Wilson v. Massey
| Decision Date | 30 March 2022 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 3:20-CV-610-RPM |
| Parties | JARRET MONTEZ WILSON, PLAINTIFF v. JILL D. MASSEY, ET AL., DEFENDANTS |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Mississippi |
On September 17, 2020, plaintiff Jarret Montez Wilson (“Wilson”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) civil rights complaint against defendants Jill D. Massey (“Massey”) and Police Officer Bobbi Thomasson (“Thomasson”) (collectively, “defendants”) alleging violations of his constitutional rights. Doc. [1]. Liberally construing his supplemented Complaint, Wilson v. Barrientos 926 F.2d 480, 482 (5th Cir. 1991), Wilson asserts claims arising under the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. Doc. [1], at 3. Before the Court are summary judgment motions filed by the defendants. Doc [20, 24].[1]
On September 14, 2017, Thomasson arrived at the scene of a collision between a Honda and Mustang on Highway 18 in Rankin County. Doc. [20], Ex. 3, at 3; [41], Ex. 2, (T. 84). She discovered the Honda driver incapacitated in his vehicle and suffering from significant injuries; he was immediately transported to the hospital. Doc. [20], Ex. 3-4. The Mustang, however, was unoccupied; after “running” the license plate number, Thomasson determined that Wilson was the registered owner. Id., Ex. 3, at 3. Two eyewitnesses, speaking to Thomasson, described seeing a “light-skinned black” man wearing a “black tank-top” flee from the Mustang. Ibid. Shortly after she reported the eyewitness description to dispatch, non-party Sergeant Elwell (“Elwell”) encountered Wilson, who was injured, roughly a quarter mile from the accident and arrested him for his flight therefrom. Ibid. Elwell informed Thomasson that Wilson was acting “belligerent and intoxicated, ” Doc. [41], Ex. 2 (T. 42), and smelled like “intoxicating beverages, ” Doc. [20], Ex. 3, at 3. Wilson was transported to Rankin County jail, booked, and released of his own recognizance to receive medical treatment; upon his release, Wilson immediately went to a Hinds County hospital. Around this time, Justice Court Judge Whitney M. Adams (“Judge Adams”) issued a search warrant authorizing Thomasson to obtain “samples” from Wilson. Doc. [20], Ex. 3, at 1.
Officer Thomasson and Nurse Massey presented the warrant to Wilson. See, e.g., Doc. [41], Ex. 2, (T. 24-28). However, Wilson was belligerent and hurled vulgarities. Doc. [29], Ex. 2; [41], Ex. 2, (T. 25). Despite being presented with the warrant, Wilson only agreed to submit to a blood test for “hospital purposes;” he emphasized that he was not consenting to an investigative blood test. Doc. [1], at 6; [41], Ex. 2, (T. 26, 49). Pursuant to the warrant, Nurse Massey then drew his blood. Doc. [29], at 2; [41], Ex. 2, (T. 18, 24-28, 38). Wilson's blood-alcohol content (“BAC”) was 0.138. Doc. [20], Ex. 5. Days later, Judge Adams issued a warrant for his arrest. Doc. [32], at 20. On November 8, 2017, U.S. Marshals arrested Wilson in connection with three misdemeanor charges and an aggravated DUI charge. See, e.g., id., at 26. Later, Judge Adams issued a mittimus setting Wilson's bail at $50, 000 in connection with the misdemeanor charges. Doc. [20], Ex. 6. Seven days later, Judge Adams issued a second mittimus setting Wilson's bail at $20, 000 in connection with a new felony DUI charge. Ibid. According to Wilson, his bail was later lowered and he posted bail.
Wilson subsequently moved to suppress his blood test results on various grounds, including consent by trickery and a defective warrant affidavit. Doc. [41], Ex. 1, (T. 16-22). While Circuit Court Judge John H. Emfinger (“Judge Emfinger”) concluded that the warrant itself was valid, he later determined that it was not properly executed in Hinds County. Id., Ex. 2 (T. 52, 77-78). Finding that Thomasson exceeded her state law-defined jurisdiction, Judge Emfinger suppressed the blood test results obtained pursuant to the warrant. Id., Ex. 2 (T. 84-87). Ultimately, Wilson pleaded guilty to (i) felonious flight from the scene of an accident, and (ii) assault on a law enforcement officer. Doc. [20], Ex. 7. In exchange, the State dismissed the other pending charges without prejudice. Doc. [41], Ex. 3. This action followed.
Summary judgment is appropriate if the “materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials” show that there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a), (c). “All facts and inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant.” Koerner v. CMR Constr. & Roofing, L.L.C., 910 F.3d 221, 227 (5th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). “‘When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.'” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) (quotation omitted). Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
In a Section 1983 case, a government official acting in his individual capacity can raise qualified immunity as an affirmative defense. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 203, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). Under the first prong, the Court asks: “do the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right?” Id. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151. “If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.” Ibid. Under the second prong, the Court considers whether the government official's conduct violated “clearly established” law. Morrow v. Meachum, 917 F.3d 870, 875 (5th Cir. 2019). Under this prong, “[t]he relevant, dispositive inquiry . . . is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151. The “clearly established” rule relied on must be “‘settled law,' . . . which means it is dictated by ‘controlling authority' or ‘a robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority[.]'” District of Columbia v. Wesby, __ U.S. __, 138 S.Ct. 577, 589-90, 199 L.Ed.2d 453 (2018) (citations omitted).
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, individuals have a constitutional right to privacy. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-600, 97 S.Ct. 869, 51 L.Ed.2d 64 (1977). The constitutional right to privacy includes “the right to be free from the government disclosing private facts about its citizens.” Ramie v. City of Hedwig Vill., Tex., 765 F.2d 490, 492 (5th Cir. 1985). By its terms, however, a disclosure privacy claim can only be asserted against “willful participants” in the disclosure, Fadjo v. Coon, 633 F.2d 1172, 1175 (5th Cir. 1981), and only protects against disclosure of “private facts” about the “most intimate aspects of human affairs, ” Ramie, 765 F.2d at 492 (citation omitted). Ultimately, in evaluating a disclosure privacy claim, the Court considers whether “(1) the person had a legitimate expectation of privacy; and (2) that privacy interest outweighs the public need for disclosure.” Cantu v. Rocha, 77 F.3d 795, 806 (5th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted).
Here, Wilson first argues that Massey violated his rights by disclosing his blood, and by extent his blood test results, to Thomasson. Doc. [31], at 7.[2] Nevertheless, the subject blood was only tested, in relevant part, for alcohol so his claim is necessarily limited in scope to disclosure of that information. Doc. [20], Ex. 5. Under the first analytical prong, Wilson has a well-established privacy interest in his medical records-and blood test results plainly fall under that umbrella. United States v. Burzynski Cancer Rsch. Inst., 819 F.2d 1301, 1309 (5th Cir. 1987). Nevertheless, the presence of alcohol in Wilson's bloodstream is not particularly embarrassing or intimate. Under these facts, Wilson's privacy interest in his blood test results is not particularly significant. Cantu, 77 F.3d at 806. By contrast, the State has a strong interest in ensuring that motorists do not drive under the influence of alcohol; prohibiting such conduct helps keep the public safe. The State also has a strong interest in pursuing criminal proceedings. Ramie, 765 F.2d at 492-93. Indeed, HIPAA regulations specifically carve out a disclosure exception for criminal proceedings. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(d)(2). On balance, the State's interest in disclosure outweighs Wilson's privacy interest. Therefore, Massey's warrant-induced disclosure of Wilson's blood test results did not violate his privacy rights; she is entitled to qualified immunity. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151.
Wilson also alleges that Massey violated his disclosure privacy rights because the media reported that he was “a drunk.” However, Wilson's Complaint is devoid of allegations that Massey played a willful role in disclosure of his blood test results to the media. He merely alleges that Massey's disclosure to Thomasson makes her liable for an unspecified future disclosure by unspecified individuals to unspecified media entities for unspecified...
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