Wilson v. Montano

• Decision Date: 03 May 2013
• Docket Number: No. 12–2051.,12–2051.
• Citation: 715 F.3d 847
• Parties: Michael WILSON, Sr., Plaintiff–Appellee, Jesse Ortiz; Oscar Leyva; Patrick Marquez; Mark Sanchez; Dustn Sarrett, Plaintiffs, v. Lawrence MONTANO, Deputy; Fred Torres, Deputy; Joe Chavez, Warden; Rene Rivera, former Sheriff; Defendants–Appellants, John Doe, VCDC booking officer or employee; Martin Benavidez, Officer; Mike Chavez, former Chief of Police; Brent Woodard; Nick Balido, former Los Lunas Police Department, Chief of Police; Louis Burkhard, Sheriff; Delinda Chavez; Joseph Chavez; Roy A. Cordova; Greg Jones, Bosque Farms Police Department, Police Chief; Roy Melnick, Los Lunas Police Department, Chief of Police; Dan Robb, Belen Police Department, Chief of Police; Steven Roberts; Derek Williams; Joe Stidham, Former Bosque Farms Police Department, Police Chief, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

715 F.3d 847

Michael WILSON, Sr., Plaintiff–Appellee,Jesse Ortiz; Oscar Leyva; Patrick Marquez; Mark Sanchez; Dustn Sarrett, Plaintiffs,

v. Lawrence MONTANO, Deputy; Fred Torres, Deputy; Joe Chavez, Warden; Rene Rivera, former Sheriff; Defendants–Appellants,John Doe, VCDC booking officer or employee; Martin Benavidez, Officer; Mike Chavez, former Chief of Police; Brent Woodard; Nick Balido, former Los Lunas Police Department, Chief of Police; Louis Burkhard, Sheriff; Delinda Chavez; Joseph Chavez; Roy A. Cordova; Greg Jones, Bosque Farms Police Department, Police Chief; Roy Melnick, Los Lunas Police Department, Chief of Police; Dan Robb, Belen Police Department, Chief of Police; Steven Roberts; Derek Williams; Joe Stidham, Former Bosque Farms Police Department, Police Chief, Defendants.

No. 12–2051.

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

May 3, 2013.

Brandon Huss, Wallin, Huss & Mendez, LLC, Moriarty, NM (Dennis K. Wallin, Wallin, Huss & Mendez, LLC, Moriarty, NM, and Mary T. Torres, Beall & Biehler, Albuquerque, NM, with him on the briefs), for Defendants–Appellants.

Matthew Coyte, Coyte Law P.C., Albuquerque, NM, for Plaintiff–Appellee.

Before MATHESON, EBEL, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

MURPHY, Circuit Judge.

I. Introduction

Appellants seek reversal of the district court's order denying their motion to dismiss claims asserted against them by Michael Wilson, Sr. under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Wilson alleges he was unlawfully detained and deprived of his constitutional right to a prompt probable cause determination. Appellants claim they are entitled to qualified immunity. The district court concluded Wilson's complaint alleged sufficient facts to state a plausible claim against each of the appellants for violating his Fourth Amendment rights. Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms in part and reverses in part.

II. Background¹

On December 18, 2010, Wilson was arrested without a warrant by Lawrence Montano, a deputy with the Valencia County Sheriff's Office (“VCSO”) in New Mexico. Montano asked Deputy Fred Torres to transport Wilson to the Valencia County Detention Center (“VCDC”). Prior to booking Wilson into the VCDC, Montano prepared a criminal complaint listing the charge against Wilson as a misdemeanor offense. Neither Montano nor Torres ever filed the criminal complaint in a court with jurisdiction or brought Wilson before a judicial officer for a probable cause determination during the time he was held at the VCDC. On December 29, 2010, eleven days after his arrest, Wilson was released from the VCDC by order of a magistrate judge. In the order, the magistrate noted no complaint had been filed. On January 4, 2010, after Wilson was released, Montano filed the misdemeanor criminal charge in an appropriate court. On April 11, 2011, the district attorney's office dismissed the charge due to insufficient evidence.

Wilson brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. His complaint named as defendants Deputies Montano and Torres; Joe Chavez, the warden of VCDC; and Rene Rivera, the Valencia County Sheriff during the time of Wilson's detention. Chavez and Rivera were named in both their individual and official capacities. Count I of the complaint alleged the defendants engaged in “Illegal and Unreasonable Detention in Violation of the Fourth Amendment.”Counts III and IV alleged Warden Chavez and Sheriff Rivera, respectively, were liable for establishing an unconstitutional policy or custom and deliberate indifference.² Wilson alleged the deputies deliberately detained him without filing a criminal complaint or bringing him before a judicial officer for a probable cause determination. He further asserted that, prior to his detention, there were numerous incidents in which VCDC held individuals without filing criminal charges or otherwise allowing them to appear before a magistrate judge. Wilson thus alleged his detention was the result of a policy established by Warden Chavez in which individuals were routinely held without the filing of criminal charges until they were released by sua sponte court orders, and that Warden Chavez trained his staff to accept inmates without the filing of charges. Wilson also asserted Warden Chavez was deliberately indifferent to the unconstitutional policy of incarcerating citizens without pending charges.

Wilson made substantially similar claims against Sheriff Rivera. He alleged there were numerous prior incidents in which VCSO deputies arrested individuals without a warrant and thereafter failed to file criminal complaints or provide prompt probable cause determinations. He asserted these illegal detentions, including his own, were the result of a policy or custom established by Sheriff Rivera. He also alleged Sheriff Rivera failed to train his staff, which resulted in the routine incarceration of individuals without legal process. In addition, Wilson alleged Sheriff Rivera was deliberately indifferent to the constitutional violations which resulted from his policies, customs, and/or failure to train his employees.³

Appellants jointly filed a motion to dismiss Wilson's claims, arguing, inter alia, Wilson's complaint failed to state a claim against any of the defendants in their individual capacities ⁴ and each of the defendants was entitled to qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion, and this appeal followed.⁵

III. DiscussionA. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

Although an order denying a motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity is not a final judgment, this court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to review the order “to the extent that it turns on an issue of law.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985). This court reviews the district court's denial of a motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity de novo, accepting as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint and viewing the allegations in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Brown v. Montoya, 662 F.3d 1152, 1162 (10th Cir.2011). The Supreme Court recently articulated in detail the standard for evaluating a motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity:

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are “merely consistent with” a defendant's liability, it “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’ ”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citations omitted) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–57, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). In the context of a § 1983 action against multiple individual governmental actors, “it is particularly important ... that the complaint make clear exactly who is alleged to have done what to whom, to provide each individual with fair notice as to the basis of the claims against him or her.” Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1250 (10th Cir.2008).

Consistent with Supreme Court precedent, this court requires a plaintiff to “allege sufficient facts that show—when taken as true—the defendant plausibly violated his constitutional rights, which were clearly established at the time of violation.” Schwartz v. Booker, 702 F.3d 573, 579 (10th Cir.2012). For a constitutional right to be clearly established, “[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). Even when the plaintiff pleads a violation of a clearly established right, the court must sometimes consider “whether extraordinary circumstances—such as reliance on the advice of counsel or on a statute—so prevented the official from knowing that his or her actions were unconstitutional that he or she should not be imputed with knowledge of a clearly established right.” Shero v. City of Grove, 510 F.3d 1196, 1204 (10th Cir.2007). This court has discretion to decide which prong of the qualified immunity test to address first in light of the circumstances of each particular case. Brown, 662 F.3d at 1164.

B. Duty to Ensure Prompt Probable Cause Determination

Appellants do not dispute that Wilson had a Fourth Amendment right to a prompt probable cause determination, and that such a right was clearly established at the time of Wilson's detention at the VCDC. Cnty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56, 111 S.Ct. 1661, 114 L.Ed.2d 49 (1991) (holding an arrestee is entitled to a probable cause determination within forty-eight hours absent “a bona fide emergency or other extraordinary circumstance”); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment requires a judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty following arrest.”). Appellants nonetheless argue they are entitled to qualified immunity because there is no clearly established law delineating which of them had the obligation to provide Wilson with a probable cause hearing. In support of this argument, appellants rely heavily on an unpublished case from this circuit, Strepka v. Miller, 28 Fed.Appx. 823 (10th Cir.2001). In Strepka, this court affirmed the dismissal of a § 1983 claim alleging officers violated the plaintiff's right to a prompt judicial determination of probable cause. Id. at 825–30. Analyzing the plaintiff's complaint against the officers in their individual capacities, we concluded: “Even...