Wilson v. Marshall

Decision Date14 September 2018
Docket Number2:14-cv-01106-MHT-SRW
PartiesBETTY WILSON, Plaintiff, v. STEVEN T. MARSHALL, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama
ORDER and RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE1

Plaintiff Betty Wilson, who was convicted in an Alabama state court of capital murder in 1993, brings this lawsuit against the Alabama Attorney General and the Madison County District Attorney for allegedly violating her right to procedural due process, barring her access to the courts, and foreclosing her opportunity to prove her actual innocence. In 2010, Wilson filed a post-conviction motion in an Alabama court seeking access to and testing of deoxyribonucleic acid ("DNA") evidence that was collected from the crime scene under Alabama's then-newly enacted post-conviction DNA testing statute, Ala. Code § 15-18-200 ("DNA statute" or "DNA law"). The motion was denied in 2011, Wilson's appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, and two petitions for a writ of mandamus to the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals and Alabama Supreme Court, also were, respectively, denied. Wilson challenges the constitutionality of the DNA statute and the denial of hermotion, appeal, and mandamus petitions by the state courts. Wilson brings her claims through the remedial statutory vehicle of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.2

In addition to challenging the constitutionality of the DNA law and the outcome of her state court proceedings, Wilson asks the court to enter a judgment that provides her the following relief:

1. Ordering defendants to take all steps reasonably necessary to ensure that the physical evidence collected in connection with the investigation and prosecution of the crime for which plaintiff was convicted, including all of the evidence referenced in the complaint, is preserved.3
2. Ordering defendants to cooperate with plaintiff in selecting a mutually-agreeable, fully-accredited private DNA laboratory to test the evidence at the expense of the Innocence Project, or, in the alternative, ordering that the evidence be tested at a laboratory chosen by this Court.
3. Ordering defendants to release the physical evidence collected in connection with the investigation or prosecution of the crime for which plaintiff was convicted for DNA testing to the laboratory chosen by the parties or this Court, including, but not limited to:
- The baseball bat,
- The victim's bloodstained fingernail clippings,
- The ski mask,
- The hairs found inside the ski mask,
- The victim's bloody clothing,
- The cigarette butts found at the scene,
- The bloodstained carpet sample found near the victim's body, and
- The hairs collected from the victim's right hand.
4. Ordering reasonable attorneys' fees and costs.
5. Ordering such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

Doc. 1 at 19-20.4

This matter is before the court on defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint. See Doc. 8.5 Defendants argue that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine; plaintiff's claims are barred by res judicata, the statute of limitations, and laches; and plaintiff's causes of action fail on their merits. Wilson opposes the motion to dismiss. See Doc. 15. The motion has been fully briefed. Upon consideration, the court concludes that defendants' motion to dismiss is due to be granted in part and denied in part.

I. Standard of Review

Defendants bring the instant motion under Rule 12(b)(6). See Doc. 8 at 4. However, in addition to requesting dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, defendants also move for dismissal due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction, which is a Rule 12(b)(1) defense. See id. at 4, 26-29. Accordingly, the court analyzes defendants' subject matter jurisdiction challenge under Rule 12(b)(1) separately from the 12(b)(6) arguments, and construes defendants' motion to dismiss as having two parts: a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to 12(b)(6). As to the Rule 12(b)(1) request, in any event, a federal court is "'empowered to hear only those cases within the judicial power of the United States as defined by Article III of the Constitution,'and which have been entrusted to them by a jurisdictional grant authorized by Congress."Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 409 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting Taylor v. Appleton, 30 F.3d 1365, 1367 (11th Cir. 1994)). A federal court is obliged to inquire on motion or sua sponte into subject matter jurisdiction "at the earliest possible stage in the proceedings."Id. at 410. Thus, the court addresses defendants' Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional challenge before weighing defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) arguments.

A. Rule 12(b)(1)

The Rule 12(b)(1) standard of review was summarized in Greenwell v. University of Alabama Bd. of Trustees, 2012 WL 3637768 (N.D. Ala. 2012). The court explained:

Challenges to subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure can exist in two substantially different forms: facial attacks and factual attacks. Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1260 (11th Cir. 2009). When presented with a facial attack on the complaint, the court determines whether the complaint has sufficiently alleged subject-matter jurisdiction. Sinaltrainal, 578 F.3d at 1260. The court proceeds as if it were evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion; that is, it views the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and accepts all well-pled facts alleged in the complaint as true. Id.
On the other hand, factual attacks question "the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact, irrespective of the pleadings, and matters outside the pleadings, such as testimony and affidavits, are considered." Id. (citing Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990)). When a court is confronted with a factual attack, the standard of review diverges considerably:
[T]he trial court may proceed as it never could under 12(b)(6) or Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. Because at issue in a factual 12(b)(1) motion is the trial court's jurisdiction—its very power to hear the case—there is substantial authority that the trial court is free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case. In short, no presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff's allegations, and the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional claims.
Lawrence, 919 F.2d at 1529 (citing Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 412 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981)). When a district court has pending before it both a 12(b)(1) motion and a 12(b)(6) motion, the generally preferable approach, if the 12(b)(1) motion essentially challenges the existence of a federal cause of action, is for the court to find jurisdiction and then decide the 12(b)(6) motion. Jones v. State of Ga., 725 F.2d 622, 623 (11th Cir. 1984).

Greenwell at *5 (alterations in original); see also McCoy v. Mallinckrodt Pharm., Inc., 2016 WL 1544732, at *2 (M.D. Ala. 2016), report and recommendation adopted, 2016 WL 1465967 (M.D. Ala. 2016) (quoting Greenwell's standard of review).

The challenge presently before the court is a facial challenge regarding the applicability of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

B. Rule 12(b)(6)

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of the complaint against the legal standard set forth in Rule 8: "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).

In evaluating a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the court must take "the factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Pielage v. McConnell, 516 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2008). However, "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009). "[A] plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitle[ment] to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).

"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). "Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] ... a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. at 663 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). "[F]acial plausibility" exists "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The standard also "calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence" of the claim. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. While the complaint need not set out "detailed factualallegations," it must provide sufficient factual amplification "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. at 555.

"So, when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief, 'this basic deficiency should ... be exposed at the point of minimum expenditure of time and money by the parties and the court.'" Id. at 558 (quoting 5 WRIGHT & MILLER § 1216, at 233-34 (quoting, in turn, Daves v. Hawaiian Dredging Co., 114 F. Supp. 643, 645 (D. Haw. 1953)). "[O]nly a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

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