Wilson v. Primesource Health Care of Ohio, Inc., CASE NO. 1:16-CV-1298
| Decision Date | 05 July 2017 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 1:16-CV-1298 |
| Parties | HENRIETTA WILSON et al., Plaintiffs, v. PRIMESOURCE HEALTH CARE OF OHIO, INC., et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio |
[Resolving Docs. 100, 104, 141, 146, 155, 160]
Plaintiffs work as support staff in nursing homes across Ohio.1 With this lawsuit, the Plaintiffs say Defendants2 failed to pay them overtime and the minimum wage. Plaintiffs bring a collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") and individual claims under the Ohio Minimum Fair Wage Standards Act ("Ohio Wage Act").3
The parties filed dueling summary judgment motions.4 Subsequently, Plaintiffs asked the Court (1) to strike several of Defendants' exhibits,5 and (2) to accept new evidence.6
For the following reasons, this Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the Defendants' motion for summary judgment. The Court also DENIES Plaintiffs' motion to strike,GRANTS Plaintiffs' motions to submit new evidence, and ORDERS an evidentiary hearing on July 21, 2017 at noon.
The Plaintiffs file this case because Defendants (collectively, "PrimeSource")7 misclassified Plaintiffs as FLSA exempt employees.8 When Plaintiffs discovered that PrimeSource could not claim exemptions for overtime and minimum wage pay, Plaintiffs sued PrimeSource for violating the FLSA and Ohio Wage Act.
Defendant PrimeSource provides on-site medical care to nursing home residents in several Midwestern states. Plaintiffs are salaried employees falling into two categories—clinical assistants9 and patient assistants.10 Both groups assisted physicians at these nursing homes. Plaintiffs often worked at different care facilities throughout the workweek.11
Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants failed to pay required overtime pay and the minimum wage. Plaintiffs seek compensation for unpaid work they allegedly performed in the morning before they arrived to the nursing homes and after they left at night.12
First, Plaintiffs say PrimeSource should pay them for carpooling time. On work nights, all Plaintiffs going to the same care facility agreed where to meet the next morning.13 In the morning, Plaintiffs met at this agreed-upon location and then traveled in a PrimeSource-ownedvehicle to that day's worksite.14 On these drives, the Plaintiffs also transported medical equipment to and from the daily worksites and allegedly participated in conference calls.15
Second, Plaintiff Clinical Assistants say they performed additional work once they arrived home at night ("at-home work").16 The Clinical Assistants report they unloaded, cleaned, and sterilized medical equipment.17 They also scanned and faxed documents related to that day's work.18
Defendant PrimeSource disputes Plaintiffs' account. PrimeSource says Plaintiffs did not work more than forty hours from Monday through Friday. PrimeSource also says it paid Plaintiffs time-and-a-half for weekend work.19 PrimeSource argues Plaintiffs' commute time is non-compensable and that the alleged at-home work was either de minimis or avoidable had Plaintiffs not "goofed off" during the day.20 Last, PrimeSource says that even if it owes Plaintiffs overtime, these payments should be made at a half-time rate because Plaintiffs' salaries covered all the time the Plaintiffs worked.21
The parties filed extensive summary judgment requests. The Court grants in part and denies in part the Plaintiffs' and the Defendants' motions.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, "[s]ummary judgment is proper when 'there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'"22 The moving party must first demonstrate that there is an absence of a genuine dispute asto a material fact entitling it to judgment.23 Once the moving party has done so, the non-moving party must set forth specific facts in the record—not its allegations or denials in pleadings—showing a triable issue.24 The existence of some doubt as to the material facts is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.25 But the Court views the facts and all reasonable inferences from those facts in favor of the non-moving party.26
When parties present competing versions of the facts on summary judgment, a district court adopts the non-movant's version of the facts unless the record before the court directly contradicts that version.27 Otherwise, a district court does not weigh competing evidence or make credibility determinations.28
The parties move for summary judgment on several often-overlapping issues. The Plaintiffs also filed several motions after the summary judgment deadline. With these late-filed motions, Plaintiffs say Defendant's officers gave false testimony and says Defendants secreted relevant evidence. The Court addresses each issue.
First, the Court finds that judicial estoppel arising from Plaintiff Aries Fisk's failure to list this claim on a bankruptcy petition does not bar Fisk's claim, but that Plaintiff Latasha Clifton lacks standing to sue. Second, the Court determines that a segment of the Plaintiffs' commute is compensable. Third, we find a genuine dispute as to whether PrimeSource must pay the Clinical Assistants for at-home work. Fourth, we conclude PrimeSource violated the FLSA, but we withhold judgment as to whether this violation was willful or whether liquidated damagesare appropriate. Fifth, the Court finds PrimeSource Group and David Fleming are joint employers. Sixth, we hold that Defendants must pay Plaintiffs a 150% premium on Plaintiffs' overtime back pay. Seventh, we hold PrimeSource may credit some previously paid weekend overtime against overtime it now owes. Next, the Court denies Defendants' request to cap Plaintiffs' damages. Then, the Court grants summary judgment on the parties' uncontested issues. Finally, the Court denies Plaintiffs' motion to strike, grants Plaintiffs' motions to submit new evidence, and sets an evidentiary hearing for July 21, 2017 at noon.
As a preliminary issue, the PrimeSource challenges whether Plaintiffs Aries Fisk and Latasha Clifton can proceed with their claims.
Plaintiffs Fisk and Clifton petitioned for bankruptcy protection. When Plaintiffs Fisk and Clifton filed for bankruptcy, neither listed their respective claims against PrimeSource as assets they owned that could be subject to distribution to Fisk and Clifton's creditors.29 Defendants say judicial estoppel bars Fisk and Clifton's claims because of this disclosure failure.30
However, before we consider judicial estoppel, the Court must answer the threshold question of whether Fisk and Clifton have standing to bring the instant lawsuit after filing for bankruptcy.
Standing to sue
When Fisk and Clifton filed for bankruptcy protection, their respective bankruptcy estates became the owners of all their property, including the FLSA claims that accrued before they filed their bankruptcy petitions.31 This means that, absent the bankruptcy trustees abandoning theFLSA claims, only Fisk's and Clifton's trustees have standing to pursue their pre-bankruptcy employment claims.32 However, Plaintiffs retain standing for claims that accrued after they filed for bankruptcy.33
Ms. Clifton worked at PrimeSource from December 15, 2014 through January 7, 2016.34 She filed for bankruptcy on April 22, 2016.35 Her entire FLSA claim accrued before she filed for bankruptcy. Therefore, only Clifton's trustee has standing in this lawsuit.36
Ms. Fisk worked from June 30, 2014 through April 2016.37 Fisk filed for bankruptcy on June 26, 2015.38 She retains standing in this lawsuit for injuries sustained after her June 26, 2015 filing.39
Because Fisk has standing to sue PrimeSource, the Court now turns to the parties' judicial estoppel arguments.
Judicial estoppel does not bar Ms. Fisk's claim
"The doctrine of judicial estoppel bars a party from (1) asserting a position that is contrary to one that the party has asserted under oath in a prior proceeding, where (2) the prior court adopted the contrary position 'either as a preliminary matter or as part of a final disposition.'"40 The Sixth Circuit, however, has noted that "when a debtor's omission might be inadvertent—such as where a debtor lacks the knowledge of the factual basis of the undisclosedclaim or where the debtor has no motive for concealment—finding Plaintiffs' actions as cause for judicial estoppel would be . . . inappropriate."41 Courts apply judicial estoppel "with caution to avoid impinging on the truth-seeking function of the court because the doctrine precludes a contradictory position without examining the truth of either statement."42
Plaintiff Fisk filed the instant lawsuit eleven months after filing for bankruptcy. Nonetheless, Defendants argue that Fisk's deposition testimony reveals she knew—and failed to disclose—the factual basis for her FLSA claims when she filed for bankruptcy.43
However, Fisk's testimony does not demonstrate that she knew PrimeSource owed her overtime. In her deposition, Fisk says she suspected PrimeSource might owe her more money because she worked so many hours.44 However, PrimeSource told Fisk she was salaried and thus ineligible for overtime.45 Because Fisk believed she was salaried, Fisk's general frustration with earning so little for so much work is insufficient to show that Fisk knew the factual basis for her FLSA claim.
Judicial estoppel does not bar Fisk's claims. Summary judgment is denied.
Plaintiff Clinical Assistants' ("CAs") and Patient Assistants' ("PAs") commute usually had two distinct segments. First, the CAs and PAs drove to designated meeting places where CAs picked up PAs in PrimeSource vehicles.46 Once together, Plaintiffs rode in PrimeSource vehicles to that day's...
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