Wilson v. Price

Decision Date04 October 2010
Docket NumberNo. 09-2904.,09-2904.
PartiesChristopher WILSON, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Keith PRICE, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

624 F.3d 389

Christopher WILSON, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
Keith PRICE, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 09-2904.

United States Court of Appeals,Seventh Circuit.

Argued Feb. 10, 2010.
Decided Oct. 4, 2010.


624 F.3d 390

Gary D. Ashman, Attorney (argued), Ashman & Stein, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Laura Cha-Yu Liu, Attorney (argued), Hogan Marren, Ltd., Tiffany M. Ferguson, Attorney (argued), Pugh, Jones, Johnson & Quandt, Chicago, IL, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before RIPPLE, MANION, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge.

Keith Price, a Harvey, Illinois alderman who had received several complaints about

624 F.3d 391

cars parked illegally in front of Midnight Auto Express, decided to take matters into his own hands. He drove to the repair shop, demanded that the cars be moved, and after an employee refused his orders, savagely beat the employee until he was unconscious. The question before the court is whether this conduct gives rise to a federal claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Although the alderman's actions were reprehensible, we find that they were not made under color of state law and, therefore, cannot serve as the basis for § 1983 liability. As a result, we affirm the district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' complaint.

I. BACKGROUND

Price was at all times relevant to this case an alderman for the Sixth Ward of the City of Harvey (“the City”). On May 2, 2008, Price received a number of phone calls from his constituents complaining about cars parked illegally on the parkway in front of Midnight Auto Express (“Midnight Auto”), a car repair shop located within the Sixth Ward. That evening, Price attempted to call the City about removing the cars, but did not get a response. Price then decided to go to Midnight Auto himself. When he arrived, he spoke with Christopher Wilson, a mechanic at the shop, and demanded that Wilson move the cars. Wilson refused. Price then demanded that Wilson summon the owner of Midnight Auto. Wilson told Price to find the owner himself and then turned to walk away. Furious, Price punched Wilson in the head several times, leaving Wilson unconscious and with a fractured jaw.

Wilson and his wife, Camilia Booker, sued Price and the City of Harvey for damages. In their first amended complaint, the plaintiffs asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 against Price (Count I) and the City (Count II), as well as state law claims for loss of consortium (Count III) and battery (Count IV). They also raised an indemnification claim against the City pursuant to 745 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 10/9-102 (Count V). Price and the City moved to dismiss all counts pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that Wilson failed to state a claim against them under § 1983 and that the court should not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. The district court found that Wilson had pleaded facts demonstrating that Price had not acted under color of state law and accordingly dismissed the § 1983 claim with prejudice. The district court also declined to exercise jurisdiction over the state law claims and dismissed them without prejudice. The plaintiffs appeal the dismissal.

II. ANALYSIS

We review de novo a district court's decision to grant a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). McCready v. eBay, Inc., 453 F.3d 882, 888 (7th Cir.2006). “We construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, taking as true all well-pleaded factual allegations and making all possible inferences from those allegations in his or her favor.” 1 Id. (citation omitted). The complaint's “allegations must plausibly suggest that the

624 F.3d 392

plaintiff has a right to relief, raising that possibility above a ‘speculative level’; if they do not, the plaintiff pleads itself out of court.” Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1084 (7th Cir.2008) (citation omitted). Dismissal is proper if “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff cannot prove any facts that would support his claim for relief.” Kennedy v. Nat'l Juvenile Det. Ass'n, 187 F.3d 690, 694 (7th Cir.1999).

The central question on appeal is whether the plaintiffs have alleged facts sufficient to establish that Price was acting under color of state law during the May 2, 2008 altercation outside Midnight Auto. To be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Price must have acted “under color of state law” to deprive Wilson of some federally guaranteed right. Pickrel v. City of Springfield, Ill., 45 F.3d 1115, 1118 (7th Cir.1995). “Not every action by a state official or employee is to be deemed as occurring ‘under color’ of state law,” Hughes v. Meyer, 880 F.2d 967, 971 (7th Cir.1989); rather, action is taken under color of state law “when it involves a misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law,” Honaker v. Smith, 256 F.3d 477, 484-85 (7th Cir.2001). The mere assertion that one is a state officer does not necessarily mean that one acts under color of state law. Askew v. Bloemker, 548 F.2d 673, 677 (7th Cir.1976). A state officer's conduct does not constitute acting under color of state law unless it is “related in some way to the performance of the duties of the state office.” Honaker, 256 F.3d at 485.

The plaintiffs contend that Price was acting under color of state law when he attacked Wilson because Price was “performing his civic duties as 6th Ward Alderman for the City” when he went to Midnight Auto in an effort to have the illegally parked cars moved. Yet, the plaintiffs fail to articulate which of Price's actions at Midnight Auto relate to his aldermanic duties. Under the Illinois Municipal Code, aldermen are elected members of the municipality's city council, and in that capacity serve a “purely legislative” function. See 65 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/6-4-6 (“The powers of the council shall be purely legislative, except as may be otherwise specifically provided by any other act or by any article of this Code.”); see also United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 512, 92 S.Ct. 2531, 33 L.Ed.2d 507 (1972) (“A legislative act has consistently been defined as an act generally done in Congress in relation to the business before it.”). No other statutory provision expands the powers of an alderman. See generally 65 Ill. Comp. Stat. §§ 5/6-4-2 to 6-4-8.

Even drawing all reasonable inferences in Wilson's favor, the complaint's allegations do not demonstrate that any aspect of Price's conduct on May 2, 2008 related to his legislative duties, which include both the statutorily authorized enactment of legislation and the activities “related in some way” to the performance of the legislative function. Honaker, 256 F.3d at 485. At oral argument, defense counsel conceded that an alderman may be acting under color of state law...

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