Wilson v. Sec'y Dep't of Corr
| Decision Date | 07 July 2021 |
| Docket Number | 3:20cv5848/LAC/EMT |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida |
| Parties | ORTAVIOUS DEVON WILSON, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY DEP'T OF CORR., Respondent. |
Petitioner Ortavious Devon Wilson (Wilson) filed a counseled amended petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (ECF No. 5). Respondent (the State) filed an answer and relevant portions of the state court record (ECF No. 9). Wilson filed a reply (ECF No. 17).
The case was referred to the undersigned for the issuance of all preliminary orders and any recommendations to the district court regarding dispositive matters. See N.D. Fla Loc. R. 72.2(B); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)-(C) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). After careful consideration of the issues presented by the parties, it is the opinion of the undersigned that no evidentiary hearing is required for the disposition of this matter, Rule 8(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. It is further the opinion of the undersigned that the pleadings and attachments before the court show that Wilson is not entitled to habeas relief.
The relevant aspects of the procedural background of this case are established by the state court record (see ECF No. 9). Wilson was charged in the Circuit Court in and for Escambia County, Florida, Case No. 2011-CF-110, with one count of second degree felony murder with a weapon/possession of a firearm (Count 1), one count of robbery with a firearm/possession of a firearm (Count 2), one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, 10-20-Life (Count 3), and one count of possession of a controlled substance (Count 4) (ECF No. 9-1 at 63-64 (amended information)).[1] Counts 3 and 4 were severed for trial (see ECF No. 9-1 at 89-91 ()). On March 28-29, 2012, a jury trial was held on Counts 1 and 2, at the conclusion of which the jury found Wilson guilty of second degree felony murder as charged and robbery with a firearm as charged, with specific findings that Wilson actually possessed a firearm during commission of the robbery (ECF No. 9-4 at 45 through ECF No. 9-6 at 242 (); ECF No. 9-2 at 5 (verdict)). On April 27, 2012, the court adjudicated Wilson guilty of Counts 1 and 2 and sentenced him as a prison releasee reoffender (PRR) to concurrent mandatory terms of natural life in prison, with pre-sentence credit of 156 days (ECF No. 9-2 at 9-31 (transcript of sentencing); ECF No. 9-2 at 40-47 (judgment and sentence)). Wilson filed a notice of appeal (ECF No. 9-2 at 49 (notice of appeal)).
On May 21, 2012, Wilson entered a written agreement with the State that he would enter a no contest plea to Counts 3 and 4, and his sentences on those Counts would run concurrently with any sentence he was then serving (ECF No. 9-2 at 36- 39 (written plea agreement)). According to the circuit court's docket, the court accepted Wilson's plea, adjudicated him guilty of Counts 3 and 4, and sentenced him to concurrent terms of five years in prison on each Count, to run concurrently with the sentence on Count 1 (see ECF No. 9-1 at 10 (circuit court docket)). The judgment and sentence rendered the same day, May 21, 2012 (see id.).
On August 9, 2013, Wilson filed a motion to correct sentencing error, pursuant to Rule 3.800(b)(2) of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure (ECF No. 9-7 at 157- 61). The trial court denied the motion (id. at 162-63).
The parties filed briefs in the Florida First District Court of Appeal (First DCA), Case No. 1D12-2443 (). The First DCA affirmed the judgment per curiam without written opinion on January 23, 2014 (ECF No. 9-8 at 91 (opinion)). Wilson v. State, 130 So.3d 232 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (Table). The mandate issued February 10, 2014 (ECF No. 9-8 at 84 (mandate)). Wilson, through counsel, sought certiorari review of one of his appellate issues in the United States Supreme Court, Case No. 13-1307 (). The Supreme Court denied the petition on June 23, 2014 (ECF No. 9-8 at 112 (opinion)). Wilson v. Florida, 573 U.S. 932 (2014).
On June 16, 2015, Wilson filed a counseled motion for post-conviction relief in the state circuit court, pursuant to Rule 3.850 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure (ECF No. 9-11 at 4-16 (Rule 3.850 motion)). Wilson subsequently filed an amended Rule 3.850 (ECF No. 9-11 at 60-78). The circuit court held an evidentiary hearing on June 12, 2019 (ECF No. 9-11 at 129-98 (transcript of evidentiary hearing)). The circuit court denied the amended Rule 3.850 motion in an order rendered on August 29, 2019 (ECF No. 9-11 at 199-209 (order)). Wilson appealed the decision to the First DCA, Case No. 1D19-3764 (ECF No. 9-14 at 95- 138 (Wilson's initial brief)); ECF No. 9-14 at 140-78 (State's answer brief); ECF No. 9-14 at 180-97 (Wilson's reply brief)). The First DCA affirmed the circuit court's decision on August 7, 2020 (ECF No. 9-14 at 199-204 (opinion)). Wilson v. State, 311 So.3d 964 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020). The mandate issued September 21, 2020 (ECF No. 9-14 at 206 (mandate)).
Wilson filed his federal habeas petition on September 25, 2020 (ECF No. 1).
A federal court “shall not” grant a habeas corpus petition on any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court's decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The United States Supreme Court explained the framework for § 2254 review in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000).[2] Justice O'Connor described the appropriate test:
Under the “contrary to” clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the “unreasonable application” clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.
Id., 529 U.S. at 412-13 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Under the Williams framework, the federal court must first determine the “clearly established Federal law, ” namely, “the governing legal principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court render[ed] its decision.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71-72 (2003). After identifying the governing legal principle, the federal court determines whether the state court's adjudication is contrary to the clearly established Supreme Court case law. The adjudication is “contrary” only if either the reasoning or the result contradicts the relevant Supreme Court cases. See Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) ().
If the “contrary to” clause is not satisfied, the federal court determines whether the state court “unreasonably applied” the governing legal principle set forth in the Supreme Court's cases. The federal court defers to the state court's reasoning unless the state court's application of the legal principle was “objectively unreasonable” in light of the record before the state court. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 409; Holland v. Jackson, 542 U.S. 649, 652 (2004). “[E]ven a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011).
Section 2254(d) also allows habeas relief for a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court where that adjudication “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). The “unreasonable determination of the facts” standard is implicated only to the extent the validity of the state court's ultimate conclusion is premised on unreasonable fact finding. See Gill v. Mecusker, 633 F.3d 1272, 1292 (11th Cir. 2011). As with the “unreasonable application” clause, the federal court applies an objective test. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003) (). “The question under AEDPA [the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996] is not whether a federal court believes the state court's determination was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable-a substantially higher threshold.” Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007) (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 410). AEDPA also requires federal courts to “presume the correctness of state courts' factual findings unless applicants rebut this presumption with ‘clear and convincing evidence.'” Landrigan, 550 U.S. at 473-74 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)).
The Supreme Court has often emphasized that a state prisoner's burden under § 2254(d) is “difficult to meet, . . . because it was meant to be.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 102. The Court elaborated:
As amended by AEDPA, § 2254(d) stops short of imposing a...
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