St.3d 549, 553, 721 N.E.2d 1057 (2000), and give effect only to the words the legislature used, making neither additions to, nor deletions from, the statutory language. See Columbia Gas Transm. Corp. v. Levin, 117 Ohio St.3d 122, 2008-Ohio-511, 882 N.E.2d 400, ¶ 19.

{¶ 12} The statute is not ambiguous. The General Assembly's mandate in R.C. 2117.06(A) is a clear and unequivocal command that "all creditors * * * shall present their claims * * * to the executor or administrator in a writing." The language unambiguously states that all creditors shall present their claims in writing to the executor or administrator, "and no apparent purpose could be served by attempting to torture it into something else," Beach v. Mizner, 131 Ohio St. 481, 485, 3 N.E.2d 417 (1936).

{¶ 13} " ‘Shall’ means must." Application of Braden, 105 Ohio App. 285, 286, 148 N.E.2d 83 (1st Dist.1957). See also Dorrian v. Scioto Conservancy Dist., 27 Ohio St.2d 102, 107, 271 N.E.2d 834 (1971), citing Cleveland Ry. Co. v. Brescia, 100 Ohio St. 267, 126 N.E. 51 (1919) ("The word ‘shall’ is usually interpreted to make the provision in which it is contained mandatory, * * * especially if frequently repeated"). And "[t]he word ‘must’ is mandatory. It creates an obligation. It means obliged, required, and imposes a physical or moral necessity." Willis v. Seeley, 68 N.E.2d 484, 485 (C.P.1946). Thus, we repeatedly have recognized that use of the term "shall" in a statute connotes a mandatory obligation unless other language evidences a clear and unequivocal intent to the contrary. State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Lyons, 140 Ohio St.3d 7, 2014-Ohio-2354, 14 N.E.3d 989, ¶ 28. Here, there is absolutely no indication in the statutory scheme that the General Assembly meant "shall" to mean anything other than "must."

{¶ 14} R.C. 2117.06's requirement for presenting claims against an estate is a mandatory part of the state's legislative scheme, Fortelka v. Meifert, 176 Ohio St. 476, 480, 200 N.E.2d 318 (1964), that fosters the expeditious and efficient administration of estates, id. at 479, 200 N.E.2d 318, citing Gerhold v. Papathanasion, 130 Ohio St. 342, 345, 199 N.E. 353 (1936). See also Vitantonio, Inc. v. Baxter, 116 Ohio St.3d 195, 2007-Ohio-6052, 877 N.E.2d 663, ¶ 11 (O'Donnell, J., dissenting). It is well settled that the " ‘state has a strong interest in the administration of its citizens' estates,’ " In re Estate of Greer, 197 Ohio App.3d 542, 2011-Ohio-6721, 968 N.E.2d 55, ¶ 22 (1st Dist.), quoting In re Emery, 59 Ohio App.2d 7, 12, 391 N.E.2d 746 (1st Dist.1978), and we assume that the General Assembly's commands in the statutory scheme were intended to be met with strict compliance. Wilson's contention that substantial compliance with R.C. 2117.06(A) should be permitted is unpersuasive because "a statute or rule that uses the word ‘shall’ in describing an act to be performed is not generally susceptible of a ‘substantial compliance’ standard of interpretation." Lyons at ¶ 28. And Wilson identifies no other language in the statute that would be evidence of a clear and unequivocal intent to overcome the mandatory nature of the presentment obligation.

{¶ 15} In reaching this conclusion, we recognize that the requirements of R.C. 2117.06 are not arbitrary ones that elevate form over substance. Rather, they protect the vital interests of the estate and its beneficiaries, as well as the estate's creditors, by ensuring the orderly, efficient, and legally proper administration of the estate by "a probate fiduciary, an officer of the Probate Court." Beacon Mut. Indemn. Co. v. Stalder, 95 Ohio App....

To continue reading

Request your trial
53 cases
  • State ex rel. [Deceased v. Indus. Comm'n of Ohio
    • United States
    • Ohio Court of Appeals
    • 21 Diciembre 2021
    ...that the commission was under a mandatory obligation to complete the aforementioned determination. See Wilson v. Lawrence , 150 Ohio St.3d 368, 2017-Ohio-1410, 81 N.E.3d 1242, ¶ 13, citing State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Lyons , 140 Ohio St.3d 7, 2014-Ohio-2354, 14 N.E.3d 989, ¶ 28 (st......
  • City of Marietta v. Bd. of Trs. for Wash. Cnty. Woman's Home
    • United States
    • Ohio Court of Appeals
    • 26 Octubre 2020
    ...the ordinance's text clearly and unambiguously reveals intent, courts must apply the ordinance as written. Wilson v. Lawrence , 150 Ohio St.3d 368, 2017-Ohio-1410, 81 N.E.3d 1242, ¶ 11 ; Wingate v. Hordge , 60 Ohio St.2d 55, 58, 396 N.E.2d 770 (1979), citing Provident Bank v. Wood , 36 Ohio......
  • Everhart v. Coshocton Cnty. Mem'l Hosp.
    • United States
    • Ohio Supreme Court
    • 28 Diciembre 2023
    ... ... for Justice ...           ... Reminger Co., L.P.A., Holly Marie Wilson, Brianna Marie ... Prislipsky, and Thomas A. Prislipsky, urging reversal for ... amicus curiae Thomas Keane ...           Squire ... written Id.; see also State v. Ashcraft, __ Ohio ... St.3d __ , 2022-Ohio-4611, ... __ N.E.3d __ , ¶ 7; Wilson v ... Lawrence, 150 Ohio St.3d 368, 2017-Ohio-1410, 81 N.E.3d ... 1242, ¶ 11 ...           III ... Analysis ...           A ... Plain ... ...
  • Omran v. Lucas
    • United States
    • Ohio Court of Appeals
    • 13 Diciembre 2021
    ...When the ordinance's text clearly and unambiguously reveals intent, courts must apply the ordinance as written. Wilson v. Lawrence, 150 Ohio St.3d 368, 2017-Ohio-1410, 81 N.E.3d 1242, ¶ 11; Wingate v. Hordge, 60 Ohio St.2d 55, 58, 396 N.E.2d 770 (1979), citing Provident Bank v. Wood, 36 Ohi......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT