Wilson v. LY Invs.
| Decision Date | 17 February 2022 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL 1:20cv300-HSO-RHWR |
| Parties | CLAUDIA WILSON and ALFRED WILSON PLAINTIFFS v. LY INVESTMENTS, L.L.C. DEFENDANT |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Mississippi |
BEFORE THE COURT is Defendant Ly Investments, L.L.C.'s Motion [43] for Summary Judgment. After consideration of the record and relevant legal authority, the Court is of the opinion that Defendant's Motion [43] for Summary Judgment should be granted as to Plaintiff Claudia Wilson's lone federal claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act, which will be dismissed with prejudice. Because the Court will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' remaining state-law claims, Defendant's Motion [43] should be denied without prejudice to the extent it seeks dismissal of those claims, and this case will be remanded to state court.[1]
I. BACKGROUND
In August 2017, Plaintiffs Claudia Wilson (“Claudia”) and Alfred Wilson (“Alfred”) (collectively “Plaintiffs”) checked into a Quality Inn Hotel in Biloxi, Mississippi, which was owned and operated by Defendant Ly Investments, L.L.C. (“Defendant” or “Ly”). See Comp. [1-1] at 2; Ans. [7] at 2. Plaintiffs allege that upon their arrival they requested an accessible room. See Claudia's Dep. [52-2] at 43. Plaintiffs assert that they were originally assigned a room with disability-accessible features, but that it had not been cleaned. See Id. at 41-43, 45-46; Alfred's Dep. [52-1] at 9-10. Claudia called the front desk, and Plaintiffs were given a second room, which was not accessible. See Alfred's Dep. [52-1] at 9 31-32; Claudia's Dep. [52-2] at 43. According to Claudia when she inquired, a hotel worker told her that it was in fact accessible. See Claudia's Dep. [52-2] at 47.
The morning after Plaintiffs checked in to the hotel, Claudia took a shower and placed a towel bathmat on the floor beside the bathtub. See Id. at 50-52; Alfred's Dep [52-1] at 13. As she exited the bathtub and stepped onto the bathmat, it moved, causing Claudia to fall, strike her head on the toilet, and suffer injuries. See Id. at 50-53; Alfred's Dep. [52-1] at 13-14. According to Claudia, the “slickness on the floor” caused the bathmat to move. Claudia's Dep. [52-2] at 53; see Id. at 56. Alfred took Claudia to a local hospital for emergency medical attention. See Id. at 21-22, 59-60; Alfred's Dep. [52-1] at 16.
On August 5, 2020, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint [1-1] in the Circuit Court of Harrison County, Mississippi, Second Judicial District, advancing claims on behalf of Claudia for negligence, negligence per se, respondeat superior, and violation of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. (“ADA”), § 12182. See Compl. [1-1] at 8-12. Claudia's husband Alfred asserted only a derivative state-law claim for loss of consortium. See Id. at 13. Defendant removed the case to this Court, invoking federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(a). See Notice [1] at 2.
Defendant has now filed a Motion [43] for Summary Judgment on grounds that Plaintiffs' premises liability claims fail because there is no evidence of the existence of a dangerous condition or that Defendant had knowledge of any dangerous condition, and because Claudia created the condition which caused her fall. See Mem. [44] at 8-14. Defendant maintains that the ADA claim fails because there is no evidence that Claudia was disabled within the meaning of the ADA at the time of the incident, nor that she was denied public accommodations due to any disability. See Id. at 15-17.
II. DISCUSSION
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). If the movant carries this burden, “the nonmovant must go beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
To rebut a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the opposing party must show, with “significant probative evidence, ” that there exists a genuine issue of material fact. Hamilton v. Segue Software, Inc., 232 F.3d 473, 477 (5th Cir. 2000). “A genuine dispute of material fact means that evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Royal v. CCC & R Tres Arboles, L.L.C., 736 F.3d 396, 400 (5th Cir. 2013) (quotation omitted). “‘If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative,' summary judgment is appropriate.” Cutting Underwater Techs. USA, Inc. v. ENI U.S. Operating Co., 671 F.3d 512, 516 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)). In deciding whether summary judgment is appropriate, the Court “must view all evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” RSR Corp. v. Int'l Ins. Co., 612 F.3d 851, 857 (5th Cir. 2010).
Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii).
A threshold requirement of an ADA claim is that “the plaintiff must, of course, establish that he has a disability.” Waldrip v. Gen. Elec. Co., 325 F.3d 652, 654 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting Rogers v. Int'l Marine Terminals, Inc., 87 F.3d 755, 758 (5th Cir. 1996)). The ADA defines “disability” as “a physical . . . impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). Major life activities “include, but are not limited to, caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working.” Id. § 12102(2)(A).
The ADA further provides, in relevant part, that the definition of “disability” in § 12102(1) shall be construed in accordance with the following provisions:
42 U.S.C. § 12102(4).
According to the applicable regulations, “[t]he term ‘substantially limits' shall be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of the ADA, ” and it “is not meant to be a demanding standard.” 28 C.F.R. § 35.108(d)(i).
An impairment is a disability within the meaning of this part if it substantially limits the ability of an individual to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population. An impairment does not need to prevent, or significantly or severely restrict, the individual from performing a major life activity in order to be considered substantially limiting. Nonetheless, not every impairment will constitute a disability within the meaning of this section.
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