Wilson v. Montgomery County Election Bd.

• Decision Date: 02 November 1994
• Docket Number: No. 54A04-9406-CV-247,54A04-9406-CV-247
• Parties: Rawleigh C. WILSON, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. MONTGOMERY COUNTY ELECTION BOARD, et al., Appellees-Defendants. 1
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Page 258

642 N.E.2d 258

Rawleigh C. WILSON, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. MONTGOMERY COUNTY ELECTION BOARD, et al., Appellees-Defendants.

No. 54A04-9406-CV-247. ¹

Court of Appeals of Indiana First District.

Nov. 2, 1994.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 26, 1995.

Transfer Denied May 9, 1995.

Rawleigh C. Wilson, pro se.

Harry A. Siamas, Crawfordsville, for appellees.

ROBERTSON, Judge.

Rawleigh C. Wilson appeals from an adverse decision on his petition for declaratory judgment. Wilson had sought a declaration that several Indiana election laws are unconstitutional. Wilson also appeals from the affirmance of the determination of the Montgomery County Election Board that he is disqualified to be a candidate for the position of Montgomery County Sheriff. He raises numerous allegations of error. We affirm.

The evidence reveals that Wilson filed his declaration of candidacy for the election of Sheriff of Montgomery County. The Montgomery County Election Board subsequently sent Wilson notice of a hearing to determine whether Wilson was qualified for the office of Sheriff. The notice informed Wilson that his name would not be placed on the ballot if the Election Board were to determine that he did not meet the qualifications to be a candidate for the office.

Wilson sought an injunction to prevent the Election Board from holding its hearing. The trial court denied the request. On March 10, 1994, Wilson filed a petition for a declaratory judgment in which he sought to have the trial court declare Ind.Code 35-50-2-1 and 3-8-1-5 unconstitutional.

On the same day, the Election Board held its hearing. The Election Board obtained a certified copy of a judgment and commitment order, which had been entered against Wilson on July 6, 1984, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana after Wilson had pled guilty to the offense of making a pipe bomb, in violation of 26 U.S.C. Sec. 5861(f) and 5871. Wilson had received a sentence of two years for the offense. At the hearing before the Election Board, Wilson agreed that he is the person named in the order. The Election Board decided Wilson was disqualified to be a candidate for public office pursuant to I.C. 3-8-1-5 because he had been convicted of a felony and, as a consequence, decided his name should not be placed on the ballot for the primary election. On March 18, 1994, under the same cause number as the declaratory judgment action, Wilson filed a motion for judicial review of the Election Board's decision. The trial court eventually affirmed the decision of the Election Board and denied the declaratory judgment in a judgment very similar to this opinion on appeal.

In Indiana, prospective candidates for local offices file a declaration of candidacy with the circuit court clerk. See I.C. 3-8-2-6. All questions concerning the validity of a declaration of candidacy filed with a circuit court clerk shall be referred to and determined by the county election board. See I.C. 3-8-2-14. Further, under I.C. 3-6-5-31, if the county election board, after affording due notice and an opportunity for a hearing, determines that a person has engaged or is about to engage in an act or practice that constitutes or will constitute a violation of a provision of Title 3 of the Indiana Code or of a rule or order issued under that Title, the board shall take the action it considers appropriate under the circumstances.

Indiana Code Section 3-6-5-14 describes the powers and duties of county election boards, in pertinent part, as follows:

Each county election board, in addition to duties otherwise prescribed by law, shall:

(1) except as provided in IC 3-8-5 and IC 3-10-7 for town conventions and municipal elections in small towns, conduct all elections and administer the election laws within the county ...

One such election law is I.C. 3-8-1-5(b)(3):

A person is disqualified from holding or being a candidate for an elected office if the person:

* * * * * *

(3) has:

(A) entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to; or

(B) been convicted of; a felony (as defined in IC 35-50-2-1).

According to I.C. 35-50-2-1, "felony conviction" means a conviction, in any jurisdiction at any time, with respect to which the convicted person might have been imprisoned for more than one (1) year; however, it does not include a conviction with respect to which the person has been pardoned or a conviction of a class A misdemeanor under I.C. 35-50-2-7(b).

Inasmuch as Wilson received a sentence of two years for his offense, he "might have been imprisoned for more than one (1) year" and the offense was a felony under I.C. 35-50-2-1. Further, in 1984, Wilson entered a plea of guilty to the charged offense, which the District Court ultimately reduced to a conviction. Wilson therefore "has entered a plea of guilty ... to" and "been convicted of a felony (as defined in IC 35-50-2-1)" and "is disqualified from ... being a candidate for an elected office" under I.C. 3-8-1-5(b)(3)(A) and (B). The Election Board was to administer the latter election law within Montgomery County and was to decide all questions concerning the validity of Wilson's declaration of candidacy. The Election Board properly did so when it decided that Wilson was disqualified for candidacy and that his name should not be placed on the ballot.

Wilson claims the Election Board is proceeding under "I.C. 5-8-3-1(b)(3)" and he therefore could have been removed only after his election under I.C. 5-8-3-2. In the notice sent to Wilson, however, the Election Board relied upon I.C. 3-8-1-5(b)(3) and not upon I.C. 5-8-3-1 (subsection (b)(3) of which does not exist). The Election Board also based its subsequent decisions on I.C. 3-8-1-5. The trial court and this Court have determined that the Election Board's decisions, based upon that statute, were proper. Wilson further maintains that I.C. 5-8-3, and not I.C. 3-8-1-5, applies to his situation because he was convicted of a federal offense. He also identifies several statutes of limitation he believes show his 1984 conviction may no longer be used to disqualify him. As noted above, however, the definition of felony, for the purposes of I.C. 3-8-1-5(b)(3), applies "in any jurisdiction at any time." I.C. 35-50-2-1. Therefore, I.C. 3-8-1-5(b)(3) applies to Wilson's 1984, federal conviction.

Wilson raises claims of disenfranchisement. He contends the decision of the Election Board violates the notion of one person, one vote. The State, however, has a legitimate interest in the qualifications of candidates. Taylor v. State Election Board (1993), Ind.App., 616 N.E.2d 380, 387. Voters do not have the privilege to vote for someone not qualified to be a candidate for the office, and the State simply has chosen one way to protect its interest in the qualifications of candidates through the mechanism of the county election board. Such a mechanism is proper.

Wilson claims that he could only be disqualified from holding office by a judge at the time of sentencing. Wilson cites I.C. 35-50-5-1.1, which allows a court to include in a sentence an order rendering the person convicted of bribery or official misconduct incapable of holding public office for a fixed period of not more than ten years. Wilson further cites I.C. 3-7-1-15(b), which provides that a person on probation or parole following conviction of a crime and not subject to lawful detention is not disfranchised. He claims that these statutes conflict with I.C. 3-8-1-5 and that together they violate the principle that all laws within the State should be uniform. Neither I.C. 35-50-5-1.1 nor I.C. 3-7-1-15(b), however, purport to apply to the circumstances in the present case. The existence of these two statutes does not nullify the statutes which allow the county election board to determine whether prospective candidates meet the qualifications to hold office. Wilson has not shown that the statutes cannot exist in harmony with each other. The trial court properly determined that the statutes are not unconstitutional.

Wilson claims he may not be disenfranchised for a crime which did not involve moral turpitude. He cites only our Rules of Court to support his contention. We note that Ind. Const., art. II, sec. 8, permits disenfranchisement upon conviction of an infamous crime. Inasmuch as Wilson might have been imprisoned for more than one year, his offense qualifies...