Wilson v. Marrow
| Decision Date | 13 February 2007 |
| Citation | 917 A.2d 357 |
| Parties | John D. WILSON, Appellant v. Jeff MARROW, Unknown Morrison, Unknown Moul, Unknown Pryal, Juanita Kramer, John Doe and Jane Doe. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court |
BEFORE: COLINS, President Judge, and SIMPSON, Judge, and LEAVITT, Judge.
OPINION BY Judge SIMPSON.
John D. Wilson (Wilson), representing himself, appeals an order of the Dauphin County Common Pleas Court (trial court) that granted Appellees'1 preliminary objections and dismissed his complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The trial court concluded Wilson's ostensible complaint for money damages in reality constituted an attempt to appeal the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole's (Board) revocation decision. Consequently, the court held Wilson's exclusive remedy was an appeal to this Court. Alternatively, the trial court determined Wilson's complaint failed to state any cognizable claims against Appellees. For the following reasons, we affirm.
Wilson is currently incarcerated at SCI-Frackville. In his complaint, Wilson alleges the following facts. In August 2003, he reported to a York parole office and requested to be taken to SCI-Camp Hill to submit a revised home plan. Complaint at ¶ 7. On the same day, Wilson was taken to York County Prison. Id. at ¶ 8. While there, Appellee Marrow, a Board agent, visited Wilson and asked if he would agree to placement in an anger management program as an alternative to prison. Id. at ¶ 9. Wilson agreed on the condition the Board approve his new home plan. Id.
Thereafter, Appellee Marrow transported Wilson to Adappt House; however, he was placed in drug rehabilitation, not anger management therapy. Id. at ¶ 10. Approximately two weeks later, Adappt House discharged Wilson based on allegations he violated parole condition 7, failure to complete the program. Specifically, Adappt House alleged Wilson made threats to a male client and sexually stalked a female client. Id. at ¶ 11.
Thereafter, Wilson appeared at a Board preliminary hearing at which Appellee Moul, a Board hearing examiner, presided. Id. at ¶ 12. At the hearing, Appellee Kramer, a Board agent, read the above allegations against Wilson. Id. Wilson alleges Appellee Moul found probable cause for a violation solely upon a reading of the charges. Id.
Appellee Pryal presided over the subsequent revocation hearing. Id. at ¶ 13. Appellee Kramer again read the allegations against Wilson. Id. A witness from Adappt House testified Wilson made terroristic threats toward a Board agent and the agent's family. Id. Ultimately, the Board rendered a decision recommitting Wilson to serve 24 months backtime.2 Id. at ¶ 14.
Wilson's complaint seeks monetary damages from Appellees for various federal constitutional violations, retaliation and other tortious conduct. Specifically, Wilson alleges violations of his Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights (Count I); defamation (Count II); official oppression (Count III); retaliation (Count IV); and negligence (Count V).
Appellees initially filed preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer and jurisdictional challenge. They also filed supplemental objections asserting res judicata. Thereafter, the trial court granted Appellees' preliminary objection to subject matter jurisdiction. The court noted Wilson's complaint alleges the Board improperly revoked his parole and violated his constitutional rights in doing so. Thus, the trial court held Wilson's exclusive remedy is an appeal to this Court from the revocation decision. Borsello v. Colleran, 833 A.2d 1213 (Pa.Cmwlth.2003).
Alternatively, the trial court concluded Wilson's complaint fails to state any cognizable claims against Appellees. Wilson appeals.3
Wilson contends the trial court erred by ruling it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint. He maintains he did not appeal the Board's decision; Wilson asserts he sued Appellees in their individual and official capacities. Wilson also alleges he properly averred claims of retaliation and constitutional deprivations.
Appellees counter that Wilson's claims are based entirely on his assertion the Board improperly revoked his parole. Therefore, Appellees contend, the trial court properly sustained their preliminary objection to subject matter jurisdiction. Borsello. Alternatively, Appellees argue that Wilson cannot collaterally appeal the Board's revocation decision under the guise of tort claims. Appellees also assert the trial court correctly held Wilson failed to state any cognizable claims against them for defamation, official oppression, retaliation or negligence.
Citing Stackhouse v. Pennsylvania State Police, 574 Pa. 558, 832 A.2d 1004 (2003) and Miles v. Beard, 847 A.2d 161 (Pa.Cmwlth.2004), pet. for allowance of appeal denied, 582 Pa. 690, 870 A.2d 325 (2005), Wilson argues the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims for money damages. Wilson maintains he pled a valid Section 1983 action.4 Specifically, Wilson avers Appellees, acting under color of state law, violated his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Wilson further avers Appellees retaliated against him for exercising his First Amendment right to freedom of speech.
As an initial matter, we recognize common pleas courts have subject matter jurisdiction "over tort actions for money damages that are premised on either common law trespass or a civil action for deprivation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983." Miles, 847 A.2d at 164. Further, where the core of the complaint is a tort action, original jurisdiction lies in common pleas court regardless of an ancillary request for declaratory relief. Stackhouse.
Nevertheless, after reviewing Wilson's complaint, we agree with the trial court that Wilson's Section 1983 claims against Appellees merely constitute an attempt to appeal the Board's revocation decision. Primarily, Wilson does not aver any injuries. In particular, he does not plead any physical, psychic or reputational injury arising from the alleged constitutional violations. Also, Wilson does not plead any damages. Thus, he avers no special, general, liquidated or unliquidated damages. Rather, the only loss he pleads is loss of freedom due to re-imprisonment. See Complaint at ¶ 37(E). Clearly, therefore, he fails to plead a basis for monetary recovery, and his sole objective is to litigate the loss of freedom occasioned by the revocation of his parole.
Consequently, we view Wilson's constitutional tort claims as a thinly disguised appeal of the Board's revocation decision. As a result, we hold the trial court properly determined it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Count I of Wilson's complaint. Borsello.6
Alternatively, we determine Count I fails to state a cause of action for the following reasons. First, Wilson avers Appellees violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights by failing to give him notice of the charges against him. Complaint at ¶ 27. However, Wilson avers Appellee Kramer read the charges against him at the preliminary hearing, which preceded the revocation hearing. Id. at ¶¶ 11-12, 26. The charges specified that Wilson failed to complete the Adappt program and that he was discharged from the program for threatening a male client and sexually stalking a female client. Thus, Wilson's averments reveal he was given notice of the charges almost three months before the revocation hearing, and this claim of deprivation is negated by Wilson himself.
Second, Wilson avers Appellees violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront and cross-examine witnesses regarding the allegations he threatened and stalked individuals at Adappt House. Id. at ¶ 25. However, Wilson concedes he was represented by appointed counsel at the revocation hearing. Id. at ¶ 30. Moreover, the hearing transcript shows Wilson's counsel did cross-examine Adappt Clinical Director John Faunce, the Commonwealth's only witness at the revocation hearing. See Wilson's Objections, Ex. A (Revocation Hearing Transcript at 4-5). Wilson's own submissions, therefore, negate this claim of deprivation.7
Third, Wilson avers Appellees violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment by imposing a new parole condition: condition 7. See Complaint at ¶ 17. However, parole is not punishment; rather, it is a release from total confinement to attempt rehabilitation. Thus, conditions of parole, primarily aimed at effecting, as a constructive alternative to imprisonment, rehabilitation and reintegration into society, do not constitute cruel and unusual punishment as a matter of law. See Commonwealth v. Walton, 483 Pa. 588, 397 A.2d 1179 (1979).
Moreover, Condition # 7 (compliance with special conditions) is a general condition applicable to all parolees under Board jurisdiction, Wilson's averments to the contrary notwithstanding. See Timothy P. Wile, Pennsylvania Law of Probation and Parole 561 (2d ed. 2003) (Conditions Governing Parole/Reparole (PBPP-11)). Section 23 of the statute known as the Parole Act8 empowers the Board to impose general conditions on all offenders under its jurisdiction and special conditions on individual offenders as it deems necessary. See also 37 Pa.Code § 63.5(a) (). Wilson avers that upon release from prison the Board's agent required him to attend the Adappt program and that he did not complete the program. Complaint at ¶¶ 10, 11. Thus, Wilson fails to state a claim for cruel and unusual punishment based on condition 7, which governed his conduct after release from total confinement.
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