Wilson v. McCoy Mfg. Co.

Citation69 So.2d 659
PartiesWILSON v. McCOY MFG. CO., Inc., et al.
Decision Date08 January 1954
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Florida

Morrice S. Uman, Tampa, for petitioner.

Richard W. Ervin, Atty. Gen., Howard S. Bailey, Asst. Atty. Gen., Lazonby, Dell, Graham & Mills, Gainesville, and Burnis T. Coleman, Tallahassee, for respondents.

Sanchez, Watkins & Watkins, Tallahassee, Samuel R. Dighton, Orlando, as Amicus Curiae.

THOMAS, Justice.

Before the enactment of Chapter 28241, Laws of Florida, Acts of 1953, the procedure for review of orders entered under the provisions of Workmen's Compensation Law, Chapter 440, Florida Statutes 1941, and F.S.A., was somewhat elaborate and prolonged. After the claim had been filed and notice had been given to the employer and a hearing had been conducted by a deputy commissioner who determined the 'dispute in a summary manner', Sec. 440.25(3)(b), any interested party could file an application for a review of the order by the full commission. The commission was empowered to 'affirm, reverse or modify [the] award, or remand to [the] deputy commissioner for further proceedings.' A party could appeal from the decision of the commission to the circuit court, and from the order of the circuit court to the supreme court.

So, in effect, the parties litigant in a compensation matter had three appeals: from the deputy commissioner to the full commission, from the full commission to the circuit court and from the circuit court to the supreme court. Obviously it was the purpose of the legislature in enacting Chapter 28241, supra, to simplify reviews that were bound to be as expensive as they were protracted.

Meanwhile this court, in South Atlantic S. S. Co. of Delaware v. Tutson, 139 Fla. 405, 190 So. 675, 681, had dealt with the subject now before us and had rendered an exhaustive opinion which helps us greatly as we undertake to light a few beacons to guide litigants and their attorneys in obtaining reviews under the new system.

The court held that orders of administrative boards were subject to judicial review by certiorari and other 'duly authorized procedure' and that not until the passage of the Florida Workmen's Compensation Act had the legislature provided for appeals from proceedings of administrative boards to the circuit court and from the ruling of the circuit court to the supreme court. The point then decided was the constitutionality of the provisions for appeals to the supreme court.

The court reiterated the familiar principle that the constitution is a limitation of power and that legislation not clearly in conflict with an express or implied prohibition should not be declared invalid. Also, it was said that although constitutional jurisdiction of a court cannot be restricted or taken away it can be enlarged if the enlargement does not diminish the constitutional jurisdiction of another court or clash with the constitution.

With this preface the court declared the acts providing for the final appeal to the supreme court constitutional because there was no expressed or implied exclusion of jurisdiction to review matters decided by the circuit court which that tribunal was empowered to adjudicate, and clearly the circuit court had jurisdiction not only of specified cases but also 'of such other matters as the Legislature may provide', Sec. 11, Article V, and the legislature under this part of the constitution had provided that the circuit courts entertain appeals from decisions of the Industrial Commission. In concluding the point, it was reasoned that the supreme court had jurisdiction of cases originating in circuit courts, Sec. 5, Article V; that the circuit court had jurisdiction of the appeals as provided by an act the legislature was empowered to pass under Sec. 11, Article V; and that these appeals when lodged in the circuit court could be regarded as cases originating there, therefore subject to the appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court.

So much for the relevant history of the manner of bringing orders of award eventually to the supreme court and of the supreme court's view in respect of its power to hear and determine them.

We turn now to the instant case and its companions, to discuss and decide the effect of Chapter 28241, supra, upon reviews in compensation disputes and the nature of the remedy now available.

In the act presently under consideration it is provided, in Sec. 9, now Sec. 440.27, Florida Statutes 1953, and F.S.A., that 'Orders of the full Commission * * * shall be subject to review only by * * * writ of certiorari filed in the Supreme Court of Florida * * *.' (Italics supplied.) The question of the constitutionality of this part of the law substituting review via certiorari for appeal is presented to us for answer.

Although many of the functions of the Industrial Commission are purely administrative the commission does exercise powers that make it a quasi judicial body. Ample proof of this quality may be found in paragraph (3) of Sec. 440.24, as it appears in Sec. 7 of Chapter 28241, supra, providing for the enforcement of orders of compensation. Nevertheless, a party to a controversy over a claim for compensation is not entitled as a matter of right to an appeal but may be relegated to procedure in certiorari to secure a review of the proceedings.

From our study of various authorities on the subject we have concluded that there can be no appeal from the decision of the commission in the absence of specific statutory provision for such advantage and the thought seems harmonious with the decision of this court in State ex rel. Williams v. Whitman, 116 Fla. 196, 150 So. 136, 156 So. 705, 707, 95 A.L.R. 1416, where it was said that the right of appeal eo nomine was not 'essential to due process of law in such cases.' There the court was dealing with an order of the board of dental examiners which had been given the power to revoke licenses, and the extraordinary writ of mandamus to coerce the restoration of a suspended dentist to 'his lawful pre-existing rights' to practice his profession was called 'an available and appropriate remedy to afford relief to [the] aggrieved party * * *.'

The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has said that in cases where a board 'acting in a quasi judicial capacity * * * errs, commonly the law affords an aggrieved party adequate relief by resort to one of the extraordinary writs.' Jaffarian v. Murphy, 280 Mass. 402, 183 N.E. 110, 111, 85 A.L.R. 293. See also Florida Motor Lines, Inc., v. Railroad Commissioners, infra.

It is plain that reviews of decisions of the Industrial Commission may no longer be presented in an out-and-out appeal, the provisions for such relief having been repealed by the legislature, and parties dissatisfied with decisions of the commission must now find solace in the extraordinary writ of certiorari.

We cannot resist the observation that this method of review would have been available anyway because the power to issue writs of certiorari is placed in this court by the constitution itself. However, we make no point either of this superfluity or, in the main, of the outline by the legislature of the procedure to be followed in entertaining the certiorari here, a matter that is properly one for the regulation of this court under its rules.

We fully recognize the enactment as an effort not only to make more simple but to make more expeditious and more inexpensive the final determination of causes arising from the administration of the Workmen's Compensation Act--an effort that is to be welcomed and encouraged.

Before leaving the question of the constitutionality of the act and proceeding to the final phases of this controversy, that is the method of presentation and the scope of review, we will dispose peremptorily, of the question about the wording of that part of the act which we have already quoted. The language is that the review shall be accomplished only by petition to the supreme court. Although the adverb refers to the method of review, the rest of the sentence indicates, of course, the intention of the legislature that the petitions for certiorari be presented to this court to the exclusion of the circuit court, despite the like power of the circuit court under the constitution to issue writs of certiorari. We feel that we need not presently explore the validity of the act so far as the circuit court is concerned. That court has the same power as this court, from the same source, regardless of the legislation, but the question of the effect of the legislation upon the jurisdiction of the circuit court can be determined when the jurisdiction of the circuit court is sought to be invoked.

We conclude on the main point that no guaranty of organic law was violated by the act and that henceforth parties to procedure before the Industrial Commission for the settlement of claims must be content with certiorari as a means of obtaining review of the commission's decision.

This brings us to a consideration of the nature and scope of the writ of certiorari as it may be used in examining orders of the commission. At the outset we are moved to say that the writ of certiorari afforded by the constitution should not be confused with the so-called certiorari provided by Supreme Court Rule number 34, 30 F.S.A. We make this observation because some attorneys have mixed the two. Certiorari under the rule was designed simply as a streamlined method of bringing appeals authorized by law to be taken from interlocutory orders entered in chancery. True the procedure in both kinds of certioraris, as is shown by the reference in rule 34 to rule 28, is similar but the elements differ entirely, one having all the qualities of an appeal, the other being severely restricted in its operation.

When the first petitions for certiorari under the act of 1953 arrived here the court, realizing that the field of Workmen's Compensation had reached enormous proportions, thought it wise first to determine the...

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