Wilson v. New York and Presbyterian Hospital

Decision Date15 July 2021
Docket Number17-CV-5012 (RRM) (CLP)
PartiesMICHAEL WILSON, Plaintiff, v. NEW YORK AND PRESBYTERIAN HOSPITAL d/b/a NEW YORK-PRESBYTERIAN HOSPITAL, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ROSLYNN R. MAUSKOPF, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

On June 22, 2021, this Court issued a Memorandum and Order, (the “Prior M&O” (Doc. No. 59)), granting defendant's motion for summary judgment as to Counts II and V-VII of the complaint and recommitting the case to Magistrate Judge Pollack for all remaining pre-trial matters. Defendant now brings a motion to correct the Prior M&O noting that Wilson orally withdrew all remaining claims at a status conference on October 24, 2019, and requests that the Court enter final judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 58. (Letter Motion to Correct (Doc. No. 60).) Wilson opposes this motion and cross-moves for reconsideration pursuant to either Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b), 59(e), or 60(b). For the reasons set forth below, defendant's motion is granted and Wilson's motion is denied.

BACKGROUND

Although familiarity with the facts and procedural history of this case is assumed, the Court will briefly recap the relevant background in this case.

Factual Background

Michael Wilson was hired on or about September 2, 2014, to work as a Projectionist in defendant's Media Services Department. (Defendant's 56.1 Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (“Def.'s SOF”) (Doc. No. 46) ¶¶ 1-3; Plaintiff's 56.1 Counterstatement of Material Facts (“Pl.'s SOF”) (Doc. No. 52) ¶¶ 1-3.) Wilson reported to Alan Pine, the Director of Media Services, and Sandra Aldea. (Def.'s SOF ¶¶ 23 25; Pl.'s SOF ¶¶ 23, 25.) At the time Wilson was hired by defendant, he was classified as an exempt employee under the FLSA. (Def.'s SOF ¶ 117; Pl.'s SOF ¶ 117.)

On August 2, 2015, Wilson emailed Eric Carr, an employee in the Human Resources department, to ask whether Wilson was FLSA exempt. (Def.'s SOF ¶ 121; Pl.'s SOF ¶ 121.) On October 1, 2015, defendant changed Wilson's job classification from exempt to non-exempt, effective immediately, and retroactively paid Wilson for all overtime worked; the classifications for all other Projectionists in Wilson's department were also changed effective October 1, 2015, and they, too, were retroactively compensated for overtime worked. (Def.'s SOF ¶¶ 125-30; Pl.'s SOF ¶¶ 125-30.)

It is undisputed that after Wilson's job classification changed to non-exempt, he continued to be offered opportunities to cover jobs scheduled in the evening or on the weekend. (Def.'s SOF ¶ 133; Pl.'s SOF ¶ 133.) It is also undisputed that after Wilson's job reclassification changed on October 1, 2015, he continued to make frequent requests to leave work early and for time off and continued to turn down off-hours assignments. (Def.'s SOF ¶ 135; Pl.'s SOF ¶ 135.) Nevertheless, Wilson testified at his deposition that “after the exemption changed suddenly, ” his coworkers continued “to work all the nighttime gigs and get paid overtime … for all that work, but I was never again put on any of those gigs… I was not allowed to, at that point, get any overtime work.” (Kosovych Declaration Exhibit 2 (Doc No. 50-2) at 44, 46.)

In the months following Wilson's reclassification, Aldea and Pine admonished Wilson for various infractions. On August 3 2015, Pine emailed Wilson to remind him that he should not arrive late to the office or be absent from work without informing his supervisors, and he should not disrupt a coworker's vacation to ask him a question about work. (Def.'s SOF ¶ 148; Pl.'s SOF ¶ 148.) Aldea also criticized Wilson for refusing to complete a job because it would require him to stay for an extra ten minutes, (Def.'s SOF ¶¶ 149-51; Pl.'s SOF ¶¶ 149-51), and disregarding her instructions, ((Def.'s SOF ¶¶ 152-57; Pl.'s SOF ¶ 152-57). Wilson received a written warning on February 19, 2016, for unprofessional and disruptive conduct, after an argument with Aldea and Pine regarding absence from work to attend a scheduled meeting. (Def.'s SOF ¶ 162; Pl.'s SOF ¶ 162.) In March 2016, Wilson received a performance evaluation for the 2015 year that was critical of his behavior towards his supervisors and coworkers and stated that he took longer than appropriate to complete tasks; nevertheless, his overall performance rating stated that Wilson “meets expectations.” (Def.'s SOF ¶¶ 130, 163-78; Pl.'s SOF ¶¶ 130, 163-78.)

On April 21, 2016, Wilson and Aldea were involved in a verbal altercation after Aldea asked Wilson what he was working on and for an estimate of how long it would take to complete. (Def.'s SOF ¶ 183; Pl.'s SOF ¶ 183.) During that argument, Wilson repeated a sexist comment a coworker had allegedly made about Aldea. (Def.'s SOF ¶ 184; Pl.'s SOF ¶ 184.) Following an investigation into the altercation, Chastity Cruz-Hamilton, then Labor Relations Manager, found that Wilson had engaged in disruptive behavior in violation of defendant's Discharge for Cause and Corrective Action Policy and Disruptive Behavior/Behaviors Policy. (Def.'s SOF ¶ 191; Pl.'s SOF ¶ 191.) Cruz-Hamilton consulted with Pine about these findings, and Pine recommended that Wilson's employment be terminated; on April 26, 2016, Pine and Cruz-Hamilton informed Wilson that his employment was terminated effective that same day. (Def.'s SOF ¶¶ 194-96; Pl.'s SOF ¶¶ 194-96.)

Procedural History

Wilson initiated the instant action on August 4, 2017, bringing eight claims. (Compl. (Doc. No. 1).) Among those claims were three claims for unpaid wages or wage notice violations brought under the FLSA and the NYLL. At a telephonic pre-motion conference on October 24, 2019, Wilson orally withdrew those claims. (See Kosovych Declaration, Exhibit 1 - Transcript of October 24, 2019, Pre-Motion Conference (Doc. No. 50-1).)

On August 17, 2020, Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on all remaining claims. (Mot. (Doc. No. 45).) The Court granted the motion in its entirety on June 22, 2021, but nonetheless recommitted the case to Magistrate Judge Pollak for all remaining pre-trial matters in the mistaken belief that some causes of action remained unresolved. (Prior M&O (Doc. No. 59).) On July 6, 2021, fourteen days after the M&O was filed, defendant moved to correct the Prior M&O, arguing that because Wilson had orally withdrawn three of his claims and the Court had granted summary judgment on the remaining claims, that an order correcting the Prior M&O and directing judgment in favor of defendant was proper under Rule 58 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Letter Motion to Amend/Correct/Supplement Order on Motion for Summary Judgment (Mot. to Amend) (Doc. No. 60).)

On July 8, 2021, Wilson filed a letter in opposition to defendant's motion, arguing that the Court had clearly not intended to enter judgment, and to do so now would be “highly prejudicial.” (Pl.'s Opp. to Mot. to Amend (Doc. No. 61) at 1.) Wilson further requested that this Court “reconsider its dismissal of Counts II, V, VI, and VII pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. §§ 54(b), 59(e) or 60(b).” (Id.) In support of this motion for reconsideration, Wilson argues that the Court “engaged in vital oversights.” (Id. at 2.) First, he argues that the Court was incorrect in concluding that Wilson's deposition testimony and affidavit were contradictory. (Id.) Second, he asserts that the Court erred in concluding that Wilson's hostile work environment claim could not survive summary judgment because Wilson had failed to show that the harassment alleged related to his membership in a protected class, arguing that Wilson had alleged a hostile work environment “in violation of New York Executive Law § 296(e), not § 296(a).” (Id. at 2.) Third, Wilson argues that the Court erred in finding that Wilson had not alleged an adverse employment action sufficient to support a claim of retaliation under the FLSA, and failed to apply the definition of adverse employment action set forth in Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006). Fourth, Wilson argues that his Local Rule 56.1 Counter-Statement of Disputed Facts, (Doc. No. 52), included “119 disputed genuine and material facts with specific attribution of each fact to the record, ” which the Court failed to consider. (Id. at 3.) Accordingly, Wilson requests that the Court deny defendant's motion and “clarify and/or reconsider its dismissal of Counts II, V, VI, and VII.” (Id.)

Defendant subsequently filed a letter opposing Wilson's motion for reconsideration as both untimely and meritless. (Opp. to Cross-Mot. for Reconsideration (Doc. No. 62).) As to timeliness, Defendant points to Local Rule 6.3, which requires that a motion for reconsideration be served “within fourteen (14) days after the entry of the Court's determination on the original motion.” (Id. at 1 (quoting Local Rule 6.3).) Wilson filed his motion sixteen days after the Prior M&O was issued and failed to provide any explanation for his delay, so defendant argues that his motion must be dismissed as untimely. (Id.) Defendant also argues that Wilson cannot bring his motion under either Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b), because no judgment has been entered. (Id.) Finally, defendant asserts that Wilson's arguments merely repeat arguments already considered and rejected by this Court in the Prior M&O, and so reconsideration is not warranted. (Id.)

Wilson responded in a letter reiterating that his cross-motion seeks “clarification initially, and, in the alternative reconsideration, ” which, he argues, exempts him from the time limits set in Local Rule 6.3 as he is primarily bringing a motion for the revision of a nonfinal judgment under Rule 54(b). (Reply in Support of Cross-Mot. for Reconsideration (Doc. No. 63) at 1.) Additionally, Wilson argues that the Court clearly...

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