Wilson v. Miller

• Citation: 143 Ala. 264,39 So. 178
• Parties: WILSON ET AL. v. MILLER.
• Decision Date: 16 February 1905
• Court: Supreme Court of Alabama

39 So. 178

143 Ala. 264

WILSON ET AL. v. MILLER.

Supreme Court of Alabama

February 16, 1905

Appeal from Chancery Court, Bibb County; Thomas H. Smith Chancellor.

Action by John W. Miller against Fayette Wilson and others. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal. Reversed.

Rehearing denied June 30, 1905.

The averments of the bill were to the effect that the complainant bought the lands in 1883 from one Walter D. Wilson, who executed a deed to complainant, and put him in possession and that he was still in possession; that said Wilson was at the time and had been for several years prior to the conveyance, in possession of the premises, claiming under a deed executed to him by one W. J. Wilson and Grace E. Wilson his wife; that said W. J. Wilson and Grace E. Wilson conveyed the lands to said Walter D. Wilson by deed in 1879; that the lands were conveyed to said W. J. Wilson by one James Hill who was the father of the said Grace E. Wilson, by deed dated July 30th, 1874, and duly recorded on that day; that the lands had been owned and possessed by the said Hill for many years prior thereto.

The bill further averred the bringing of an action of ejectment against the complainant, by the defendants, who were the children of said Grace E. Wilson, who was then dead; that they based their claim to the lands described in the bill upon an alleged deed said to have been executed by James Hill to said Grace E. Wilson, for life, with remainder to her children, which deed was prior to July, 1874, and bore an endorsement purporting to show that the same was filed for record on the 5th day of April, 1874. Complainants alleged that said deed was in fact not executed until long after July, 1874, and that the date thereof, and the certificate of registration were fraudulently altered, to make it appear that it was executed prior to the date of the deed under which complainant claimed. The bill also alleged that said deed to Grace E. Wilson was, as executed, a conveyance in fee to her, but was subsequently fraudulently altered so as to grant her a life estate only, with remainder to her children.

The bill prayed for an injunction of the action of ejectment, and that the said deed to Grace E. Wilson be canceled as a cloud upon the title of the complainant.

Haralson J., dissenting.

W. W. Lavender and J. M. McMaster, for appellants.

Logan & VandeGraaf, for appellee.

HARALSON J.

It is familiar "that a court of equity will not take jurisdiction, when there is a clear, complete and adequate remedy at law. The mere intervention of fraud, no discovery or any special equitable relief being sought, will not authorize a court of chancery to grant relief, or entertain concurrent jurisdiction with the court of law, in cases cognizable at law." Youngblood v. Youngblood, 54 Ala. 486; Peeples v. Burns, 77 Ala. 292.

It is also true that "a court of equity is reluctant to interpose by injunction against an ejectment at law, founded on a legal title the plaintiff is fairly proceeding to establish. An equitable case, a case of purely equitable cognizance, must be made to appear, before the court will interpose to restrain the proceedings in the action." Kerr on Injunctions, 26; Lehman v. Shook, 69 Ala. 492.

One of the well recognized grounds of equity jurisdiction, is to remove clouds from titles, when the deed or other instrument or proceeding constituting the cloud may be used to injuriously or vexatiously embarrass or affect a plaintiff's title. "A court of equity will not interpose to prevent or remove a cloud which can only be shown to be prima facie a good title, by leaving the plaintiff's title entirely out of view. It is always assumed, when the court interferes, that the title of the party complaining is affected by a hostile title, apparently good, but really defective and inequitable by something not appearing on its face. * * * Would the owner of the property, in an action of ejectment brought by the adverse party, founded upon the deed, be required to offer evidence to defeat a recovery? If such proof should be necessary, the cloud would exist. If the proof would be unnecessary, no shade would be cast by the presence of the deed." Torrent Fire Engine Co. v. City of Mobile, 101 Ala. 563, 14 So. 557.

Such a bill will not be entertained when the complainant is not in possession, unless he shows some special equity,--some obstacle, or impediment, which would prevent or embarrass the assertion of his rights at law. Plant v. Barclay, 56 Ala. 561. Such bills can only be maintained, as has been held, in the absence of some special ground of equity jurisdiction, by parties who are in possession. They alone need such remedial assistance, for they cannot institute a suit at law to test the rival title. Smith's Ex'r v. Cockrell, 66 Ala. 83.

This, however, as was said by Brickell, C.J., in Lehman v. Shook, 69 Ala. 493, is "only one of the reasons for which the court intervenes. There are other and broader reasons--the prevention of litigation, the protection of the true title and the possession, and because it is the real interest of both parties, and promotive of right and justice, that the precise state of the title be known, if all are acting bona fide; and if not, that a merely colorable and pretended claim is a fraud upon the real owner, and as such should be extinguished. 1 Story's Eq. § 711a."

Indeed the case referred to seems to be an adjudication of the one in hand. There, the complainants were in possession of the land, and an ejectment suit had been brought by the defendant and was pending against them. The complainants who were judgment creditors of W. T. Shook, under a bill filed for the purpose, were by the decree of the court, let in to redeem the lands in question, sold under the power in the mortgage by said W. T. Shook and were put in possession of the lands by the decree on the 30th of January, 1878. On the 10th of June, 1873, said W. T. Shook had executed to the defendants, Laura E. Shook and Hester E. Hodges, the deed, the bill was filed to cancel. This deed recited the consideration to be $3,000.00 and was filed for record on the 1st of December, 1873. The bill charged that the recital in the deed as to the consideration was false; that the deed was voluntary and made to the defendants by the grantor, who was then insolvent, with intent to hinder, delay and defraud his creditors. On the 14th of February, 1879, the defendants in that suit commenced said action of ejectment to recover from complainants, the land mentioned in the deed, when, on the 25th of April, 1879, the complainants filed the bill to cancel said deed as a cloud on their title and to enjoin said ejectment suit. The bill was held to have been well filed, and the decree was reversed and cause remanded, with instructions to the chancery court, to render a decree enjoining the action of ejectment and declaring the conveyance of the premises executed by Shook to his daughters, bearing date of the 10th of June, 1873, of record in the probate court of the county, void and inoperative as against the title of the appellants, who were judgment creditors of said W. T. Shook. Brickell, C.J., in his opinion, among other things said: "Whenever a deed or other instrument exists, not void upon its face, which may be vexatiously or injuriously used against a party having the rightful...