Wilson v. Morris

• Decision Date: 12 September 1989
• Citation: 563 A.2d 392,317 Md. 284
• Parties: Ann G. WILSON et al. v. Connie I. MORRIS, Personal Representative of the Estate of Irene Mae Ragland. 52 Sept. Term 1988.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 284

317 Md. 284

563 A.2d 392

Ann G. WILSON et al. v. Connie I. MORRIS, Personal Representative of the Estate of Irene Mae Ragland.

52 Sept. Term 1988.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Sept. 12, 1989.

Ralph S. Tyler, Asst. Atty. Gen. (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen., Carmen M. Shepard, Lydia B. Duff, Asst. Attys. Gen., Baltimore, Richard R. Page Wyrough, Farrington, Smallwood & Wells, Landover), all on brief, for petitioner.

Daniel F. Goldstein (Elizabeth M. Kameen, Brown & Goldstein, Baltimore, William Schildt, Strite, Schildt & Varner, Hagerstown), all on brief, for respondent.

Argued before MURPHY, C.J., and ELDRIDGE, COLE, RODOWSKY, McAULIFFE, ADKINS and BLACKWELL, JJ.

BLACKWELL, Judge.

In this personal injury case, we evaluate two important issues accepted for certiorari: 1) whether evidence of prior and subsequent policies of a day care center in attending patients is admissible to show a breach of the standard of care and 2) does a juror's statement regarding "the insurance crisis" and the high cost of injury cases establish juror bias so as to warrant a mistrial. We shall affirm the intermediate appellate court's decision remanding the case for a new trial. Morris v. Wilson, 74 Md.App. 663, 539 A.2d 1151 (1988).

In March, 1982, Irene Ragland (Ragland), then sixty-seven years old, entered the Western Maryland Adult Day Care Treatment Center for the Chronically Ill and Aging (the Center) because she needed physical therapy, psychiatric counseling and general care. Due partly to a serious back operation, she was physically unable to perform basic personal care. Ragland was unable to bathe herself, to get off the couch without assistance, to walk unassisted or to prepare a meal on her own. ¹ On May 6, 1982, a staff member of the Center, Mary Shain (Shain), escorted Ragland in a wheelchair from the Center to the adjacent Washington County Health Department. As part of a care plan, Ragland was taken to the psychiatrist's offices on the second floor. Pursuant to patient monitoring policies in effect at the time of the accident, Ragland was left in the waiting area. Shain notified the receptionist to call her when Ragland was ready to return to the Center.

When the call came to get Ragland, Shain was in a meeting but was informed that the patient was ready to return. Ragland waited approximately fifteen to twenty minutes, then with assistance took the elevator to the first floor receptionist area. Ann G. Wilson (Wilson), the Health Department receptionist on the first floor, apparently offered to wheel her back to the Center. Ragland was left unattended at the top of an inclined sidewalk when Wilson returned to her desk to answer a phone call. Subsequently, the wheelchair rolled down an access ramp for the handicapped resulting in Ragland falling forward onto the pedals of the wheelchair. ² As a result of the incident, Ragland suffered two fractured vertebrae. ³

From the time the Center was founded until approximately eighteen months before the accident, and again, beginning the day after, the Center's policy was for an attendant to transport, monitor and remain with patients taken to the Health Department for medical care. ⁴ The trial judge refused to admit the evidence of prior and subsequent practices of the Center. The court also denied plaintiff's motion for mistrial based on alleged juror bias. The trial judge granted a motion for judgment for defendant Shain, and the jury later returned a verdict for the remaining defendants, Binkley and Wilson. ⁵ The Court of Special Appeals reversed holding both prior and subsequent procedures demonstrate a pattern of conduct that is relevant and admissible. Morris v. Wilson, 74 Md.App. at 668, 539 A.2d at 1153-54. On the issue of juror bias, the intermediate appellate court stated, "Although we cannot say at this point whether a mistrial was warranted, the failure of the trial judge to inquire into a serious allegation of juror bias compels us to remand the case for a new trial." Id. at 677, 539 A.2d at 1158. For purposes of simplifying our analysis, we shall address the issues in the following order:

1) The admissibility of the prior patient monitoring policy of the Center;

2) The admissibility of the subsequent policy after the accident; and 3) Whether the trial judge abused his discretion in refusing to grant the motion for mistrial.

I.

During the course of the trial, plaintiff's counsel sought to introduce evidence that until late 1980 or early 1981, the Center's policy was to have a staff member remain with patients who were taken to the Health Department until their appointments were completed. Plaintiff's counsel expressly proffered to the court that the prior practice of the Center was relevant to show "an awareness of the hazard ..., [it] shows foreseeability before the act and it doesn't discourage corrective action." In the brief of Respondent, Connie I. Morris (Morris), counsel emphasized the prior policy was relevant to establish the applicable standard of care. The argument continued with the following premise: "in connection with the 'reasonableness' of the defendant's conduct, the plaintiff should have been permitted to introduce, not only the fact of the prior policy, but also the reasons it was changed prior to the accident."

Petitioner steadfastly maintained the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in excluding the prior policy. Counsel emphasizes the evidentiary determination should be subject to our typical relevancy analysis, with a weighing of the probative value against prejudicial effect. See, e.g., Cross v. State, 282 Md. 468, 474, 386 A.2d 757, 761 (1978). The fact that the Center had a different patient monitoring policy "one and a half to two years prior to plaintiff's accident is simply too remote in time to be probative of the question of whether defendants breached the standard of care on May 6, 1982." We have not previously considered under what circumstances a prior policy or practice is admissible to prove an alleged breach of the applicable standard of care.

When Morris' counsel sought to interrogate Binkley as to the prior patient monitoring policies of the Center, the following colloquy transpired Q (Mr. Goldstein): Was it your practice to have patients taken ... who were taken over to the Western ... to the Health Department to have your staff remain while they completed their appointment?

Ms. Johnston: Objection.

The Court: Objection is sustained.

After counsel approached the Bench, the discussion continued:

The Court: For what purpose do you want to approach the Bench?

Mr. Goldstein: Well, to the extent that the issue here is one of a prior practice. While I'm aware that Ms. Johnston in a Motion in Limine has challenged subsequent practice, we would urge that the prior practice is fully admissible on the issue of standard of care, on the issue of feasibility.

The trial judge sustained the objection stating:

Well, Mr. Goldstein, I disagree with you. I just don't think that any prior practice before 1982 or whatever, 1980 has any relevance to an accident that happened in 1982....

The assessment of the admissibility of the prior practice of the Center should be subject to traditional relevancy principles. Generally, "evidence which is relevant to a material issue is admissible, except as otherwise provided by statute or by rules applicable in Maryland courts." 5 L. McLain, Maryland Practice: Maryland Evidence § 402.1, at 294 (1987).

In Kennedy v. Crouch, 191 Md. 580, 62 A.2d 582 (1948), we set forth the following central relevancy principles to be applied in civil cases: "[i]t is an elementary rule that evidence, to be admissible, must be relevant to the issues and must tend either to establish or disprove them, and evidence which does not tend to describe or explain the facts and circumstances of the case is inadmissible." Id. at 585, 62 A.2d at 585; Haile v. Dinnis, 184 Md. 144, 152, 40 A.2d 363, 367 (1944) ("All facts having rational probative value are admissible, unless some specific rule forbids.") (quoting Wigmore, Evidence § 10, at 293 (3d ed. 1940)).

"For an item of evidence to be admissible, it must be both relevant and material. Evidence is material if it tends to establish a proposition that has legal significance to the litigation. Evidence is relevant if it is sufficiently probative of a proposition that, if established, would have legal significance to the litigation." Paige v. Manuzak, 57 Md.App. 621, 632, 471 A.2d 758, 763 (1984) (quoting 1 Wigmore, Evidence § 2 (Tillers rev. 1983)).

As otherwise stated, "Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make [the] existence of a material fact more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. A material fact is a fact that is of legal consequence to the determination of the issues in the case." 5 L. McLain, supra, § 401.1, at 261; C. McCormick, Evidence § 185, at 541 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984) (McCormick identifies the second aspect of relevance as "probative value," which is the tendency of evidence to establish the proposition that it is offered to prove.). As stated by Professor McLain in her treatise, "what issues are material to a particular case is determined by the pleadings and the substantive law." 5 L. McLain, supra, at 262 (other citations omitted).

We agree with the Court of Special Appeals' conclusion that "absent some rule against its admission, the evidence of prior policies would be admissible as long as it was relevant, competent, and material." Morris v. Wilson, supra, 74 Md.App. at 676, 539 A.2d at 1157. We similarly find no statute, rule, or other authority which would prescribe the inadmissibility of prior practices as a matter of law. The trial court's determination as to the admissibility of the Center's prior policy in monitoring patients depends upon whether the evidence is more or less likely to establish the standard of care required of the Day Care Center.

The record lacks any...