Wilson v. Sheldon

Decision Date26 October 2017
Docket NumberNo. 16-3981.,16-3981.
Parties Robert WILSON, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Edward T. SHELDON, Warden, Respondent-Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

ON BRIEF: Matthew M. O'Rourke, MILLER JOHNSON, Grand Rapids, Michigan, for Appellant. Jonathan R. Khouri, OFFICE OF THE OHIO ATTORNEY GENERAL, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellee.

Before: SUTTON, DONALD, and THAPAR, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

BERNICE BOUIE DONALD, Circuit Judge.

Petitioner Robert Wilson appeals the district court's dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. For the reasons that follow, we AFFIRM the district court's denial of habeas relief.

I.
A. Factual Background

Wilson was convicted of murdering Brenda Navarre in 2008 and sentenced to 15 years to life. Navarre, a confidential informant for the Toledo Police Department's ("TPD") Vice Narcotics Unit, was found unresponsive and bleeding from the head on December 1, 1993. A bloody, 110-pound boulder was found near her body. Navarre died several days later. Autopsy results showed that Navarre died of blunt force trauma to the head.

TPD misclassified the offense as a felonious assault, rather than a homicide after Navarre died from her injuries, and as a result destroyed the relevant evidence from the scene once the statute of limitation for felonious assault had expired. The case remained unsolved and was eventually classified as a "cold case."

Over a decade later in 2005, Janet Wilson, Wilson's wife, met with TPD to discuss Wilson's possible involvement in Navarre's murder. Sergeant Lou Vasquez of the TPD was investigating a robbery involving Ms. Wilson's grandson, and after the investigation concluded, Ms. Wilson contacted Sergeant Vasquez to discuss Navarre's murder. Following multiple conversations, Ms. Wilson made a formal statement in August 2006. Subsequently, Detective Bart Beavers, of the TPD's Cold Case Unit, reopened Navarre's case. Detective Beavers spoke with Ms. Wilson seven or eight times about the case. Detective Beavers discovered that Navarre's murder had been misclassified as a felonious assault and never properly categorized as murder after she died from her injuries. As a result of the miscategorization, the evidence found at the scene had been destroyed.

Ms. Wilson testified against Wilson at trial, but owing to Wilson's assertion of spousal privilege, her testimony was limited to acts and communications by Wilson in the presence of a third party. Ms. Wilson's son, Alfonso Davis, also testified, specifically about the night of the murder, during which Wilson made comments about confidential informants. Davis testified that Wilson told him that "snitch bitches die," and "he had to kill the snitch bitch," and finally, that he had "dropped a brick on her head." Sergeant Vasquez and Detective Beavers both testified that Ms. Wilson's statements had been consistent during the investigation and at trial, but neither testified to the specific content of her comments to them.

B. Procedural Background

After a four-day jury trial, Wilson was convicted of murder and sentenced to fifteen years to life. On October 23, 2008, Wilson appealed his conviction to the Ohio Court of Appeals, arguing that the State had violated his due-process rights by failing to retain incriminating physical evidence. The court affirmed his conviction and concluded that the physical evidence, including the bloody boulder, was not "materially exculpatory." State v. Wilson , No. L-08-1380, 2010 WL 2025521, at *6 (Ohio Ct. App. May 21, 2010). Wilson appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court, which declined jurisdiction. State v. Wilson , 126 Ohio St.3d 1598, 935 N.E.2d 45 (Ohio 2010) (table).

On November 18, 2009, while Wilson's appeal was pending, Wilson filed a "motion to vacate or set aside judgment of conviction or sentence" in the trial court. State v. Wilson , No. L-13-1210, 2014 WL 1343694, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 28, 2014). Wilson argued that the state failed to adhere to discovery obligations under Ohio Crim. R. 16(D) which deprived him of a fair trial as a result of the police department's destruction of physical evidence. Id. On April 29, 2011, the trial court denied Wilson's motion for post-conviction relief as untimely. Id.

While Wilson's direct appeal was pending, he also filed an application to re-open his appeal under Ohio Appellate Rule 26(B)(1), in which he argued ineffective assistance of counsel. The Ohio Court of Appeals denied his application, and the Supreme Court of Ohio dismissed his subsequent appeal. Wilson v. Sheldon , No. 3:12-cv-14, 2016 WL 4225571, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 11, 2016).

Wilson filed his habeas petition on January 4, 2012, raising ten grounds for relief. Id. at *2. The Respondent filed a Return of Writ on March 6, 2015. On June 1, 2016, the magistrate judge filed a Report and Recommendation ("R & R"), in which he recommended dismissing three grounds for relief as procedurally defaulted and denying six grounds of relief because the state appellate court "did not unreasonably apply clearly established federal law in rejecting Plaintiff's claims." Id. Wilson filed objections to the R & R on three grounds:

1. Ground One—Violation of Due Process for Improper Bolstering of the Credibility of Witnesses;
2. Ground Two—Petitioner's Due Process rights were violated when he was denied the right to review Mrs. Wilson's grand jury testimony;
3. Ground Four—Mr. Wilson's right to due process was violated when State failed to preserve material evidence.

Id. The district court overruled Wilson's objections, adopted the R & R, and dismissed Wilson's § 2254 petition. The court granted a certificate of appealability on the three issues raised in Wilson's objections. Id. at *10. Wilson now appeals.

II.

In habeas proceedings, we review a district court's legal conclusions "de novo and its findings of fact for clear error." Akins v. Easterling , 648 F.3d 380, 385 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Braxton v. Gansheimer , 561 F.3d 453, 457 (6th Cir. 2009) ). Wilson's petition is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA") because the petition was filed after AEDPA's effective date. See id . (citing Lindh v. Murphy , 521 U.S. 320, 326–27, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997) ).

Under AEDPA, a federal court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus on a claim that has been adjudicated on the merits by a state court unless the state court's adjudication of that claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Under the first prong of § 2254(d), a state court decision is contrary to clearly established federal law if the state court "arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme Court] on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme Court] has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Williams v. Taylor , 529 U.S. 362, 413, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). "Under the ‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme Court's] decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Id .

Importantly, "a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly." Renico v. Lett , 559 U.S. 766, 773, 130 S.Ct. 1855, 176 L.Ed.2d 678 (2010) (quoting Williams , 529 U.S. at 411, 120 S.Ct. 1495 ). "Rather, that application must be ‘objectively unreasonable.’ " Id . (citations omitted). "A state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state court's decision." Harrington v. Richter , 562 U.S. 86, 101, 131 S.Ct. 770, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011) (citations omitted). "AEDPA thus imposes a ‘highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings,’ and ‘demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.’ " Lett , 559 U.S. at 773, 130 S.Ct. 1855 (internal citations omitted).

A. Admission of Prior Consistent Statements

Wilson argues that the statements from Sergeant Vasquez and Detective Beavers regarding Ms. Wilson's prior consistent statements were improperly admitted because they were hearsay statements which were made after Ms. Wilson's motive to lie arose, which thereby denied Wilson due process of law. Respondent argues that admission constituted a state evidentiary ruling that does not warrant habeas relief.

With regard to evidentiary rulings, the standard for habeas relief is not easily met. "[F]ederal habeas courts review state court evidentiary decisions only for consistency with due process." Coleman v. Mitchell , 268 F.3d 417, 439 (6th Cir. 2001). "A state court evidentiary ruling will be reviewed by a federal habeas court only if it were so fundamentally unfair as to violate the petitioner's due process rights." Coleman v. Mitchell , 244 F.3d 533, 542 (6th Cir. 2001). Moreover, such rulings "are usually not to be questioned in a federal habeas corpus proceeding." Seymour v. Walker , 224 F.3d 542, 552 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting Cooper v. Sowders , 837 F.2d 284, 286 (6th Cir.1988) ). Even if errors are made in the application of state law, "[such] errors ... especially with regard to the admissibility of evidence, are usually not cognizable in federal habeas corpus." Walker v. Engle , 703 F.2d 959, 962 (6th Cir.), cert. denied , 464 U.S. 962, 104 S.Ct. 396, 78 L.Ed.2d 338 (1983). If a ruling is especially egregious and "results in a...

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