Wilson v. Lund, 41442
Decision Date | 23 December 1971 |
Docket Number | No. 41442,41442 |
Citation | 491 P.2d 1287,80 Wn.2d 91 |
Parties | Donald WILSON and Karen Wilson, Appellants, v. Lee L. LUND and Jane Doe Lund, husband and wife, d/b/a Triple L. Ranch, Respondents. |
Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Neil Hoff, Tacoma, for appellants.
Merrick, Johnson, Burgess & Hofstedt, F. Ross Burgess, Tacoma, for respondents.
This is an action for wrongful death of a 5-year-old boy instituted by his father, Donald Wilson, and his mother, Karen Wilson, plaintiffs (appellants), against the defendants (respondents), Lee L. Lund and his wife, doing business as Triple L. Ranch. The crux of this appeal is whether the legislature in amending RCW 4.24.010 in 1967 authorized the recovery of damages for mental anguish in cases involving the wrongful death of or injury to a child. We answer this question in the affirmative.
The action arose out of a riding mishap at the defendants' dude ranch on August 5, 1966, which resulted in the death of the Wilson's son, Kelly. Both parents instituted this action under RCW 4.24.010, alleging negligence on the part of the ranch owners.
In Wilson v. Lund, 74 Wash.2d 945, 447 P.2d 718 (1968), we held that the divorced mother, Karen Wilson, was entitled to bring suit in her own name. The order of the trial court dismissing the mother was reversed and the cause was remanded for further proceedings. We did not there reach the question raised, and the contention advanced by Karen Wilson in support of introducing psychiatric evidence because the order excluding the evidence in that case (without a prior call for an offer of proof or its equivalent) was premature.
Upon remand, the case was tried to a jury. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff mother, Karen Wilson, for $12,500, and a verdict in favor of the plaintiff father, Donald Wilson, with no award of damages. The plaintiffs have appealed. Their crucial contention is that the legislature, in amendment RCW 4.24.010 in 1967, authorized recovery for mental anguish or emotional harm as an element of damages--under appropriate circumstances in actions for the wrongful death of a child. Furthermore, in this connection, it is urged that the trial court erred in refusing to allow admission of psychiatric evidence and other evidence of grief, mental anguish or suffering of Karen Wilson, allegedly resulting from her child's wrongful death, for the purpose of recovering for emotional harm as an element of damages under RCW 4.24.010, as amended in 1967.
Three quarters of a century ago, Mr. Justice Holmes made the sage and significant statement that:
(t)he language of judicial decision is mainly the language of logic. And the logical method and form flatter that longing for certainty and for repose which is in every human mind. But certainty generally is illusion, and repose is not the destiny of man. Behind the logical form lies a judgment as to the relative worth and importance of competing legislative grounds, often an inarticulate and unconscious judgment, it is true, and yet the very root and nerve of the whole proceeding. You can give any conclusion a logical form.
(Italics ours.) Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv.L.Rev. 457, 465--66 (1897). In the appellate briefs and arguments in this case, it seems apparent that the parties have made a conscious choice in emphasizing different and opposing premises, assumptions, or logical forms--which are potentially available to resolve--in either of two different ways--the problem of statutory interpretation presented to us in this appeal. In making a judicial decision in this case, our efforts need not be with less candor and awareness of the facts of life and the nature of the judicial process than revealed by the joint overall efforts of the parties in this appeal. Be this as it may: the crucial language of the 1967 amendment to RCW 4.24.010 reads:
damages may be recovered for the Loss of love and companionship of the child And for injury to or destruction of the parent-child relationship . . .
(Italics ours.) Respondents, seeking to uphold the judgment of the trial court, contend that the amendment does not provide recovery for mental anguish in cases involving the wrongful death of or injury to a child. They seek solace and support in the following: (1) that denial of recovery for mental anguish is a principle well-entrenched in the judicial decisions of this state in cases of this nature; (2) that few states permit the recovery of damages for mental anguish either under legislative enactments or by judicial decisions; and (3) that existing tort law in this and other areas generally does not allow recovery of damages for mental anguish where 'ordinary' negligence is involved.
We are convinced that these arguments involve an uncritical one-sided application of legal logic and without concomitant, caereful examination of the underlying assumptions and premises. The assumptions or premises implicit in all three arguments are that the legislature (1) was aware of this court's strongly-entrenched policy against recognition of damages for mental anguish; (2) was additionally aware that such damages have generally been disallowed in other jurisdictions; (3) was further aware that such damages are not frequently awarded in other areas of tort law; and (4) therefore intended to do nothing to change the status quo by enacting the 1967 amendment to RCW 4.24.010; I.e., intended to continue the prevailing policy of our law disfavoring the award of damages for mental anguish.
The basic fault with these logical premises and conclusions is that their opposite seems more commonsensical, rational, and convincing. That is, if one assumes that the legislature was fully cognizant of this court's previous interpretation of RCW 4.24.010, predating the revised enactment in 1967, it is patently illogical to conclude that the legislature employed additional words and different language simply to reinforce or reenact the substance and meaning of the Preexisting statutory language which this court had already construed to deny recovery for mental anguish in cases of the instant kind. Actually, if the legislature intended No change--but to continue the status quo--I.e., no recovery of damages for mental anguish--this surely could have been accomplished best by doing nothing at all. Instead, the legislature took affirmative action and enacted the 1967 amendment of RCW 4.24.010. To acccept the restrictive interpretation of the statute urged by respondents in support of the trial court's decision is to say the legislature did nothing at all in passing the 1967 amendment. Such reasoning, among other things, is contrary to the principle of statutory interpretation that the legislature does not indulge in futile and useless acts, but only in purposeful and meaningful ones.
But, the question is not just whether the legislature intended to change the law. The real question is What change the legislature intended to make in the nature of damages recoverable for wrongful death of or injury to children.
A certain portion of the 1967 amendment initially presents little or no interpretative problem since the term 'companionship' as an element of damages has received previous consideration and definition by this court. The measurement of this element has been detailed generally in Lockhart v. Besel, 71 Wash.2d 112, 426 P.2d 605 (1967), and in Clark . Icicle Irrigation Dist., 72 Wash.2d 201, 432 P.2d 541 (1967). In Clark, this court quoted with approval the definition of companionship stated in Wycko v. Gnodtke, 361 Mich. 331, 339, 105 N.W.2d 118, 122 (1960):
(J)ust as an item of machinery forming part of a functioning industrial plant has a value over and above that of a similar item in a showroom, awaiting purchase, so an individual member of a family has a value to others as part of a functioning social and economic unit. This value is the value of mutual society and protection, in a word, companionship.
Thus, previous decisions of this court construing the word 'companionship' in statutory actions for the wrongful death of a child, substantially reduce the potential ambiguity in the statutory language debated in this appeal. But the 1967 amendment to RCW 4.24.010 Does not, however, Confine damage recovery in such actions to Loss of companionship.
On the face of the statutory language employed, it is clear that the legislative amendment envisioned or intended that recovery may be granted for Several integral, and in our judgment, inseparable, elements of damage; viz., (a) loss of love, (b) loss of companionship, and (c) injury to or destruction of the parent-child relationship. The loss of or injury to a child is an experience involving a complex pattern of human relationships, emotional reactions, and responses. The 1967 amendment evidences recognition of this complex pattern.
To attempt to exclude from this complex pattern of emotional responses the possibility of recovery for parental grief and mental anguish, is to fail, without justification, to ascribe any meaning--other than a negative one--to the statutorily expressed concept of recovery for 'loss of love . . . and for injury to or destruction of the parent-child relationship.' Such an exclusionary formulation--among other things--provides no guidelines or direction for determining precisely What damages are, in fact, recoverable for loss of love and damage to the parent-child relationship, and would be of little or no benefit to the practicing bar or to the bench in the day-to-day business of construing and applying the amended statute.
We cannot refuse to give positive meaning to one of the statutory phrases--' parent-child relationship'--merely because it is unique, and the language seems to have no readily ascribable 'ordinary meaning.' It is a fact that this language appears neither in statutory provisions of other jurisdictions relating to wrongful death recovery. Nor does the...
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