Wilson v. Shalala

• Decision Date: 06 January 1994
• Docket Number: No. CY-93-3031-JBH.,CY-93-3031-JBH.
• Parties: Belva WILSON, Plaintiff, v. Donna E. SHALALA, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Washington

841 F. Supp. 1491

Belva WILSON, Plaintiff, v. Donna E. SHALALA, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant.

No. CY-93-3031-JBH.

United States District Court, E.D. Washington, Yakima Division.

January 6, 1994.

Wade E. Gano, Yakima, for plaintiff.

Rolf H. Tangvald, Spokane, for defendant.

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION IN PART, INTER ALIA

McDONALD, District Judge.

Magistrate Judge Hovis filed a report and recommendation (Ct.Rec. 18) on December 20, 1993 with respect to the summary judgment motions filed by plaintiff and defendant. There being no objections to said report and recommendation and the court having reviewed the same, the court ADOPTS the report and recommendation in its entirety and IT IS ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (Ct.Rec. 8) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

2. Defendant's motion for summary judgment (Ct.Rec. 13) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

3. The Secretary's decision is AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.

4. Judgment is entered in favor of plaintiff in accordance with this court's finding that she is entitled to disability benefits from May 29, 1988 through October 31, 1989 and through a "trial work period" from November 1, 1988 through July 1989. Furthermore, that under the reentitlement provision, plaintiff is entitled to receive benefits for the months of August, September and October 1989.

5. The Secretary certify payment of benefits to plaintiff for any amounts withheld for the period from May 29, 1988 through October 31, 1989; or, in the alternative, that the Secretary desist from seeking recovery of an "overpayment" for said months.

6. Judgment is entered in favor of defendant in accordance with this court's finding that plaintiff was engaged in substantial gainful activity as of August 1, 1989.

7. This matter is REMANDED to the Secretary for a determination of whether plaintiff is entitled to a deduction for the purchase of the ergonomic chair in September 1991; and if so, whether said deduction and any other evidence indicates that plaintiff was not engaged in substantial gainful activity for the month of September 1991 (or any months thereafter).

IT IS SO ORDERED. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment accordingly and forward copies of the judgment and this order to counsel.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

HOVIS, United States Magistrate Judge.

JURISDICTION/PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Belva Wilson, plaintiff, applied for Social Security disability insurance benefits ("DIB") on September 19, 1988. On January 14, 1989, the Social Security Administration (SSA) issued a Notice of Award granting plaintiff benefits based on a disability onset date of May 29, 1988. On June 3, 1991, plaintiff was notified that her benefits would be terminated. The SSA concluded that plaintiff had been engaging in substantial gainful activity and that she was no longer disabled. Plaintiff filed a request for reconsideration. In its response to the request, the SSA revised its original determination, finding that the notice of disability cessation was inappropriate. Instead, the SSA reopened the plaintiff's September 19, 1988 application for disability benefits and found that plaintiff was not entitled to any benefits. The SSA based its decision on its finding that plaintiff had returned to substantial gainful activity within twelve months after being awarded benefits. The SSA therefore reversed its prior decision granting benefits.

After timely requesting a hearing, plaintiff, represented by counsel, appeared and testified before Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Raymond B. Little. On September 24, 1992, the ALJ issued a decision denying benefits to plaintiff based on her September 19, 1988 application. The Appeals Council denied a request for review, and thus the ALJ decision became the final decision of the Secretary. The Secretary's decision is appealable to district court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). This matter is heard by the undersigned based on the order of reference signed by the Honorable Alan A. McDonald.

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS

Plaintiff went to work in November 1988 as a secretary/bookkeeper for St. Paul's parish in Yakima, Washington. She has continued to work there, at least through the date of the administrative hearing. In 1989, plaintiff's earnings totaled $13,876.52; in 1990, $14,887.50; and in 1991, $16,500.00. (Tr. 77). Wage records show that plaintiff was paid $1,137.50 for each month of 1989 and for January of 1990. The records further indicate that plaintiff was paid $1,250.00 for the remaining eleven months of 1990 and the first three months of 1991. (Tr. 47-48). Plaintiff alleges that when she was initially hired, she was only able to stay on the job one to three hours a day. Eventually, she was able to stay longer. Her employer reports that plaintiff's wages are subsidized in an amount equal to approximately 50 hours per month. (Tr. 67-68).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

"The Secretary's determination that a claimant is not disabled will be upheld if the findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)...." Delgado v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 570, 572 (9th Cir.1983). Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla, Sorenson v. Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112, 1119 n. 10 (9th Cir.1975), but less than a preponderance. McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 599, 601-602 (9th Cir.1989); Desrosiers v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 846 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir.1988). "It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 1427, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971). "Such inferences and conclusions as the Secretary may reasonably draw from the evidence" will also be upheld. Mark v. Celebrezze, 348 F.2d 289, 293 (9th Cir.1965); Beane v. Richardson, 457 F.2d 758, 759 (9th Cir.1972). On review, the court considers the record as a whole, not just the evidence supporting the decision of the Secretary. Weetman v. Sullivan, 877 F.2d 20 (9th Cir.1989); Thompson v. Schweiker, 665 F.2d 936, 939 (9th Cir.1982).

It is the role of the trier of fact, not this court to resolve conflicts in evidence. Richardson, 402 U.S. at 400, 91 S.Ct. at 1426-27. If evidence supports more than one rational interpretation, the court must uphold the decision of the ALJ. Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 579 (9th Cir.1984).

A decision supported by substantial evidence will still be set aside if the proper legal standards were not applied in weighing the evidence and making the decision. Brawner v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 839 F.2d 432, 433 (9th Cir.1987).

ISSUES

Plaintiff contends that the Secretary erred in a matter of law. Specifically, plaintiff contends:

1. The ALJ erred in not finding the plaintiff entitled to a trial work period from November 1988 through July 1989.

2. The ALJ erred in finding that plaintiff has engaged in substantial gainful activity.

Absent legal error, the underlying issue before the court is whether substantial evidence supports the decision of the Secretary that the plaintiff is not entitled to a trial work period and that she is not disabled.

DISCUSSION

SEQUENTIAL EVALUATION PROCESS

The Social Security Act defines "disability" as the "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The Act also provides that a claimant shall be determined to be under a disability only if his or her impairments are of such severity that the claimant is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering claimant's age, education and work experiences, engage in any other substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).

The Secretary has established a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining whether a person is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. Step one determines if he is engaged in substantial gainful activities. If he is, benefits are denied. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). If he is not, the decision maker proceeds to step two, which determines whether the claimant has a medically severe impairment or combination of impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c).

If the claimant does not have a severe impairment or combination of impairments, the disability claim is denied. If the impairment is severe, the evaluation proceeds to the third step, which compares the claimant's impairment with a number of listed impairments acknowledged by the Secretary to be so severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d); 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. If the impairment meets or equals one of the listed impairments, the claimant is conclusively presumed to be disabled. If the impairment is not one conclusively presumed to be disabling, the evaluation proceeds to the fourth step, which determines whether the impairment prevents the claimant from performing work he has performed in the past. If the claimant is able to perform his previous work, he is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). If the claimant cannot perform this work, the fifth and final step in the process determines whether he is able to perform other work in the national economy in view of his age, education and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f). See: Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 107 S.Ct. 2287, 96 L.Ed.2d 119 (1987).

The initial burden of proof rests upon plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of entitlement to disability benefits. Rhinehart v. Finch, 438 F.2d 920, 921 (9th Cir.1971). The initial burden is met once a claimant establishes that a physical or mental impairment prevents him from engaging in his previous occupation. The burden then shifts to the Secretary to show (1) that the claimant...