Wilson v. Mich. State Bd. of Registration in Med.

• Decision Date: 24 July 1924
• Docket Number: No. 285.,285.
• Citation: 199 N.W. 643,228 Mich. 25
• Parties: WILSON v. MICHIGAN STATE BOARD OF REGISTRATION IN MEDICINE.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

228 Mich. 25

199 N.W. 643

WILSON

v.MICHIGAN STATE BOARD OF REGISTRATION IN MEDICINE.

No. 285.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

July 24, 1924.

Original mandamus by Norman D. Wilson against the Michigan State Board of Registration in Medicine. Writ issued.

Argued before CLARK, C. J., and McDONALD, BIRD, SHARPE, MOORE, STEERE, FELLOWS, and WIEST, JJ.Thomas, Shields & Silsbee, of Lansing, for petitioner.

Andrew B. Dougherty, Atty. Gen., and Fred L. Warner, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant.

FELLOWS, J.

Plaintiff by his petition shows that he is a graduate of the Georgia School of Eclectic Medicine of Atlanta, Ga., and after his graduation was licensed to practice medicine and surgery in that state by its board of medical examiners; he alleges that the requirements for registration in Georgia were deemed, and are now deemed, by defendant, to be the equivalent to those in this state, and that the two states have reciprocal relations, and defendant board has licensed others from Georgia, including one Stewart, who graduated in the same class as did plaintiff and who was licensed there the same day he was; he alleges that he is now a resident of this state and has applied to defendant board to be registered and given a certificate of registration under subdivision 2 of section 6726, C. L. 1915, and that the defendant board, although advised by the Attorney General that it was its duty to grant such application, refused so to do. Upon the filing of the petition we issued an order to show cause why a mandamus should not issue. Defendant in its answer to such order admits plaintiff's graduation and registration in Georgia, states that it does not ‘fully’ maintain reciprocal arrangements with the Georgia board, but does not state wherein they fall short; admits it has licensed other applicants who have been licensed in Georgia, including said Stewart, but denies that it deems the requisites in Georgia equivalent to those in this state, but fails to state in what regard they do not measure up, nor does it claim that this was the reason for its refusal; admits the advice of the Attorney General, but states that it was not in writing. While not specifically alleging that it has exercised its discretion, it is to be inferred from the answer that such is its claim, and that it here relies on the words ‘at the discretion of the board,’ found in the section above cited in defense of its refusal to register plaintiff. It sets up no fact or set of facts upon which it exercised such discretion, if it did so, and in its answer gives no grounds or reason for such refusal.

There should be at this time no doubt about the proposition that this court does not sit as a general reviewing body of the actions of the numerous boards created to examine applicants for licenses to follow the various professions and callings. To such boards is, and must be, committed the exercise of a sound discretion, but to them is not committed the exercise of an arbitrary will. They may exercise their discretion, but it must be exercised upon the facts before them. In speaking of the exercise of judicial discretion it was said by Chief Justice Marshall in Osborn v. U. S. Bank, 9 Wheat. 738, 866 (6 L. Ed. 204):

‘Judicial power, as contradistinguished from the power of the laws, has no existence. Courts are the mere instruments of the law, and can will nothing. When they are said to exercise a discretion, it is a mere legal discretion, a discretion to be exercised in discerning the course prescribed by law; and, when that is discerned, it is the duty of the court to follow it. Judicial power is never exercised for the purpose of giving effect...