Wilson v. Loew

• Decision Date: 03 March 1958
• Docket Number: No. 33,33
• Parties: Michael WILSON, Gale Sondergard, Howard Da Silva, et al., Petitioners, v. LOEW'S Incorporated, a Corporation, Paramount Pictures, Inc., a Corporation, et al
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

355 U.S. 597

78 S.Ct. 526

2 L.Ed.2d 519

Michael WILSON, Gale Sondergard, Howard Da Silva, et al., Petitioners,

v LOEW'S Incorporated, a Corporation, Paramount Pictures, Inc., a Corporation, et al.

No. 33.

March 3, 1958.

Messrs. Robert W. Kenny and Ben Margolis (Mr. Samuel Rosenwein, on the brief), for petitioners.

Messrs. Irving M. Walker and Herman F. Selvin, for respondents Loew's Incorporated and others.

Messrs. Guy Richards Crump and Henry W. Low, for respondents Doyle and others.

Messrs. Edward J. Ennis and A. L. Wirin, for American Civil Liberties Union, as amicus curiae.

PER CURIAM.

The writ is dismissed as improvidently granted because the judgment rests on an adequate state ground.

Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, dissenting.

By demurrer to petitioners' complaint, the respondents in this case admitted that they agreed with each other to exclude from employment all persons who refused, on the grounds of the Fifth Amendment, to answer questions concerning their political associations and beliefs put by the Un-American Activities Committee of the House of Representatives.

The complaint alleged, and the demurrer thereby conceded, that petitioners had considerable experience in the motion-picture industry; and that respondents directly or indirectly controlled all motion-picture production and distribution in the United States and all employment opportunities therein. The California court sustained the demurrer on the ground that petitioners had not 'alleged that but for defendants' alleged interference any one of plaintiffs would, or even probably or possibly would, have been employed in the industry.' 142 Cal.App.2d 183, 195, 298 P.2d 152, 160.

This ruling on California law should result in a reversal of this judgment.

This is a case of alleged interference with the pursuit of an occupation, not an alleged interference with a particular contract or business relationship. The California cases on interference with the 'right to work' are broad in scope. In James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal.2d 721, 155 P.2d 329, 160 A.L.R. 900, the California Supreme Court held that a union could not exclude Negroes from membership in the union when at the same time there was a closed shop in the industry. The Marinship case was later followed in Williams v. International Brotherhood, 27 Cal.2d 586, 165 P.2d 903, where some of the plaintiffs were former employees. No showing of the possibility of employment was made. In Williams the court emphasized that a 'closed shop agreement with a single employer is in itslef a form of monopoly'; and it condemned attempts by a union 'to control by arbitrary selection the fundamental right to work.' 27 Cal.2d, at page 591, 165 P.2d at page 906. Here on the pleadings the respondents comprise a nation-wide monopoly over the industry and arbitrarily place petitioners on a 'black list.'

Dotson v. International Alliance, 34 Cal.2d 362, 210 P.2d 5, held that out-of-state workers, qualified for union membership, could recover damages for 'wrongful...